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Introduction 
“Java” 
 
In June of 1916 G.G. Stroebe, hydraulic engineer of the Bureau of Public Works in Manila, 
traveled to the island of Java in the Dutch East Indies on a short trip. Upon his return to the 
American colony he submitted a ten-page trip report to the Bureau’s Quarterly Bulletin in 
which he presented its readers with his impressions of the island. He covered topics such as 
the broadening of education by the Dutch colonial authorities to a small but growing share of 
the indigenous population and more technical matters such as the construction methods used 
for the new deepwater port at Soerabaia. But he was most impressed by the vistas afforded 
him when he traveled through the countryside, and he supposed that many would agree with 
him: travelers, he thought, could not help but be amazed by the intensive tilling of the soil and 
the wide variety of cultures grown—ranging from sugar, tobacco, and rice, to hemp, kapok, 
and rubber. In fact, the exemplary state of agricultural activity on Java was what drove him to 
submit his article to the Bulletin. As he put it, the island’s “object lessons, especially in 
agriculture and irrigation, […] for the traveler are so evident and numerous that a recital of 
some of the impressions created by the journey may be of benefit to readers residing in other 
tropical lands.”1
 The fruits of Java’s garden were not always as bountiful as Scidmore or Stroebe 
perceived them to be. The Demak regency, located in central Java, had been struck by deadly 
famines several times. Between 1848 and 1850 four successive crop failures had reduced the 
population by almost a third,
 He approvingly cited the title used by the celebrated contributor to the 
National Geographic Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore for her 1897 travelogue Java: Garden of the 
East, finding it an apt description for the source of the island’s wealth. 
2 and another severe famine afflicted the area in 1872. But even 
as recently as 1902 – in the period that separated the accounts of the American geographer 
and the engineer – the inhabitants of Demak faced the specter of hunger.3
                                                          
1 G.G. Stroebe, “Impressions from a trip to Java,” Quarterly Bulletin of the Bureau of Public Works 5, no. 3 
(October 1st 1916): 2-12, 2. 
 Somehow Stroebe 
was blind to this event which was so grave that it had shaken the Dutch administration of the 
colony to its core and led to feverish debates on how to prevent future subsistence crises in the 
2 C. Fasseur, The politics of colonial exploitation: Java, the Dutch, and the Cultivation System, trans. R.E. Elson 
(Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992), 113. 
3 Wim Ravesteijn, "Irrigatie en koloniale staat op Java: de gevolgen van de hongersnoden in Demak," in 
Jaarboek ecologische geschiedenis (Gent: Academia Press, 1999). 
2 
 
 
 
area.4 It is ironic that the words used by Scidmore in the preface to her book on Java to 
describe the magic of Java can also be read as a warning against its rosy portrayals: “Myths 
and legends and fairy tales grow with tropic rankness in those far ends of earth even to-day, 
and gravitate inevitably to the stranger’s ear.”5
 Why was Stroebe unaware of the hardship endured by Java’s “gardeners”? Throughout 
his article he displayed a familiarity with the climate of the colony, knowledge of the long 
history of the Dutch presence in the archipelago which dated back to the East India Trade, and 
a keen insight into the workings of Dutch colonial rule. His use of economic data, gleaned 
from budget reports compiled by the bureau of public works in “Netherlands India”, reveal 
him to have been a diligent inquirer, so that that he can hardly be accused of a lack of interest 
for the subject matter. Nor was he entirely uncritical; in his remarks on the school system he 
rendered harsh judgment on the lack of attention given to athletics in the Dutch schools, and 
the sanitation system struck him as underdeveloped in comparison to the works in the 
Philippines.
 
6
 Stroebe’s depiction of Java as a garden of plenty despite the evidence that the reality 
of the island could not live up to this image can be better understood when several other 
factors are taken into consideration. First, regarding his impression that the “garden” was well 
kept: due to his occupation as a hydraulic engineer, the extensive irrigation works erected by 
the Dutch colonial authorities would naturally have caught Stroebe’s eye. Furthermore, 
judging from his report it appears that the Dutch gladly catered to the American visitor’s 
interests by taking him on a tour to several important irrigation works.
  
7 The Dutch on Java 
had every reason to protect the carefully nourished image of the island’s agricultural wealth, 
as they presented it as the product of their engineering achievements and as evidence for the 
success of their rule. The influence of the Dutch reached beyond Stroebe too: R.A. van 
Sandick, who had been a hydraulic engineer in the Dutch East Indies between 1879 and 1884 
before returning to the Netherlands, is thanked in the preface to Scidmore’s 1897 book as 
having provided her with valuable stories on the past and history of Java—the “myths and 
legends and fairy tales” mentioned before.8
                                                          
4 Wim Ravesteijn, "Irrigation development in colonial Java: the history of the Solo Valley works from a 
technological regime perspective," International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management 2, no. 4 
(2002): 361-386. 
 
5 Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore, Java: The Garden of the East (New York: The Century Co., 1897), ix. 
6 Stroebe, “Impressions from a trip to Java,” 5, 8. 
7 Ibid., 9. 
8 Scidmore, Java: The Garden of the East, xviii. 
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But there is reason to believe Stroebe was not an unwitting purveyor of this positive 
image of Java. He had an agenda of his own, as did his employers and the editors of the 
Quarterly Bulletin. What they all shared was a growing interest in the application of irrigation 
technology in the Philippines, an interest that had been developing over the course of several 
years. A departing director of the Bureau of Public Works (BPW) in Manila had visited 
several colonial holdings, including Java, in 1909 to compile reports on the irrigation 
techniques used there,9 and in 1912 the newly instituted Irrigation Council met for the first 
time to discuss the creation of new legal frameworks to improve water management in the 
Philippines.10 After the spectacular failure of the BPW’s first large irrigation project in 191111 
the Bureau’s irrigation division was completely reorganized in mid-1912 by W.L. Gorton, an 
experienced irrigation engineer and a recent arrival to the archipelago,12 under whose 
direction a new project of significant cost immediately commenced.13
This new dynamism also found its way into the pages of the Quarterly Bulletin. In an 
article appearing in 1913 under the title “Why irrigate?” the author argued that sufficient 
funds should be made available for the implementation of an ambitious irrigation policy, so 
that the Philippine islands would be able to produce enough food locally to meet demand and 
make imports unnecessary. Again, the Javanese example was cited: with a smaller areal and a 
larger population it was portrayed as self-sufficient
  
14—and again, this was contrary to the 
actual situation: Javanese agriculture had in recent years been unable to meet the growing 
food demands of the population and was forced to resort to imports.15 Acting director of the 
BPW C.E. Gordon opined in the opening editorial of an issue that appeared exactly a year 
before Stroebe’s trip report that of all the public works operations in the Philippine islands, 
“perhaps the most backward are those appertaining to irrigation development.”16
                                                          
9 United States. Philippine Commission and U.S.P. Commission, Report of the Philippine Commission to the 
Secretary of War, 1909 (Government Printing Office, 1909), 141. 
 He attributed 
this in part to a lack of long-term planning, pointing to the practices on Java where Dutch 
10 United States. Philippine Commission and U.S.P. Commission, Report of the Philippine Commission to the 
Secretary of War, 1913 (Government Printing Office, 1913), 212. 
11 Warwick Greene, "Annual Report of the Director of Public Works, 1911," (Manila: Bureau of Public Works, 
1912), 35. 
12 United States Philippine Commission, Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1912 
(Government Printing Office, 1913), 148. 
13 The estimated expenditure for the project was 800,000 pesos, a significant sum considering the Bureau’s 
annual budget of 10 million pesos. Greene, "Annual Report of the Director of Public Works, 1911," 12, 40. 
14 A.H. Sjovall, “Why irrigate?” Bureau of Public Works Quarterly Bulletin 2, no. 1 (April 1st 1913): 45-48, 48. 
15 D.H. Burger, Sociologisch-economische geschiedenis van Indonesia (Landbouwhogeschool, Afd. Agrarische 
Geschiedenis, 1975), 41-45; J.J.P. De Jong, De waaier van het fortuin: van handelscompagnie tot koloniaal 
imperium : de Nederlanders in Azië en de Indonesische archipel, 1595-1950 (Sdu, 1998), 425. 
16 C.E. Gordon, “Irrigation,” Quarterly Bulletin of the Bureau of Public Works 4, no. 3 (October 1st 1915): 2-3, 
2. 
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engineers collected hydraulic data for a minimum of five years before committing resources 
to the construction of irrigation works. The Philippines could only reap the rewards that 
irrigation promised to provide if the engineers of the BPW were equipped with the resources 
to adopt such a long term vision for the American colony.  
In the imagination of the American engineers working in the Philippines the irrigation 
practices on Java were therefore an example clearly worth following, even as their 
perceptions of the island sometimes conflicted with reality. “Java” became a rhetorical trope 
as much as a practical example. The question thus becomes to whom the rhetoric of these 
engineers was directed. Helpfully, the Quarterly Bulletin reiterated its fourfold mission on the 
top of the first page of every issue: “(1) To show each engineer and employee the work of the 
provincial division as a unit, (2) To show him that his work is a unit part of the whole, (3) To 
make the work of the Bureau of personal interest to him, (4) To make clear to every 
provincial and municipal official, and to the people, the work being done by the Bureau.”17
                                                          
17 Bureau of Public Works Quarterly Bulletin 1, no. 1 (April 1st 1912): 1. 
 In 
other words, the publication was a media conduit for the Bureau and its members that was 
used to improve unit cohesion while simultaneously propagandizing the achievements and the 
ambitions of the colonial engineers to a wider audience. Both the propaganda and the 
ambitions of the colonial engineers in Philippines and the Netherlands Indies will be at the 
heart of this investigation. 
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Rhetoric, ambition, technocracy 
 
As outlined above, the Quarterly Bulletin served as a valuable platform for engineers in the 
Philippines to express their ideas, and allowed them to insert themselves into the political 
debate on colonial policy—in this specific case the debate on improved irrigation works. But 
the ambitions of the engineers went well beyond the mere shaping of specific colonial 
policies. Owing to their technical training, engineers believed themselves to be the wielders of 
an esoteric knowledge: they possessed a deeper understanding of the role that the rapid 
progress of technology had come to play in the shaping of society. Engineers used this 
knowledge to claim that they held the keys to social progress: as industrializing societies were 
confounded by the challenges of modernity, many engineers would confidently assert that 
under their direction the world could be led to a triumph of rationality and progress.  
In the colonies, where indigenous societies were perceived by the Western imperialist 
powers as “backwards” and “primitive” and technology as absent, the judicious application of 
the engineers’ esoteric knowledge appeared to hold even more promise. As the story of “Java” 
shows, engineers believed that the mass construction of technological artifacts under their 
direction could vastly improve the lives of indigenous peoples and change society along with 
it. Engineers exerted such great influence in the colonial administration of the Netherlands 
Indies in the early twentieth century that the sociologist J.A.A. van Doorn has asked whether 
their control over policy-making constituted a form of technocracy: a society where absolute 
confidence is vested in the possibilities that technology create and where the possession of 
specialist expertise is the defining measure for the legitimacy of an individual’s policy 
proposals.18
Crucial to Van Doorn’s vision is his belief that the engineer had emerged from a new 
era in technological development. No longer a tinkerer using the tools of day-to-day life, the 
engineer had become a man of science who reasoned in the abstract. The products of their 
 Such a technocratic society would be guided by engineers who applied 
technological solutions to problems, as opposed to the legalistic methods of the existing ruling 
caste of lawyers, whose administration – in the eyes of the engineers – had brought progress 
only at a glacial pace. 
                                                          
18 J.A.A. Van Doorn, De laatste eeuw van Indië: ontwikkeling en ondergang van een koloniaal project 
(Amsterdam: B. Bakker, 1994), 157. He first presented his ideas at the Anglo-Dutch Conference on Comparative 
Colonial History held in Leiden on September 23-25, 1981. J.A.A. Van Doorn, The engineers and the colonial 
system: technocratic tendencies in the Dutch East Indies (Rotterdam: Comparative Asian Studies Program, 
1982). 
6 
 
 
 
creativity stood in a new mental “domain.”19 In the context of the Netherlands East Indies this 
status of the engineer as a “technologist” could be contrasted with the more down to earth 
attitudes of his colleagues at the Department of Agriculture who mingled with the local 
population to disseminate new methods for agricultural production.20 Suzanne Moon has 
pushed back against the distinctions drawn by Van Doorn, arguing that technology – even 
when it became ever more complex and unintelligible for those not inducted into the ranks of 
engineers – cannot simply be extricated from the larger social context it originated from. In 
her study of the operation of the Indies’ Department of Agriculture she downplayed the 
political power of the irrigation engineers in the Dutch colony, and revealed that the progress 
made by the Department of Agriculture in the Indies’ farm sector was also “technological” 
progress in every sense of the word.21 She concluded that this increasing reliance on 
technology for development was not an indicator of technocracy because the Dutch political 
debates on what direction development should take in the colony had not died down, nor had 
policy-making fully come under the control of privileged experts. Instead these experts were 
embedded within the bureaucracy of an expanding colonial state apparatus.22
The growing arsenal of powerful technologies that the colonial state had at its disposal 
eased its efforts to reshape the environment, economy, and society of the colony. But the 
technological asymmetry between the colonizer and the colonized also formed the bedrock of 
Dutch belief that their rule over the subordinated peoples in the archipelago was legitimate. In 
the nineteenth century Dutch society had been drastically reshaped by technologies such as 
steam engines, the telegraph, sanitation, and railways. These technological achievements, 
which were considered the products of a superior Western rationality and scientific mindset, 
became the hallmarks of “civilization”—and the absence of the former implied an absence of 
the latter. But this sense of superiority did not breed complacency—it became a call to action: 
it gave birth to the “civilizing mission.” This ideology mandated that those who were in 
possession of “science” and “rationality” venture out into the world and use them to spread 
“civilization” to all corners of the globe. The Netherlands were far from alone in developing 
such an ideology. In France and in Britain colonial expansion was supported with reference to 
their respective mission civilisatrice and “White man’s burden”, in the words of Kipling. 
 
                                                          
19 Van Doorn, De laatste eeuw van Indië, 123. 
20 Ibid., 148. 
21 S. Moon, Technology and ethical idealism: a history of development in the Netherlands East Indies (Leiden: 
CNWS Publications, 2007), 6. 
22 Ibid., 23. 
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The civilizing mission was first comprehensively studied by Michael Adas, who traced 
its origins to the activities of earlier Christian missionaries. In the course of the nineteenth 
century many of the evangelizers came to discern a clear link between Christianity and the 
production of superior technology; spreading the gospel in their eyes therefore did not only 
offer salvation to heathens, but also instilled them with values such as rationality that would 
allow them to practice science. At a later stage Christianity was decoupled from technology, 
and the gift of science was enough to inspire missionary zeal in the Europeans. Against 
previous historiography, which had often portrayed the civilizing mission as opportunistic and 
self-serving rhetoric used by the colonizers to veil their naked lust for wealth, power and 
domination, Adas showed that the mission was rooted in Europeans’ “radically new way of 
looking at the world and organizing human societies.”23 To advance a society – to create 
“civilization” – scientific norms had to be disseminated to its members. The supporters of the 
civilizing mission regarded it as the destiny of the Europeans to disseminate those norms, and 
imperialism was a means to that end.24
The civilizing mission was also a familiar ideology for the American engineers 
populating the pages of the Quarterly Bulletin. In words reminiscent of Van Doorn, who had 
described the Dutch East Indies as a “colonial project” geared towards the reshaping of 
indigenous society,
 
25 Adas suggested that the period of American rule in the Philippines “can 
best be understood as a vast engineering project.”26 Engineers were as prevalent in the 
administration of this American archipelago as they were in the neighboring island chain 
under Dutch rule. In the Philippines they contributed more to the shaping of the civilizing 
mission than any other bureaucratic caste, and their strategies for the uplift of the Filipino 
population were welcomed by governors who admired their scientific calculus and 
technology-driven optimism.27 In many ways, the image of the engineer was the polar 
opposite of the reigning perception of the Filipinos: the rationality, empiricism, expertise and 
boundless ambition of the technological expert stood opposite the backwards, superstitious, 
and static attitudes of the indigenous population.28
This study contends that American colonial engineers in the Philippines, and their 
Dutch colleagues in the Netherlands East Indies, carefully nourished such an image of 
 
                                                          
23 Michael Adas, Machines as the measure of men: science, technology, and ideologies of Western dominance 
(Cornell University Press, 1990), 209. 
24 Ibid., 210. 
25 Van Doorn, De laatste eeuw van Indië, 83. 
26 Michael Adas, Dominance by design: technological imperatives and America's civilizing mission (Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 144. 
27 Adas, Dominance by design, 146. 
28 Ibid., 155. 
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themselves as both the arbiters of what policies constituted the civilizing mission and as the 
paragons of the rational and scientific norms that the mission hoped to instill in the colonized 
subjects. Owing to their scientific training and technological acumen, many of them thought 
of themselves as the ultimate authorities within the bureaucracy on how to efficiently organize 
the colonial administration. Focusing on the period between 1900 and 1920, I want to show 
that their efforts to control the content of the civilizing mission and their attempts to become a 
powerful professional class in the political structure of the colony are best understood when 
seen through the lens of their technocratic aspirations. 
The technocracy concept holds merit despite the reservations expressed by Suzanne 
Moon. Although she correctly noted that the engineers failed to achieve political dominance 
and erect their hoped-for technocratic social regimen in the colonies, her focus on the 
outcomes of the high-level political debates renders the activism of the engineers largely 
invisible. When the perspective is focused on the grassroots campaigns and strategies of the 
aspiring technocrats amongst the engineers, however, it becomes possible to distinguish a 
period in which the eventual success of those efforts appeared to them as a very real 
possibility. The colonial society they envisaged will be reconstructed in these pages by 
turning to the publications and a variety of other media and PR outlets used by the colonial 
engineers.  
Central to my argument is the insight that the colonial states in the Philippines and the 
Netherlands East Indies were not monolithic entities, but consisted of various pressure groups 
that pursued their own agendas.29
The understanding of these discourses used here owes much to the methodology used 
by Gail Bederman in her study of the functioning of “civilization” discourse in the United 
 Each of these groups attempted to gain support for their 
position through the production of discourses that explained and legitimated their demands. 
The engineers were no different. Their discursive productions exuded a determined 
confidence in their own capabilities and were used to convince their audience that engineers 
were deserving of a privileged (or even controlling) position in the colonial state. This led 
them into coalitions and conflicts with a variety of other actors, such as commercial entities, 
the metropole, and the established members of the bureaucracy. The pluralism of the practical 
realities of American and Dutch empire will be on full display throughout the analysis of 
these discourses. 
                                                          
29 F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in Tensions of 
empire: colonial cultures in a bourgeois world, ed. F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler (University of California Press, 
1997), 1-56. 
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States between the last decade of the nineteenth century and the entry into the First World 
War. Her reading of the discourse concept allowed for the ideas and practices contained 
within it to be “multiple, inconsistent, and contradictory.”30
The reason that engineers could entertain the notion that they might become the 
predominant administrative grouping within the Philippine and Dutch East Indies colonial 
societies was their sudden emergence as an influential profession in the economies and 
societies of the Netherlands and the United States. As their numbers increased, and as the 
results of their reshaping of the public space in these countries became ever more readily 
visible, engineers sought a social status commensurate to their perceived importance to 
industrial society. They presented themselves as the ideal of the new middle-class: educated, 
rational, and progressive. It can be adduced from the adoption of their rhetoric into the 
common parlance of broader society that the self-representations of the engineers as experts 
deserving of greater political power were persuasive. But the engineering profession’s claim 
to authority ran counter to the democratic reforms in the Netherlands and the United States 
that broadened the political base, and that made votes rather than expertise the paramount 
factor in the political arena.
 This methodology acknowledged 
that discourses could be adapted by their users to fit different situations, making the 
historians’ efforts to reconcile these divergent applications futile. The discursive productions 
used by the colonial engineers were as plural as the imperial reality they lived in. The focus 
will therefore be on identifying the keywords within those discourses – as has been done with 
the example of “Java” above – to establish the common vocabulary that the civilizing mission 
discourse of the engineers was built upon. 
31
The emergence of engineering as a profession took place almost contemporaneously in 
the Netherlands and the United States. There are also other reasons why the colonial practices 
of the engineers in the Philippines and Dutch East Indies invite a comparison. First, the 
imperialism of both the Netherlands and the United States underwent a paradigm shift as new 
civilizing missions were developed in either country at the turn of the nineteenth century. In 
the United States the closing of the frontier in the late nineteenth century had ended its phase 
 No such tension existed in the colonial space, where democracy 
was absent. It was on the back of the experiences gained in the metropolitan campaign for 
greater political clout and authority that the engineers could cherish the hope that a colonial 
technocracy might be easier to implement. 
                                                          
30 G. Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-
1917 (University of Chicago Press, 1996), 24. 
31 Haber, Efficiency and uplift, 105. 
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of continental expansion. Imperialism went overseas when it followed the growing reach of 
American commercial enterprises, but it was also buoyed by discourses that sought to 
preserve the frontier mentality that stretched back to the first American settlers and was 
supposedly crucial for the health of the nation.32 In the Netherlands, the articulation of the 
Ethische Politiek or Ethical Policy in the years shortly before and after the close of the 
nineteenth century changed the objective of the colonial project in the East Indies colony from 
exploitation to development. The last restive regions were pacified shortly thereafter, and as 
the authority of the Dutch deepened and widened in the archipelago the commercial 
investments in the colonial economy took off. This boom attracted many immigrants from the 
Netherlands, but their reasons for heading East were more than merely pecuniary. Life in 
colony was thought to be adventurous, exciting, and full of opportunities. The colony came to 
play a similar role in the Dutch national imagination as the frontier did in the United States.33
In the Netherlands East Indies, as in the Philippines, engineers were part of this influx 
of colonial adventurers. Adventure, however, also entailed the presence of danger—and 
representations of the conditions on the islands showed the colony to be full of it. The threats 
the colonizers expected to face did not only stem from the unfamiliar surroundings and 
tropical disease. They also saw danger lurking in the indigenous populace. The discovery of 
the germ theory of disease had only very recently made the vectors that spread illness fully 
understood. But the theory was also appropriated by a new pseudo-scientific discourse of  
“contamination” in the West that argued that the Western colonizers faced the threat of social 
and cultural corruption in the colonies: the supposed moral vacuum of the indigenous colonial 
societies was a menace to the “civilized” outsiders. This discourse was particularly strong in 
the United States, where a latent fear of degeneracy had a long history in society. These fears 
fed both the American imperialist and anti-imperialist lobby: the former felt that the civilizing 
mission demanded that American men confront this challenge and fill the moral vacuum to 
hone their martial prowess and assert their virility and racial power; many of the latter feared 
that colonialism would corrupt America’s young men and threaten the future health of the 
nation by degrading the race.
 
34
What is immediately clear from this logic is that the threats posed by the colony were 
deeply gendered and racialized in the American discourse. Dutch literary works set in the 
 
                                                          
32 W. Lafeber and W.I. Cohen, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The American search for 
opportunity, 1865-1913 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 159; Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, 184. 
33 De Jong, De waaier van het fortuin, 354. 
34 K.L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and 
Philippine-American Wars (Yale University Press, 2000), 134, 181. 
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Netherlands East Indies, such as Louis Couperus’ novel De Stille Kracht, reveal that a similar 
preoccupation with physical and mental contamination was also prevalent in the Netherlands 
at the time.35 Various studies have analyzed how the understanding of the categories of race 
and gender shaped Dutch and American imperialism and colonial rule.36 However, no full 
studies exist on the importance of gender and race for the process of self-fashioning of the 
colonial engineers37—despite the fact that Ruth Oldenziel has convincingly shown that these 
aspects of the engineers were absolutely pivotal for their efforts to increase their social status 
in the United States.38
Next to the similarities between the Netherlands and the United States already 
mentioned – the contemporaneous emergence of the engineering profession, receptivity of the 
general population to their rhetoric, new civilizing missions, and a shared fear of 
contamination and degeneracy – further similarities can be discerned, this time with regard to 
their neighboring colonies in Southeast Asia. Some of these similarities are geographical. 
Both are expansive archipelagoes located along the “Pacific ring of fire”, and are home to 
many active volcanoes. The island chains are each comprised of many thousands of links, but 
in either colony the majority of the population was concentrated on a single large island; for 
the Netherlands East Indies on Java, and in the Philippines on Luzon.
 Additionally, as has been mentioned before, the exclusively male 
engineers were the ultimate representatives of western rationality. This meant that in the eyes 
of the imperialists they would likely have been the foot soldiers of progress assailing the 
vestiges of a backwards and depraved tropical society, and in the eyes of the anti-imperialists 
they would have been the cannon fodder wasted on improving a cesspool. This study aims to 
fill the historiographical lacunae by revealing how the activities and rhetoric of the colonial 
engineers were inflected by their ideas on their gender and race, both through their own 
actions and through those of others. 
39
                                                          
35 L. Couperus, De stille kracht: roman (L.J. Veen, 1900). Also available in English as L. Couperus, The Hidden 
Force; A Story of Modern Java (Forgotten Books, 1921). 
 However, the 
population of the former colony amounted to almost five times the population of the latter: 
about thirty-five million versus some seven million at the close of the nineteenth century. 
36 A.W. Mccoy and F.A. Scarano, Colonial crucible: empire in the making of the modern American state 
(University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); F. Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands 
Indies 1900-1942 (Equinox Publishing (UK), 2008); A.L. Stoler, Carnal knowledge and imperial power: race 
and the intimate in colonial rule (University of California Press, 2002); Hoganson, Fighting for American 
Manhood. 
37 Michael Adas did, however, devoted several pages to the subject. Adas, Dominance by design, 161-165. 
38 R. Oldenziel, Making technology masculine: men, women and modern machines in America, 1870-1945 
(Amsterdam University Press, 1999). 
39 E.H.G. Dobby, Southeast Asia (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1950), 216, 319. 
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Climatological differences between the two colonies, especially with regards to 
rainfall, are also significant. Although elevation and complex wind patterns can create 
microclimates allowing for considerable variation within both archipelagoes, Java has 
generally more pronounced wet and dry seasons, whereas precipitation in the Luzon region is 
generally more evenly spread through the year, although total annual rainfall can be up to 
twice as high as on Java. The Philippines are also often ravaged by typhoons, whereas the 
Netherlands East Indies, located closer to the equator, were spared such havoc.40
In both archipelagoes a combination of rice (often grown in paddy), maize, and 
tropical root crops was the staple food of the local populations, who used similar techniques 
for its cultivation.
 
41 Although their climates differed, both Filipinos and Indonesians42 faced 
similar challenges. Typhoons and bandjirs43
American and Dutch engineers faced these similar destructive climatological 
challenges, and their technical solutions were often very much alike. But their solutions were 
shaped by more than just the practical necessities of each particular problem; they were also 
shaped by certain ideas of what exactly constituted improvement. Both the Dutch and 
American engineers were in the thralls of the idea of “permanence”, and looked with 
admiration at the public works of ancient civilizations that had survived for millennia. They 
saw themselves as the architects of a new great civilization, like Rome—although, 
revealingly, the American focused on the road networks of the Romans while the Dutch were 
mesmerized by their aqueducts. Thus, even the technical solutions of the engineers deserve to 
be read as cultural productions when they were accompanied by such ideological rhetoric. 
These “engineering cultures”
 – flash floods of river systems that afflicted 
many parts of Java – and the lack of industrial building technology made the construction of 
permanent infrastructure impossible for the indigenous population. Bridges and waterworks 
were all erected on a temporary basis, and often destroyed by these violent natural 
phenomena.  
44
                                                          
40 Dobby, Southeast Asia, 227, 321. 
 were not confined to the national borders of the countries 
where the engineers lived and received their technical education. This study will therefore 
also seek to elucidate the shared elements of the Dutch and American colonial engineering 
cultures. 
41 Ibid., 231-233, 325-329. 
42 Although the demonym “Indonesian” is anachronistic here, for the purposes of readability it will be used to 
denote all the indigenous peoples of the Netherlands East Indies.  
43 Although the modern spelling is “banjir”, this paper will use the original terminology used in the pages of the 
American and Dutch publications. Topographical names used in the primary sources will also be retained. 
44 Gary Lee Downey and Juan C. Lucena., "Engineering Cultures," in Science, Technology, and Society, ed. Sal 
Restivo (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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The time period analyzed here commences in 1900, when the United States had quite 
suddenly become a colonial power in Southeast Asia and the Netherlands revamped its 
colonial mission with the launch of its Ethical Policy in 1901. It ends in 1920, when the 
Filipinization of the American colonial bureaucracy had much reduced direct American 
influence on the workings of the Philippine state, and when nationalist politics in the 
Netherlands East Indies led to increasing friction between colonizer and colonized. By 
drawing on the rhetoric used by colonial engineers to articulate their ideas on the civilizing 
mission, their technocratic aspirations, the elements of an international engineering culture 
will be reconstructed. To this end the publications of the engineers will be studied. These 
include several major engineering periodicals, annual reports of public works departments and 
engineering societies, political pamphlets, and the articles by engineers submitted to 
prominent journals outside their fields.45
In the historiography the colonial practices and civilizing mission of the Netherlands 
have been positioned alongside those of France and Britain, its close neighbors in Europe, 
whereas the late nineteenth-century expansion of the United States has often been contrasted 
with a more general “European” imperialism. To date no systematic comparison of the Dutch 
and American policies has been performed. This study is among the first to make a country-
to-country trans-Atlantic comparison. To this end the political culture, economy, and society 
of the two countries will be explored in detail.  
 
This two-part study commences with a historiographical overview of the literature on 
the emergence of the engineering profession and the new imperialism of the Netherlands and 
the United States. The first chapter of this part serves to familiarize the reader with the 
environments from which the colonial engineers originated, and lays the groundwork for the 
reconstruction of the engineers’ vocabulary. The second chapter of this part will present the 
major elements of the Dutch and American discourses on their respective civilizing missions, 
and provides the ideological backdrop to the engineers’ own ideologies of colonial 
development. In the second part of the study the focus will be squarely on the production of 
engineering cultures in the colonial contexts of the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines. It 
will investigate individual lives, moments of crisis, and the cultural production in the pages of 
periodicals and journals, to understand how colonial engineers fashioned themselves, and 
were fashioned, as the Missionaries of Modernity. 
 
                                                          
45 See the Note on Sources on page 179 for more information on the periodicals used throughout this study. 
14 
 
 
 
Part 1: Engineering and civilizing 
1. Engineering: metropolitan origins  
 
The historiography of engineering occupies an unusual position within the larger framework 
of the historiography of science. Although engineering is also embedded within the empirical 
paradigm of the exact sciences, it has the image of being an occupation set firmly within the 
“practical arts”: instead of experimenting in a sterile laboratory environment, the engineer 
works with what he has, striving for the economical use of resources and the efficient 
management of labor and resources. Engineers are usually defined as those actors within the 
division of labor who have been trained in mathematics and natural sciences so that they may 
provide solutions to problems in the material environment that are of a technical nature.46
In both the American and Dutch metropoles the decades between 1890 and 1920 were 
formative years for the engineering profession. As the membership of the occupation 
expanded explosively, issues of political power, social status, economic success and ideology 
came to a head for the engineers. By contextualizing the emergence of the engineering 
profession within the larger social and economic transformation that occurred in both the 
Netherlands and the United States in these years, this overview will also serve to show how 
engineers continually fashioned themselves and were fashioned in a rapidly changing society. 
Their optimistic belief in the in the improvement of society through the application of science 
and technology proved contagious for many within the Dutch and American public and polity. 
The engineer’s jargon was adopted by those who sought to imbue their political programs 
with greater scientific authority, and engineering ideas on “efficiency” and “nut” (“utility”) 
entered into the respective American and Dutch popular lexicon. The United States will be 
surveyed first, followed by the Netherlands. This chapter will conclude by assessing what 
 But, 
simultaneously, the engineer has also proven to be a versatile canvas: the image of the 
occupation was finely attuned to the specific cultural, economic and political environment of 
the various locales its practitioners operated in. The engineer fulfilled an ideological role for 
many political movements, and engineers actively fashioned their image for maximum 
personal gain—they were both the subjects and objects of a process of identity formation.  
                                                          
46 Harry Lintsen, Ingenieurs in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw: een streven naar erkenning van macht (Den 
Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 15. 
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methodological insights from the historiography are particularly useful for understanding the 
Dutch and American engineering communities. 
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1.1. Years of Progressivism: the United States 
 
The early 1900s were not only a pivotal moment for America’s young engineering profession, 
they were also a turning point in American social, economic, and political history. At the 
dawn of the twentieth century the value produced in the manufacturing sector for the first time 
exceeded that of the agricultural sector, heralding the arrival of the United States as an 
industrial nation.47 On the back of the long economic depression of the late nineteenth century 
a wave of consolidation swept business across the country, creating a new type of corporate 
industrialism. Massive business cartels, the so-called trusts, sought after profits not by having 
their products compete effectively, but by cutting costs such as wages. This pitted 
management against the workers and made class conflict an endemic feature of the American 
economy.48 Rapid urbanization turned more than half the population into city-dwellers by the 
second decade of the century as fifteen million immigrants settled in the US.49 Significant 
internal migration also took place, with African-Americans moving north in large numbers to 
escape the racism of the south.50 Gender relations, up until then governed by Victorian moral 
codes, changed as feminists demanded a space for women in the public sphere and industrial 
capitalism pushed men into industrial employment, undercutting their ideal of independence 
and autonomy.51 Finally, the “muckraking press” exposed the extent to which corruption had 
become embedded in the political and economic functioning of the United States.52
The fraying of the political, cultural, and economic order that Americans from every 
walk of life had relied on was a protracted process, but its collapse can be located in the years 
of Progressivism. This amorphous movement gripped the country in the first decade of the 
century, and was defined by a clamor for “reform” that dominated the political discourse 
during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and the elections that first put Howard Taft and 
then Woodrow Wilson in the White House. It quickly faded from view during the First World 
War.
  
53
                                                          
47 John Whiteclay Chambers II, The tyranny of change : America in the progressive era, 1900-1917 (New York: 
Saint Martin’s Press, 1980), 16. 
 This relatively short-lived political phenomenon and its nation-wide appeal has 
presented a challenge for political and social historians who seek to explain its origins, 
widespread success, and sudden decline. 
48 Steven J. Diner, A very different age : Americans of the progressive era (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 28. 
49 Chambers, The tyranny of change, 91. 
50 Diner, A very different age, 131. 
51 Bederman, Manliness & civilization, chapter 2. 
52 Chambers, The tyranny of change, 118. 
53 Ibid., 236.  
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 This challenge also extends to historians working on the history of the engineering, as 
the emergence of that profession did not just coincide with the Progressive political moment 
but also collided and comingled with it. Engineering and Progressivism were in a complicated 
two-way relationship with one another. This has led to the historiography on both topics 
having become closely intertwined. When “the notion that the political and intellectual 
ferment of the Roosevelt and Wilson years cohered into an entity called progressivism,” 
which was “one of the central organizing principles of American history,”54 was called into 
doubt by scholars of political history in the early 1970s, the past of the young occupation also 
came to be seen in a new light. The fracturing of the image of Progressivism as a unified 
political program opened the era up to what Daniel T. Rodgers called a “pluralistic reading”55
 
, 
which painted a picture of a host of newly formed pressure groups in America forming loose 
coalitions with one another to effect change. That reading made visible the previously 
invisible avenues used by actors in these pressure groups to exercise power, and, in 
conjunction with the new fields of critical race theory and gender studies, drew actors into 
focus that had previously been overlooked in the historiography. How this affected the study 
of the engineering profession will be detailed below. 
                                                          
54 Daniel T. Rodgers, “In search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American history 10, no. 4 (December 1982), 
113-132: 113.  
55 Rodgers, “In search of Progressivism,” 114. 
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1.2. Ideology, profession, “efficiency” 
 
George S. Morison, president of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), broached 
the topic of professionalism in his annual address of 1895 to the organization’s members. He 
did this against the backdrop of the engineer’s ambivalent status within the economic system, 
a problem that every member of the occupation had to wrestle with: on the one hand, the 
engineer was an integral part of the American capitalist order and as such loyal to the 
businesses that employed him; on the other hand, engineers were men of science who handled 
of esoteric knowledge and, like scientists, sought the autonomy to use that knowledge as they 
saw fit.56 Morison was one of the first commentators to strike a new balance between loyalty 
and autonomy by giving a definition of the nature of the engineering “profession”, proposing 
a mode of conduct for its members, and arguing for a collective mission—in short, he 
formulated its ideology.57 The ideology had its foundation in “the assumption that their group 
had a unique and vital role to play in social progress.”58
This ideology started from the claim that all technology had been wrought by 
engineers, or “technologists”, who as bearers of this key to the future improvement of 
civilization had a special role to play in society. The cohesion of the engineering profession 
was to be derived from their shared ability to translate scientific knowledge into practical use, 
thus defining engineering as “applied science.” Guided by science, its members would 
conduct themselves as impartial arbiters of social problems, offering solutions that followed 
from clear logic and hence promised the produce best outcomes. However, this appeal to logic 
and science did not imply that the work of engineers would be morally neutral. Engineers 
believed that their supposedly unbiased perspective gave them a superior moral understanding 
of society. Finally, the engineers had an altruistic responsibility towards the public as “priests 
of material development”, as Morison had called the profession’s members.
 This ideology would later become 
indelibly connected to the writings of Thorstein Veblen, but by the time the idiosyncratic 
author had risen to national prominence in the 1910s the ideology had already established 
itself as a powerful intellectual current among American engineers. 
59
The ideology of engineering was formulated at a time when the number of engineers 
and engineering education programs were increasingly rapidly in the United States: the 
  
                                                          
56 Edwin T. Layton, The revolt of the engineers; social responsibility and the American engineering profession 
(Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971),Layton, The revolt of the engineers, 54. 
57 Ibid., 57. 
58 Ibid., 58. 
59 Ibid., 57-60. The quote appears on page 58. 
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student population stood at ten thousand in 1900, a tenfold increase of enrollment a decade 
earlier. The engineers were increasingly aware of their growing social clout, and the self-
congratulatory tone of the ideology must have appealed to many of them. But its dissonance 
with the actual social status of the engineer, which was much more modest, bred resentment 
and became a call to action.60 The engineering societies such as the ASCE, AIEE (the 
American Institute of Electrical Engineers) and ASME (the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers) worked to underpin the engineers’ claims to social responsibility with their efforts 
to make their membership appear more trustworthy, for example by creating constitutions 
governing their organization’s functions and by adopting codes of ethics that their members 
should obey. There were also unsuccessful efforts to merge the existing organizations in 
hopes of unifying the profession.61 These mergers failed because several competing factions 
could be distinguished within the profession at the time: fault lines existed between older, 
established engineers and a much larger younger group seeking entry into the workforce. But 
despite this internal competition within what was supposed to be a united profession, many of 
its members believed that their collective social status could be improved by taking an active 
role in politics.62
It was in the political arena that the interests of the engineers and the Progressives 
coalesced. Progressives wished to re-organize society and politics under the banner of 
“reform.” They were gripped by a “progressive ethos”, which John Chambers in an influential 
reading doubly defined as a combination of “the nineteenth century sense of Protestant 
evangelism with the new methods of science and large-scale organization”,
  
63 and as a 
combination of “moral idealism and pragmatic, piecemeal reform with a sweeping vision of 
democracy and rejuvenated national community.”64
In many ways engineers appeared to fit the role of the experts that would staff these 
new impartial bureaucracies. But Progressives and engineers also collided, because the 
campaign to create a bureaucratic apparatus was inimical to the engineers’ efforts to gain 
 In practice the clarion call of reform 
translated into a campaign to overcome the political corruption that Progressives saw as 
endemic. They sought a through the reorganization of the state apparatus and the creation of a 
bureaucracy that was not beholden to powerful interest groups seeking to capture the political 
system for their own ends.  
                                                          
60 Layton, The revolt of the engineers, 61. 
61 Ibid., 84. 
62 Ibid., 61. 
63 Chambers, The tyranny of change, 112. 
64 Ibid., 232. 
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authority and autonomy for their profession. Edwin Layton has observed that “[engineers] 
regarded their proposals as substitutes for progressive reform, not as supplements to them.”65 
Engineers were threatened by the emerging bureaucracies being put in place by Progressives 
because these would force them into increasingly subordinate roles, diminishing their 
independence, authority, and social status.66
But the relationship between Progressives and the engineers went beyond mere 
collaboration and competition, as they were connected to one another through their shared 
interest in the elimination of waste. This connection is most clearly seen in the use of the 
buzzword “efficiency” by both groups, an idea so popular that it developed into a full-blown 
craze.
  
67 This craze had its origins in the scientific management movement that was 
spearheaded by Frederick W. Taylor. He had gained national prominence by resolving a labor 
conflict at a railroad company in 1910 by promoting the efficiency of its operations. But 
rather than portraying this economical solution merely as an achievement of financial 
management, Taylor turned the so-called Eastern Rate Case into a morality play fit for the 
consumption of the American public: he presented efficiency as a form of moral behavior that 
served the public interest.68 He codified his ideas in his wildly successful 1910 book The 
principles of scientific management, which made the case that engineers were the crucial 
social intermediaries that could resolve the conflicts between capital and labor .69
Progressives were attracted to the moral agenda contained within Taylor’s scientific 
management as they had embarked on a campaign of “conservation” – see Theodore 
Roosevelt’s campaign to preserve the American landscape in national parks – and latched on 
to scientific management’s popular success by adding “efficiency” to their rhetorical 
repertoire.
  
70
                                                          
65 Layton, The revolt of the engineers, 64. 
 For them, efficiency became shorthand for effective political administration run 
by experts that would reestablish the social harmony that had been lost in the wrenching 
economic changes brought on by corporate industrialism. It gave Progressives the tools to 
“uplift” the American working classes into the middle-class morality and to make an end to 
the class struggle that destabilized economy and society. But Taylor and his followers also 
offered something more to Progressives from the privileged and established classes: by 
66 Ibid., 79. 
67 Samuel Haber, Efficiency and uplift; scientific management in the progressive era, 1890-1920 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), x.  
68 Ibid., 54. 
69 Ibid., 24-25.  
70 Haber showed how various influential middle-class reformers of the era such as Louis Brandeis, Herbert Croly 
and Walter Lippman were charmed by Taylor’s “scientific management” and adopted parts of it in their own 
solutions for the social problems that vexed the country. 
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favoring the expert as an authority, scientific management tempered some of the radically 
democratic aspirations of the people. Engineers and Progressives therefore both stood to gain 
from the rhetoric of efficiency. The engineer and engineering were turned into symbolic 
representations and appropriated by various actors and groups in American society in favor of 
reform. The technological rhetoric of the engineers became a reservoir of symbols that 
political movements drew from to support their ideological convictions, making the discourse 
of engineering a common thread “connecting social institutions, cultural process, and political 
practice.”71
By 1915, however, the efficiency craze had run its course, and its power as a rhetorical 
device waned. Samuel Haber has ascribed this to its success, as the tenets of its message as a 
lesson in morality had been absorbed by society and become mainstream.
 It created a language that functioned as a jargon, investing the speaker with power 
and authority. 
72 As the craze that 
had made them the focal point of public interest subsided, other developments also worked to 
undermine American engineers’ campaign to increase their professional power. First, the 
centrifugal forces within the profession frustrated attempts to unify its membership: electrical, 
mining, and mechanical engineers increasingly went their own ways as they looked out for 
their parochial interests; various new societies and professional organizations sprouted from 
the fertile ground of engineering as its sub disciplines evolved and expanded; and the ASCE 
that Morison had belonged to was almost torn apart by the generation gap between its older 
and younger members.73 Second, the benefits that had been expected to accrue from the 
increased application of scientific management, and which should have legitimated the 
authority and autonomy sought by the engineers, often failed to materialize, so that the 
program lost much of its economic foundation.74
Third, simultaneously with the waning of Progressivism during and after World War I, 
engineers increasingly resigned themselves to a role as cogs within corporate industrialism, 
rather than fighting to become the designers of the grand machinery that they had aspired to 
be.
  
75
                                                          
71 John M. Jordan, Machine-age ideology: social engineering and American liberalism, 1911-1939 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994),5. 
 The enthusiasm of engineers to go beyond the technical necessities of their occupation 
and also concern themselves with labor control and social engineering often worked to 
support the prerogatives of the emerging system of corporate capitalism—they “consciously 
undertook to structure the labor force and foster the social habits demanded by corporate 
72 Ibid., 118. 
73 Ibid., chapters 4 and 5. 
74 Ibid., 212. 
75 Ibid., 201. 
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capitalism.”76 This was an inversion of what Veblen had envisioned: he had written of a 
“soviet of technicians”,77 an independent and socially respected engineering collective which 
would guide social and economic development with its application of scientific management. 
But engineers proved unable to remodel the economic and social order to their liking and 
instead staked out a domain for themselves within the confines of corporate capitalism.78
However, the social status of the engineers was not only tied up in their role within the 
economic system, even though much of the early historiographical literature on the engineers’ 
campaign of professionalization has given that impression. By focusing squarely on the 
efforts of engineers to remodel their community to make it more closely resemble those 
occupational classes that had been most successful in gaining social status and respectability – 
such as doctors and lawyers who formed powerful medical and legal associations – the path 
towards professionalization appeared as the most important method for analyzing the rise of 
an occupational group. Later research conducted in the vein of what Rodgers had described as 
the “pluralistic reading” noted that the engineers’ campaign to improve their social status was 
partially detrimental to the efforts of other social groups seeking betterment of their 
circumstances. Engineers (and Progressives) made use of the scientific rhetoric of engineering 
to contrast their own image with that of other competing social groups. By emphasizing their 
own supposed scientific rationality, engineers discredited competing social groups by 
portraying them as hysterical, overly emotional, or generally irrational.
 
79 Throughout much of 
the Progressive Era this process of “othering” was directed against African Americans, 
women, and the waves of immigrants that threatened to diminish the economic security, 
cultural authority, and political power of the established middle-class.80
These supposed threats bred anxiety among white, male Americans. Because wage 
labor became increasingly common and unavoidable in the context of industrial capitalism, 
white middle-class American men were being confronted with mounting difficulties as they 
tried to live up to the ideal of independence prescribed by the once-dominant Victorian social 
mores. This led to a shift in the popular ideas of what constituted desirable personal behavior. 
The gentlemanly self-control that Victorians tried to live by was jettisoned in the year leading 
up to and during the Progressive Era and replaced by the “vigorous life” with its emphasis on 
virility, strenuous exercise and even aggression. These were the traits on which America’s 
 
                                                          
76 Jordan, Machine-age ideology, xxiv. 
77 Thorstein Veblen, The engineers and the price system (New York: Cosimo Classics 2006), 91. 
78 Noble, America by design, xxiv.  
79 Jordan, Machine-age ideology, 4. 
80 Diner, A very different age, chapter 5. 
23 
 
 
 
frontier society had supposed been built, and building character through this rough living was 
thought to be a defense against the supposed danger of effeminacy, overcivilization, and 
decadence.81 The closing of the frontier in the late nineteenth century and the increasing 
prevalence of a new set of mental disorders called neurasthenia were thought to be evidence 
for the reality of this danger.82 In the (pseudo) scientific discourses of the day the threat of the 
psychological destabilization of the American was intimately connected to anxieties of race. 
Theodore Roosevelt, the most prominent proponent of vigorous living, made constant 
allusions to an impending racial suicide if American men did not reinvent themselves. His 
Social Darwinist visions of an ongoing “race war” are further evidence of the extent to which 
the new ideals of the vigorous life were directed against an “other”, and how exclusion and 
repression were elements integral to his vision of masculinity.83 Race therefore became part 
of the foundation for the new patriarchal power that was created between 1890 and the entry 
into the First World War.84
In this atmosphere of race and gender anxiety the predominantly white, male engineers 
organized to bar women and African Americans from entry into their profession to prevent 
these underprivileged members of society from diluting the social status of the engineering 
profession. The application of gender studies and critical race theory has drawn into clearer 
focus how deliberate efforts were made by the “in”-group to create a gendered and racialized 
profession that would perpetuate the exclusion of those outsiders. The codes of ethics that 
previous literature had analyzed from the paradigm of professionalization were, when seen in 
this new perspective, part of larger discursive project that was meant to assuage the anxieties 
of engineers who felt that their racial and masculine power were being threatened. Even the 
collective empowerment that historians working within the older “organizational” paradigm 
saw in the formation of the professional societies was in part driven by these anxieties 
according to those applying gender theory: the creation of a “fraternal world” acted as another 
barrier to entry for women who aspired to be engineers, and hence served as another 
safeguard for the status of male engineers.
  
85
The professionalization campaign of the engineers in the United States can therefore 
be better understood within the context of the changing class and gender codes in wider 
American society. Embedding the campaign for status of the engineers in the change from a 
  
                                                          
81 Bederman, Manliness & civilization,79. 
82 T.J.J. Lears, No place of grace: antimodernism and the transformation of American culture, 1880-1920 
(University of Chicago Press, 1994), 38, 56. 
83 Lears, No place of grace, 189-190. 
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Victorian moral order to one of vigorous living as per the ideals that Theodore Roosevelt 
publicly embodied as the archetypical Progressive, allows for otherwise hidden scripts to be 
revealed as informing the opinions and actions of actors from the engineering occupation. 
Thus, even though the engineers ultimately failed to create a profession with a social status on 
a par with the medical and legal community, they still succeeded in creating a shared 
consciousness or esprit de corps despite the failure to effectively organize themselves. This 
sense of an engineering community was the result of both an ideology built on the belief that 
its members possessed esoteric knowledge and superior rational minds – and thus was 
something that one wished to belong to – and of the creation of a gendered and racialized 
space that produced cohesion by excluding “others”: women, immigrants, and non-‘whites’. 
That the drive towards autonomy and greater social status would fail was still unclear 
in the years that the Progressive movement dominated the American political landscape, 
however. The fact that Progressives also took up the language of efficiency and (scientific) 
management as an instrument to establish their authority and make claims to power appeared 
to offer a bright future for the engineers. That future promised administration being carried 
out by experts, although the shape of this system was still unclear—it even lacked a common 
name. For example, the vision of Herbert Croly, co-founder of the influential magazine The 
New Republic and whose calls for Progressive reform were steeped in the language of 
scientific management, has been described as a “plebiscitarian administocracy.”86 Thorstein 
Veblen, who believed engineers would be the perfect candidates for pulling the levers in such 
an administration of experts, had called it a “soviet of technicians.” Not until the early 1930s, 
when the American public’s faith in the ability of politicians to come up with solutions for the 
ongoing economic depression had been shaken and engineers again appeared to have the 
answers did the system become known among the general public under a single name, when 
the Technocracy Movement proposed the management of society by technical experts.87
 
 
Short-lived though the movement was, their concept of “technocracy” has endured. 
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1.3. The Netherlands: de maakbare samenleving88
The take-off into sustained economic growth of the Netherlands lagged behind that of its 
closest neighbors. It took well into the 1880s for the power provided by steam engines to 
exceed that generated by the thousands of windmills that littered the country.
 
89 And yet the 
country did excel in some sectors, particularly in the fields of bridge building and 
hydrological engineering. The growth of the railway network sped up in the late 1850s, 
leading to the construction of large bridges to span the wide delta of rivers running through 
the country. Progressively more impressive feats of construction and design were achieved, 
culminating in successes such as the Moerdijk-bridge across the Hollands Diep: when this 
locally designed and forged railway bridge was opened in 1872, its seven million kilograms of 
iron and steel traversed almost a mile of water, making it the longest bridge on the 
continent.90 The quality of hydrological engineering in the country garnered the Dutch 
engineers acclaim abroad, and many of them went on to work on foreign sites like Eastern 
Europe, Japan, Egypt, and South America.91
Two decades later, the gap between the Netherlands and the United States in terms of 
economic structure and technology had narrowed considerably: the economic structure had 
evolved to such a degree that in the Netherlands, too, large corporations were driving 
innovation in the petrochemical and electrical sectors.
  
92 But even though industrial activity 
“exploded” after 1890, it has been observed that “industry never dominated its economy; 
agriculture, trade, services, and the colonies remained equally important components of a 
strongly diversified economy.”93
The past of the engineering profession in the Netherlands is nevertheless in many ways 
remarkably similar to that of its counterpart in the United States. As will be shown in further 
detail below, among the shared characteristics are the similar male, middle-class backgrounds 
 Despite the rapid economic modernization, differences 
persisted between the economic structure of the small European country with large colonial 
possessions and that of the continent-sized nation of immigrants across the Atlantic.  
                                                          
88 “De maakbare samenleving” translates as “the malleable society”, an idiomatic turn of phrase referring to 
social engineering. 
89 Harry Lintsen, “Een land met stoom,” in Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een 
modern samenleving 1800-1890 6, Harry Lintsen ed., 191-216. (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1995),192. 
90 A.J. Veenendaal, “Spoorwegen,” in Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: de wording van een moderne 
samenleving 1800-1890 2, Harry Lintsen ed., 129-163. (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1993), 148, 157. 
91 Van der Woud, Een nieuwe wereld, 121. 
92 J.W. Schot, H.W. Lintsen and A. Rip, “Betwiste modernisering,” in Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste 
eeuw 1, ed. J.W. Schot, H.W. Lintsen and A. Rip, 17-35. (Zutphen: Walburg Pers,1998), 21. 
93 J.C.H. Blom and E. Lamberts ed., translation James C. Kennedy, History of the Low Countries (New York: 
Berghahn books, 1999), 404. 
26 
 
 
 
of its members; their attempts to improve their social status through professional 
organizations and the adoption of codes of ethics; their interest in improving the social 
conditions in their country, which was coupled to a sense of superiority stemming from their 
supposed monopoly over presumably unbiased scientific inquiry; their participation in new 
political movements that saw a greater role for the state; and, finally, their technocratic 
aspirations. 
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1.4. Delft, and beyond 
 
In the Netherlands the Military Revolution had necessitated the building of fortifications of 
great mathematical complexity to defend against artillery. The designers of these structures 
who built them were absorbed into the ranks of the standing armies.94 American engineers 
would also owe part of their origins to the Army Corps of Engineers, which was founded in 
the eighteenth century.95 The construction of large public works projects such as canals and 
railroads from the early nineteenth century onwards gave birth in both countries to the civilian 
counterpart of the military engineer, the civil engineer. By mid-century, education no longer 
took place merely on the job or at the military academies, but also at specialized institutes of 
learning. The spectacular expansion of engineering education in the US has already been 
noted, but in stark contrast to the American experience – where twenty-one engineering 
colleges had been founded by 1870, and over a hundred by the end of the century – the 
Netherlands had only a single site for the training of civil engineers until 1920: the city of 
Delft, which up to this day remains almost synonymous with technical education. The school 
there went through several incarnations as its student body expanded: first, since 1840, as a 
royal academy; after 1864, in the wake of nation-wide education reforms as a Polytechnische 
School (Polytechnical School) that provided a form of vocational training; and after 1905 as a 
Technische Hogeschool (Technical College) providing degrees on a par with those of the 
universities.96
The recognition of the academic quality of the Delft curriculum came after many years 
of lobbying by engineers who wished to elevate the status of their educational institute. This 
campaign was led by two Dutch professional organizations, the Koninklijk Instituut van 
Ingenieurs (KIvI, the Royal Institute for Engineers) founded in 1847 and the Vereniging van 
Burgerlijke Ingenieurs (VBI, Society for Civil Engineers) founded in 1853, which for most of 
the nineteenth century were the only institutions of their kind. The KIvI was dominated by 
engineers working in the military, the Netherlands Indies, and Rijkswaterstaat, the large state 
bureaucratic apparatus tasked with maintaining the country’s hydrological infrastructure. The 
VBI was exclusively the home of Delft graduates and contained many engineers with a 
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background in railroads and civil engineering. Both had been founded with the implicit 
intention of improving the social status of the engineer.97
There was initially little competition between the two engineering societies, but there 
was also little cooperation. This was due in part to their catering to different audiences, and in 
part due to their different goals: the KIvI portrayed itself as a rigidly scientific organization 
whereas the VBI’s goal was to promote the interests of its members.
 
98 Even when the recently 
founded societies for mechanical (1889) and electrical engineers (1895) merged with the 
steadily shrinking KIvI in 1899, efforts were made not to impinge on the domain of the VBI, 
which had seen its membership grow in recent years. The latter changed its name to 
Vereniging van Delftse Ingenieurs (VDI, Society of Delft Engineers) in 1900 to emphasize its 
role as a protector of the interests of Delft educated engineers. And yet, that was also the same 
year that the VDI reached an agreement with the enlarged KIvI to jointly publish the 
successful weekly De Ingenieur which it had founded in 1886.99 The complicated two-step 
between the societies shows that while there was no clear, single community of engineers in 
the Netherlands, there was also no complete fragmentation. Instead a segmented profession 
containing multiple pressure groups that each had their own occupational cultures existed. 
The members of these groups preferred to deal with colleagues from their own segment, but 
they also extended friendships and collegial relations to the larger professional domain.100
With the closing of the 1800s and the dawning of a new century, a new era also began 
for Dutch engineering. Modernization, though belated compared to other countries, had still 
bred anxieties in Dutch society that were comparable to those of more economically advanced 
countries. Dutch engineers, like their American colleagues, responded by taking an active 
interest in the political process.
  
101
A new generation of liberal politicians who envisioned an active role for the 
government had several engineers in their midst. Two engineers from Delft acted as ministers 
of the department of Waterstaat, Trade and Industry in the three liberal cabinets that governed 
 Unemployment, the abominable conditions the working 
classes lived in, and the adversarial relations of labor and capital were among the pressing 
social problems collectively known as the “social question”, and engineers actively partook in 
the political process that grappled with this conundrum.  
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the country between 1891 and 1901.102 In that capacity they contributed to the spate of social 
legislation that regulated safety in the workplace, improved housing, and created health laws. 
Their liberalism supported government intervention and broke with the laissez-faire tradition 
of the past, and the movement was replete with figures who styled themselves as progressive-
liberals, social-liberals, or (in following of the French examples) radicals.103
More clearly left-wing sentiments ruled in Delft, where many students and recent 
graduates became enamored with socialism during their time there. Conditions for activism 
amongst engineers trained in the city were in many ways propitious. The VDI’s weekly De 
Ingenieur provided Delft engineers an outlet where they could editorialize on the social 
question, something which they did enthusiastically. The students’ “Debating Club”, founded 
in the late nineteenth century, often hosted discussions on the social question, inviting 
speakers from affiliated organizations in other Dutch university towns. It counted among its 
members the later editor of De Ingenieur R.A. van Sandick and the illustrious member of 
parliament and colonial enthusiast H.H. van Kol. The socialist rhetoric voiced there during the 
1890s was sufficiently anti-establishment to be deemed subversive by the state security 
apparatus.
 
104 The Debating Club’s activism gave the city the reputation of “red Delft”, and 
other idealistic organizations of a socialist bent were founded by its members. Like earlier 
graduates from Delft and Dutch engineers who had learned their trade on the shop floor 
instead of the schoolroom (and just as their American counterparts) the new crop of Delft 
engineers believed that the answer to the social question lay in the resolution of the wasteful 
conflicts between capital and labor. The young graduates were more convinced than those 
who went before them that the role of their own profession in providing such a resolution was 
crucial.105
It is likely that the fact that the Delft engineers had all received their training at the 
same institution and belonged to the same student population imbibed them with the belief 
that the profession they were entering into was united to a similar degree. Even though the 
shared experience did provide some foundation for professional cohesion
  
106
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, this belief was 
overly rosy. Aside from differences of political opinion amongst the engineers, new industrial 
techniques and corporate organization came to exert the same centrifugal forces on the 
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engineering community in the Netherlands as it did in the United States.107
But even though the Dutch engineering community was not as cohesive as many 
wished it to be, a strong sense of collegiality existed among the practitioners of the 
occupation. This was not merely a result of having sat in the same college benches but of the 
extra-curricular life of the engineering students too. Turn-of-the-century Dutch engineers 
deemed it vital that engineers develop their social skills in order to adequately respond to the 
challenges of their future work environment. Particularly noteworthy in this training process 
was the role of the Delftsch Studenten Corps (DSC), which until 1897 was the only student 
society in the city and had 80 per cent of the students in its member rolls. The Dutch student 
societies of the “corps” variety resembled the many “Greek” fraternities and sororities in the 
United States in spirit, but exceeded their individual chapters in the number of active 
members, who in the Netherlands numbered in the hundreds, if not thousands. The societies 
were sites were homosocial activities could take place and friendship networks forged. Hazing 
rituals initiated new members into a world with its own social mores, fostered inter-
generational amity, and shaped their masculine identities. Members and alumni believed that 
DSC membership would imbue the students with the social skills necessary for controlling a 
demanding workplace, where social skills and technical acumen would both be tremendously 
valuable.
 No longer the 
follower nation it had been several decades earlier, by 1900 the country had become home to 
well equipped R&D labs, large multinationals, and an empowered interventionist government 
seeking to spur growth with its policies, each of these fields taking engineers in different 
professional directions.  
108
The crisis of modernization created opportunities for new groups to manifest 
themselves in the Dutch political arena, and engineers had every reason to believe that they 
might successfully grasp those opportunities and secure positions of great influence. In the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century, engineers working at the Rijkswaterstaat, the hydrological 
state apparatus mentioned earlier, were invested with such power: they were often able to 
overcome the opposition of other bureaucracies and pushed through design decisions that 
were closest to their own prerogatives. Throughout the twentieth century engineers functioned 
 At the same time the DSC, with its fraternal environment, served as an example 
of the kind of brotherhood of engineers that graduates of Delft hoped to reproduce at a 
professional level—and that they would then leverage to improve their social status and 
political influence. 
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as influential experts for the increasingly interventionist government administration, and in 
that capacity engineers had, at the very least, considerable influence in the policymaking 
process. Sporadic instances of unprecedented autonomous political decision-making by 
engineers took place in response to the wrenching social question: the planned expansions of 
cities to accommodate the growing urban population, and the wholesale design of towns to be 
built on land recently reclaimed from the sea and expansive road networks were outlets of 
their technocratic ambitions. But even an acclaimed architect such as H.P. Berlage could not 
push through his plans in the early decades of the 1900s without having significant 
modifications foisted upon him by city politicians.109
Looking back it is clear that technocratic rule was chimerical in the Netherlands; 
engineers never possessed such a powerful mandate that they could perform their tasks 
autonomously.
  
110 They had to contend with too many other social groups that came to the fore 
simultaneously. In the Netherlands engineers did not rise above the other groups of 
scientifically trained experts who came to believe that their scientific authority also provided 
them a legitimate claim to political power, and therefore had to share a discursive space with 
them. The logical inference made by many academically trained scientists at the time was that 
their scientific research  contributed to the modernization process so that they were the ones 
who could help control it—essentially the same logic of the engineers, but with science taking 
the place of technology in this rationalization.111
Dutch society was susceptible to this scientific rhetoric of the scientists and engineers. 
This can be gleaned from the adoption of the jargon used in those professions by society at 
large. The concept of “normalization”, which had once described the elimination of erratic 
river flows, was picked up as a popular buzzword that came to refer to any effort to make 
what was once chaotic into something “systematic.”
  
112 These concepts combined with the 
Dutch bourgeois ideal of nut (utility) to form a political imperative to systematize and 
normalize not only the environment, but business and society too. The hoped-for result of this 
systemic thinking and normalizing was an improvement of the rentabiliteit or profitability of 
social and economic activity.113
                                                          
109 D. van Lente and J.W. Schot, “Techniek als politiek: ingenieurs en vormgevers van de Nederlandse 
samenleving,” in Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw 7, ed. J.W. Schot, H.W. Lintsen and A. Rip, 197-
231. (Zutphen: Walburg Pers,2003), 200. 
 In other words: “efficiency” had also made its way – via a 
110 Van Lente and J.W. Schot, “Techniek als politiek,” 199. 
111 David Baneke, Synthetisch denken: natuurwetenschappers over hun rol in een moderne maatschappij, 1900-
1940 (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2008), 4. 
112 Van der Woud, Een nieuwe wereld, 12. 
113 Ibid., 109. 
32 
 
 
 
route found locally – into the Dutch vocabulary by 1900, where it proved a potent rhetorical 
tool in the years that followed. 
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1.5. Transatlantic fraternity: inspiration, emulation, and cooperation 
 
In 1900, having just returned from a visit to the United States, the Dutch engineer R.P.J. 
Tutein Nolthenius gave a seminar on his travel experience to an assembled audience of the 
KIvI of which he was a member. As part of his American journey he had visited a renowned 
bridge-builders’ factory, where he was struck by how utterly un-striking it was: the no-frills 
design of the site exuded the concern for efficiency of the American engineers, a trait they 
were known for amongst their European colleagues. To a British or French engineer, for 
whom design meant form as well function, such a blatant disregard for aesthetics was likely to 
have been unpalatable. But for Tutein Nolthenius, the emphasis on utility was familiar, and he 
told his listeners that he could think of no other place where a Dutchman in his profession 
might feel more at home.114
 Reading the various trip reports in the pages of the KIvI’s publication De Ingenieur it 
is obvious that Tutein Nolthenius was hardly the only Dutch engineer who took an interest in 
the achievements of his colleagues across the Atlantic. The editor of the weekly, R.A. van 
Sandick, visited the country in 1904 and delivered a favorable speech on the life of the 
American engineer which he reprinted in the weekly;
 
115 C.F. Stork, a scion of the family that 
founded the Stork mechanical conglomerate, did the same when he visited the country for 
business in the same year.116 H.P. Berlage wrote a glowing report of Manhattan and Frank 
Lloyd Wright’s designs,117 and irrigation engineer P.J. Ott de Vries investigated the 
impressive irrigation works in the western part of the United States.118 But not all reports 
looked as wistfully overseas as these; a Dutch engineer working in the United States told the 
readers of De Ingenieur of the much heavier workload American engineers were accustomed 
to,119 and a consular report warned Dutch engineers who were considering to emigrate to 
America that they might face a dearth of employment opportunities there.120
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But the reservations expressed in the critical articles do not unseat the conclusion that 
Dutch engineers felt that their conception of their profession was in tune with the attitudes of 
the American engineers. Their gravitation to their confreres in the United States was not for 
lack of a broader international orientation on the part of the Dutch professionals: during their 
first year in Delft the students received an education in French, German, and English to allow 
them to keep up with the publications in foreign journals.121
Historians have adopted several perspectives in search of an explanation for the 
creation of occupational communities by the engineers in the Netherlands and in the United 
States—communities that, as the above shows, may even extend across the Atlantic. These 
perspectives view the identity of the engineers as constituted along several axes. The first of 
these is the engineer as a member of a “profession.” Many engineers fostered that hope that 
uniting their occupation into a cohesive group – for example, into something akin to the 
American Medical Association in the United States – was the best method for collectively 
campaigning for greater social status and political influence. Although these efforts were 
ultimately unsuccessful due to a fragmentation of their occupation into different segments, 
engineers in either country still clustered into leading societies that through their respective 
journals and publications contributed to the shaping of the image and identity of the 
engineers. 
 The focus of the Dutch engineers 
on the United States was therefore elective, instead of being the result of a pre-existing 
transatlantic affinity for the country. In short, despite having emerged from the highly specific 
local conditions of the Netherlands, Dutch engineering developed a culture that its members 
felt was uniquely congruent with that of the United States. 
The second axis conceives of the engineers as members of an exclusive “brotherhood.” 
This perspective has been applied most fruitfully to the study of the American engineers—
which is to some extent surprising, since Ruth Oldenziel, the author of the most influential 
work of this kind, is herself Dutch. But the example of the great importance that Dutch 
engineers attached to the membership of the DSC during their years of training at Delft and 
the fraternal bonds that were created there underline that this vantage point is also valuable 
when studying the history of the engineers in the Netherlands. The use of gender and critical 
race studies reveals how engineers fostered a white, masculine identity that they could then 
leverage against other rising social groups and in the process enhance their own social power. 
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The third and final axis along which engineers constituted their identity, and which 
builds upon those of professionalism and gender power, is that of their “rationality.” Drawing 
from the discourse of science, engineers presented themselves in either metropole as objective 
observers who could point a way out of the conflict between capital and labor, and who could 
pass judgment over policy without falling prey to political bias. In the fraught political and 
social climate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, engineers fashioned 
themselves, and were also fashioned by other social forces, as trustworthy characters 
deserving of being invested with authority. It is along these three axes that the engineers will 
be analyzed throughout this study.  
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2. “Civilizing” 
 
American and Dutch imperialism underwent a sea change in the years between 1898 and 
1901. The nineteenth century continental expansion of the United States over land, which has 
been described as the its “first empire”122, neared completion by the 1890s when the country’s 
settlements reached from the Atlantic to the Pacific. By that time the rise of America as a 
major economic power and the comparative decline of Britain’s economic might vis-à-vis 
new European competitors – specifically Germany – had led to a gradual retreat of the British 
from Latin America. It ushered in an era of US hegemony in the Western hemisphere, making 
the Monroe doctrine a practical reality.123 At the close of the 1890s America began its second 
empire when it went overseas: the administration of president William McKinley claimed the 
island possessions of Spain for itself in the Treaty of Paris that concluded the Spanish-
American War of 1898. The US thus assumed control over Guam, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines. This outcome demanded that a new apparatus of colonial control be created by 
the Americans, who had little previous experience with such a mode of governance.124
Something new was afoot in the Netherlands and its Indies colony too. The three 
previous centuries of involvement in the Netherlands Indies had been centered on the 
extraction of primary resources from Java and several spice island in the Moluccas, so that the 
Dutch presence in the peripheral areas of the colony was only slight. But new military tactics 
taken up in the 1890s durably extended the reach of the colonial administration to the outer 
islands of the archipelago for the first time. It is therefore possible to speak of imperialist 
expansion even though this took place within the recognized borders of the colony.
  
125
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at the behest of the welfare of the Indonesian population and shook up its mode of operations 
in the process.126
 The imperialist fervor in the Netherlands and the United States took place in the 
atmosphere of international expansionist agitation of the late nineteenth century. Britain and 
France continued building their vast empires Africa and Asia while new competitors, 
particularly Germany and later also Japan, joined in the scramble for colonies. Economic 
interests and Great Power politics provided some of the motives for the imperialist 
competition. But the colonial ideologies that the Dutch and the Americans articulated and the 
administrations they set up in their expanding territorial holdings were shot through with 
moralistic rhetoric: the civilizing missions. This chapter describes the content of those 
missions and the process through which they were initially articulated. It also describes the 
shape of the colonial administrations of the Philippines and Netherlands Indies. 
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2.1. America’s mission in the Philippines: ‘benevolent assimilation’ 
 
In 1898 the Spanish-American War broke out over the fate of the decaying Spanish Empire’s 
overseas territorial holdings in the Caribbean. Spanish rule in Cuba had already a faced series 
of insurrections in previous decades when it was confronted with an escalating revolution 
from 1895 onwards.127 The upheaval threatened the substantial economic interests of 
American business on the island, while the violent response of the Spanish to the Cuban 
demands for independence was castigated by the American press. President McKinley, who 
had assumed office in 1897, also deplored the Spanish failure to come to terms with the 
Cuban rebellion.128 In January of 1898 the USS Maine was dispatched to the harbor of 
Havana to demonstrate the continued resolve of the United States to protect its interests on the 
island. It sank the next month with great loss of life due to an explosion—and though the 
cause of the blast was unclear, the Spanish were blamed for the sinking by America’s 
sensationalistic “yellow journalism.”129 Spain and the United States had long been on a 
collision course over Cuba, but now the countries were on a path to war. Spain entered into 
negotiations in an effort to avert a military confrontation, but in the meantime the McKinley 
administration commenced preparations for armed conflict. Secretary of the Navy John D. 
Long and his Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt expanded the theatre of this expected 
conflict to include the Philippines, and instructed George Dewey, Admiral of the Asiatic 
squadron, to draw up plans for the taking of Manila.130
Negotiations with Spain broke down in April over the American demand for direct 
involvement in the process of resolving the revolution on Cuba. McKinley signed the 
declaration of war on April 29th, and in a series of crushing naval defeats the Spanish 
squadrons in Santiago and Manila were dispatched to the ocean floor. Although the American 
armies that invaded Cuba faced considerably more resistance, the conflict ended after three 
months in a decisive American victory—leading it to be called a “splendid little war.”
 
131
 In the period between the occupation of Manila by Dewey and the signing of an 
armistice in August of 1898 McKinley decided that at least part of the Philippines would be 
kept under American occupation. His decision to keep a territorial holding in Asia was driven 
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by the expected strategic value of the islands for the United States. The Open Door policy that 
had safeguarded access to the Chinese market was falling apart as the Manchu dynasty 
crumbled under the pressures of European and Japanese imperialist agitation. America was in 
danger of being shut out from China, but McKinley hoped that with part of the Philippines 
serving as a way station for trade and as a forward positioned military base the United States 
could still pry open China’s markets and safeguard the rapidly growing commercial interests 
in the country.132 Gradually, coaxed by the French and British who feared that Germany 
might covet any unclaimed parts of the archipelago, McKinley expanded the American 
territorial claim by October of 1898 to encompass the entirety of the Philippines. Possession 
of the islands was transferred from Spain to the United States in the Treaty of Paris concluded 
in December of that year, in exchange for a 20 million dollar indemnity.133
 The Cuban rebellion, the sinking of the Maine, and the appreciation of the strategic 
value that an outpost in Asia might provide, were the proximate causes for the war with Spain 
and the annexation of the Philippines. These proximate causes were themselves the result of 
the assertive posturing of the United States towards Spain and the interest in territorial 
aggrandizement, which were the expressions of the rise of militaristic and imperialist 
sentiments in American society and its political class. A mixture of growing national 
confidence and concerns over perceived threats to the social order of the United States had in 
recent years given rise to the belief that aggressive outward expansion was the key towards 
preserving America’s institutions and further enhancing the country’s prosperity and standing 
in the world. 
 
 The first discursive space where this mixture was at play was in the sphere of 
economic thought. The very real emergence of the United States in the 1890s as the world’s 
largest and most productive industrial economy allowed it to throw its weight around in 
international politics. At the same time a new paradigm stated that economic development 
was in danger of hitting a plateau, and that the country’s capitalism would wilt and its 
economy be thrown into turmoil unless American producers successfully expanded into 
foreign markets. The collapse of the Open Door policy and the protectionist barriers that the 
European powers threw up around their empires raised the question of whether this goal was 
possible without having imperialism backing the economic expansion—in other words, 
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whether alluring foreign markets like that of China literally had to be conquered to be of use 
to America’s producers. Imperialists answered the question in the affirmative, and McKinley 
showed himself to be of a similar persuasion.134
 Ideas on gender and race formed the second discursive space where confidence and 
concern intermixed. These ideas factored into the thinking of members of the political elite 
such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Albert Beveridge, who went much further in their 
endorsement of American imperialism than McKinley did. They were convinced that 
imperialism was necessary to stabilize the societies of so-called “primitive” peoples who they 
deemed racially inferior and lacking the capacity to govern themselves in an orderly manner. 
Only then could American business prosper in these otherwise hostile conditions. They 
asserted that the United States ought to aggressively pursue such an empire to claim its 
rightful place as a world power and that wars that would have to be fought to demonstrate 
American superiority; this militarism led them and others who clamored for war to be labeled 
“jingoes.”
 
135
The jingoes welcomed warfare as it was instrumental to their strategy of safeguarding 
American masculinity. Combat could once again instill American men with the vigor that the 
jingoes, like so many, feared was ebbing away in the 1890s, and ward off the overcivilization 
that threatened to make the country’s men effeminate and weak.
  
136 It comes as no surprise 
that Theodore Roosevelt, with his professed belief in the necessity of the “vigorous life”, was 
an exemplary member of the jingoes: he resigned as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and led 
his volunteer Cavalry regiment up San Juan Hill during the taking of Cuba. His exploits 
during the Spanish-American War cemented his reputation with the public, and campaigning 
on his heroism in the December elections held in the same year as the war he secured the seat 
of governor of New York.137
 A strong lobby of anti-imperialists in the United States vehemently opposed the likes 
of the jingoes and their imperialist schemes. According to their laissez-faire views, business 
did not need to operate under the protective umbrella of imperialism and the high costs that 
military protection entailed.
  
138
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make the already fraught racial relations in the Republic even more problematic.139 Their 
assumptions on the brutality and primitive state of society in the Philippines were similar to 
those of the imperialists, but their conclusions were different: instead of acting as a moral 
gymnasium where virile men could grow their character, the “antis” warned that colonial 
warfare would breed depravity among the American soldiers and degenerate the quality of 
their race for generations to come and debase the nation in the process.140 More 
fundamentally, they saw the coercive imperialist project in the Philippines as an affront to the 
American constitution and a dangerous departure from the nation’s democratic traditions.141
 The plan for annexation was strongly opposed in the Philippines too. Led by Emilio 
Aguinaldo, Filipinos had rebelled against Spanish rule in the years prior to Dewey’s taking of 
Manila. Aguinaldo’s forces controlled all of the Luzon island with the exception of the port 
city held by Dewey, and in June of 1898 he had proclaimed a Philippine Republic with 
himself as its president. The good relations with the Americans, in whom the Filipinos saw 
supporters for their independence, soured as McKinley became more enamored with the 
seizing of their territory. When the imperialists in Washington moved to annex the Philippines 
following the Treaty of Paris, a costly guerilla war broke out in February of 1899.
 
142 The 
commitment of the US army peaked at more than 70,000 soldiers in 1901, the year Aguinaldo 
was captured, with over 120,000 Americans serving at one time or other during the conflict. 
The war dragged on for two more years when it ended in an American victory, and was 
estimated to have cost the lives of up to 4,000 American soldiers, tens of thousands of 
Filipino combatants, and hundreds of thousands of civilians who died of the famine and 
disease that followed in the wake of the chaotic warfare.143
McKinley had sent out the “Philippine Commission” in January of 1899 to answer the 
question of how the new acquisition ought to be governed. The Secretary of War Elihu Root, 
whom the president had appointed in late 1899 and who was tasked with pacifying the 
archipelago, also contributed to the structuring of the administration. Some of the antis’ 
concerns filtered through into Root and the Commission’s policies that defined the 
relationship between the archipelago and the American metropole. The rights granted by the 
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constitution and American citizenship were not extended to the Filipinos,144 and no colonial 
office was set up in Washington along the lines of the European imperial competitors.145 
Instead, the affairs of the territories gained in the Spanish-American War were administrated 
by the Bureau of Insular Affairs which fell under the aegis of the Department of War.146
Root and the Commission had to create the colonial bureaucracy almost whole-
cloth.
  
147 They looked to the methods of administration used by the Dutch and the British in 
hopes of finding models worth emulating, but found them wanting. The use of local elites as 
intermediaries for colonial rule in India and the Netherlands Indies could not be implemented 
in the Philippines where such a class was absent.148 More importantly, from the moment that 
he decided to annex the archipelago, McKinley had outlined a series of objectives for 
American rule that he intended to be fundamentally different from those of the European 
colonies. He found willing collaborators in Root and the members of the Commission. At the 
heart of their program was the idea that administration of the United States over the 
archipelago was to be temporary and oriented towards improving the welfare of the 
indigenous population. This stood in stark contrast to what they saw as the extractive 
objectives of Anglo-Dutch colonialism. The Americans therefore thought of their benign 
goals in the Philippines as being a testament to the exceptionalism of their nation.149
It can be adduced from the rhetoric of the key players in the American policy-making 
class that they were in agreement on the civilizing mission their nation had to fulfill. 
McKinley had couched his decision to annex the islands in the rhetoric of “guardianship”, 
implying that development rather than domination was his ultimate goal for the territories.
 
150 
Root also sought to establish that the American sovereignty over the Filipinos was geared 
towards preparing them for self-government and spreading civilization to the islands.151
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William Howard Taft, who was asked by McKinley to head the Second Philippine 
Commission and to further implement what the latter had dubbed the policy of “benevolent 
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assimilation,”152 used the Progressive rhetoric of the time to describe the task that the 
Americans had set themselves as one of “uplifting” the people of the islands.153
These men, all members of the Republican party, faced tough opposition from the 
antis who rallied behind the Democratic presidential hopeful William Jennings Bryan for the 
1900 election. Believing that imperialism would be the dominant campaign issue, McKinley 
firmly embraced it when he selected its staunch supporter Theodore Roosevelt as his running 
mate.
  
154 Roosevelt had expressed his agreement with the expansionist exhortations of 
Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The White Man’s Burden” – carrying the subtitle “The United 
States and the Philippine Islands” – that the Americans had an obligation to spread 
civilization.155 During the campaign Bryan gradually abandoned the imperialism theme when 
he could not make electoral hay of the issue, but ended up losing to the McKinley-Roosevelt 
ticket nonetheless. Less than a year later, on September 6th, McKinley was fatally injured by 
the bullets fired by the anarchist Leon Czolgosz. Eight days later McKinley succumbed to his 
wounds, and Roosevelt took up the office of President of the United States.156
Taft, who had been solicitor general in the United States and at the time of McKinley’s 
request served as a judge on the sixth circuit court, had been sworn in two months earlier on 
July 4th 1901 as the governor of the first civil administration of the islands. The Philippine 
Commission’s program for what has later been described as the “social engineering”
 
157 of the 
colony rested on three pillars: the education, economic development, and democratic tutelage 
of the Filipino people. These would prepare them for eventual independence.158
In much of the historiography these three tenets have figured as the core of the 
civilizing mission of the United States in the Philippines—with a particularly large share of 
the attention in the literature being devoted to the mission’s apparent emphasis on education. 
The ambitious nature of the educational agenda and the swiftness with which it was 
implemented are certainly deserving of emphasis. The administration had offered high wages 
to attract teachers in the metropole and could choose from thousands of applicants; those who 
had been selected began arriving as early as June of 1901, with the arrival in August of the 
more than five hundred teachers carried by the army transport Thomas being a particularly 
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noteworthy event.159 The school system in the Philippines succeeded in serving a much larger 
share of the indigenous population than the systems operating in the European colonies in 
Asia, although the daunting size of the task and problems with funding ultimately blunted the 
effectiveness of the educational policy.160
More overtly successful, at least from the perspective of the American rulers who 
sought to minimize the nationalistic sentiments that had powered the guerilla, was the pillar of 
democratic tutelage. The first local elections were held in 1902, and five years later votes 
were cast for a Philippine Assembly, although suffrage was extended to only a small sliver of 
the population.
  
161 Nevertheless, the Assembly proved a cooperative institution and, aided by a 
rapidly expanding civil service that provided upward mobility for the educated Filipinos, tied 
indigenous elites into the state-building project of the Americans. In combination with the 
commitment to eventually withdraw from the archipelago, the early institution of an elected 
deliberative body has been credited with preventing the kind of restive political atmosphere 
that developed in other contemporary Asian colonies.162
In a departure from the historical narratives that emphasized education, Michael Adas 
has argued that an “engineers’ imperialism … came to dominate the colonial project in the 
islands.”
 
163 The influence of the engineers over the administration’s policies began 
immediately in 1901 when control over the colony was transferred to the civilian 
administration. The colony’s thirty-seven provinces were governed by three-man boards, and 
in each of them a civil engineer acted as a supervisor. In that capacity their control over policy 
was considerable, as they decided which infrastructure should be constructed and how the 
public space should be modernized.164 Also, after 1907 the boards were invested with 
additional tax collecting powers to fund public works, giving the engineers greater financial 
resources.165
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development of the Philippine economy166 – likely a factor for the discounting of this pillar of 
the civilizing mission in much of the historiography, which has tended to focus on education 
and democratic tutelage instead – meant that engineering projects took place in a semi-
haphazard fashion, further empowering the engineers who stood at the helm of the 
construction works.167
Initially, the engineers were spread out over the provincial administrations and, after 
1902, over the Bureau of Engineering and Construction of Public Works and the Bureau of 
Engineering and Construction of Public Buildings. The Bureau of Public Works set up in 
Manila in 1905 brought the colonial engineers together in a single bureaucracy which 
answered to the Commissioner of the Police, a member of the Philippine Commission. As the 
primary institution concerned with the development of the infrastructure of the islands, the 
Bureau was deemed to be of great importance by the members of the Commission, who saw it 
as a tool to directly affect the material prosperity of the archipelago’s population. How the 
relationship between Bureau, Commission, and the larger colonial state apparatus played out 
will be detailed in the second part of this study. 
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2.2. The Dutch mission in the Indies: Ethische Politiek 
 
Dutch involvement in the affairs of the Indonesian archipelago stretched back almost three 
hundred years by the close of the nineteenth century, dating back to the first voyages of the 
Dutch East India Company. Yet despite this long presence, the territorial extent of the 
colonial rule of the Netherlands was only limited, and in some respects a recent imposition: 
only by 1830 could the colonial state truly claim to control the island chain’s most populous 
island of Java, whereas its power over the outer islands within its territorial claim still ranged 
from slight to non-existent.168
But Java, home to four out of every five inhabitants of the Indies, made the colony an 
enormously profitable prize for the Netherlands. The cultuurstelsel (cultivation system) that 
was put in place after 1829 mandated that the island’s villages reserve part of their areal for 
export crops, such as coffee and sugar, to pay the hefty tax that the colonial government 
demanded from its inhabitants. The profits of the cultuurstelsel were remitted to the state 
coffers of the Netherlands where it provided about one fifth of all government revenue in the 
first decades of its operations, even peaking at close to a third in the 1851-1860 period.
  
169 The 
Dutch relied on the existing feudal relations on the island to make their extractive practices 
work, developing a symbiotic relationship between the colonial government and the 
indigenous aristocracy. The dominant administrative unit was the Regency, led by the 
aristocratic bupati or regent in Dutch. The regents, in return for a share of the profits and the 
Dutch support of their rule, and their lower-level intermediaries saw to the delivery of the 
required amount of export crops. This Inheemsch Bestuur (Indigenous government) was 
overseen by the Dutch Binnenlands Bestuur (BB, Domestic government) who appointed 
residenten (Residents) to oversee the governance of the regencies. The Residents were 
charged with overseeing the financial affairs of the regencies they had been assigned to and 
promoting the local agricultural production, as well as being responsible for the maintenance 
of the roads and irrigation infrastructure.170
The batig-slotbeleid, or net-profit system
 
171
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like a huge plantation. The incentive structure for its rulers was therefore structured to achieve 
optimal production: Residents who succeeded in increasing the production of export crops 
could look forward to a larger cut from the profits. The regents, whose relationship with the 
BB came to resemble an “alliance”172, also received pecuniary benefits by increasing the 
profits that the Dutch rulers reaped.173 By mid-century the extractive prerogatives of the 
cultivation system began creating perverse outcomes: areal was reserved for export crops 
where rice had previously been grown, diminishing the amount of food available for 
sustenance and leading to occurrences of famine. In 1860 the former assistant-Resident of 
Lebak, Eduard Douwes Dekker, unleashed a withering critique of the exploitative nature of 
Dutch rule in the archipelago under the pseudonym Multatuli with his novel Max Havelaar. 
Multatuli was a staunch believer in the necessity of Dutch colonialism in the archipelago, but 
sought to curb its excesses. Despite having no immediate effects, the Max Havelaar is 
considered to have been a first step towards the reforms that led to the gradual dismantling of 
the cultivation system and its replacement with a less coercive economic regime in the 
1870s.174
The end of the cultivation system had in part been brought about by the liberal 
attitudes gaining favor in the Netherlands, and the hope that the adoption of a liberal trade 
regime in the colony might bring greater profits—because the batig slot was still highly 
necessary.
 
175 Accordingly, the feudalism on which the Dutch rule had relied on fell in 
disfavor, and the BB gradually increased its power vis-à-vis the old regent aristocracy. The 
power of the aristocracy was further hollowed out as the expanding Dutch bureaucracy 
attracted a new group of indigenous officials. These local bureaucrats, drawn from the higher 
socio-economic classes, were inducted into the existing priyayi class of administrative elites 
through a merit-based system, and in part supplanted the old aristocrats as the BB’s most 
important indigenous allies.176
The decade of the 1870s was also the time when more efforts were made by the 
colonial state to extend its zone of control to the outer regions where the Dutch, at least 
nominally, exercised sovereignty. Economic imperatives to an extent drove this effort: Java’s 
population had surged and its soil was being exploited intensively; new land had to be opened 
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up.177 The reach into Sumatra encountered resistance from the state of Aceh, located on the 
island’s north-western fringe along the strategic Malacca Straits, and a series of expeditions 
were launched in 1873 and 1884. These proved expensive but ineffective. The campaign led 
by J.B. van Heutsz, who brought new military tactics, strategy, and technology to bear on the 
conflict, pacified the region between 1898 and 1904.178 Military power brought the other 
outer regions under control in the same period, and the colonial bureaucracy fanned out over 
the archipelago in the wake of the soldiers and together with the expanding economic interests 
in the island chain. At the dawn of the new century the BB and its administrators stood at the 
peak of their power.179
The gradual reforms of the structure of Dutch rule in the Indies did not allay the 
concerns of those who witnessed the continuing the socio-economic deprivation of the 
indigenous population. The journalist Pieter Brooshooft, the editor of several blossoming 
newspapers in the colony, criticized the plantation-like operation of the colonial state and 
expressed concern for the continued poverty of the indigenous population, comparing the 
Indies to a patient being bled dry and in danger of perishing. He contended that the 
government of the Netherlands had a moral obligation to return the profits extracted as part of 
its batig slot policy to the archipelago, calling it an ereschuld in an 1890 article—a “debt of 
honor.” But his call for a new moral foundation for the governance of the colony, a 
foundation which he called the Ethische Politiek or Ethical Policy, elicited no response from 
the government.
 
180
Brooshooft had simply spoken too soon. When his friend C.Th. van Deventer 
expressed the same ideas in the same terms with his article “Een Eereschuld” published in 
1899 in the influential periodical De Gids, they received a warm welcome. What Van 
Deventer added to Brooshooft’s rhetoric was a three-pronged approach for improving the 
conditions of the Indonesians: emigration (from overpopulated Java to the outer islands), 
irrigation, and education.
 
181 Buoyed by the increasingly successful military campaigns 
throughout the archipelago, the time was considered ripe for a more ambitious social agenda 
in the colony.182
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developing the island chain.183 The paternalistic message of uplifting and civilizing the 
working classes in the metropole was thus extended to the indigenous peoples of the 
colony.184
The new government that came to power in the Netherlands in 1901 took up the 
Ethical Policy as an article of faith in its plans for the Indies and that year, in her annual 
speech from the throne, Queen Wilhelmina expounded on the responsibilities and moral 
duties of the Dutch towards their colonial subjects.
 
185 The cabinet’s Minister of Colonies 
A.W.F. Idenburg internalized the Ethical Policy’s message of uplift and was convinced of the 
need to change governmental structure accordingly. Power was to be devolved down from the 
centralized colonial state apparatus and the educational agenda would serve to emancipate the 
Indonesians, and a separation of the metropolitan and colonial finances – ending the batig slot 
– could provide the financial firepower to achieve the material and spiritual uplift of the 
colonial subjects.186
 Van Doorn expressed surprise in his study of the role of engineers in the governance 
and development of the Indies colony that they were underrepresented in the debate on the 
course of the Ethical Policy. The principal players came mostly from the legal profession and 
had been employed in various positions throughout the colonial government.
 
187 The exception 
was lower house representative Henri Hubertus van Kol, who had graduated from Delft as an 
irrigation engineer in 1875.188
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 He had enrolled in hopes of starting a career in the Indies, and 
after completing his studies he successfully secured a position in the colony, making landfall 
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convinced of his own clean bill of health, which he secured with a second opinion he had 
demanded – he decided to run for parliament instead.189
With the 1897 election Van Kol took his seat for the SDAP in the lower house where 
he acted as a staunch critic of the Dutch colonial practices. He belonged to the so-called 
Indies Specialists who could draw on their own experiences in the colony to deliver expert 
analyses and incisive critiques of colonial policy. Van Kol sharply opposed imperialist 
expansion in general and, from his own experiences, the “Dutch annexation-fanaticism” of 
Aceh in particular. These costly military campaigns diverted funds from what he saw as the 
real moral duty of Europeans: the material development through public work construction of 
the “primitive and ignorant peoples”, whom the European had a moral duty to uplift. Van Kol 
thus drew a sharp dichotomy between imperialism and colonialism, rejecting the former and 
favoring the latter. He articulated his vision for a social-democratic colonial policy at the 
Congrès International de Sociologie held in Paris in 1900 and in the reports compiled in its 
wake, comparing the task of developing the colonized peoples to tutoring a child to become a 
man.
  
190 The engineer Van Kol saw technology as the tool to achieve this goal.191
Van Kol was a minority in his perception that the Dutch were engaged in “annexation-
fanaticism.” According to the historian J.J.P. de Jong, the political rhetoric in the Netherlands 
during the late nineteenth century sharply distinguished between imperial powers like France 
and Britain on the one hand, which were engaged in an expansionist scramble for territory, 
and the deepening of Dutch control within the recognized and respected borders of its Indies 
colony on the other. The fin-de-siècle Dutch thus ascribed to their activities in the colony a 
certain degree of exceptionalism, seeing it as the result of a colonialist rather than an 
imperialist program. Much of the historiography followed this belief that the Dutch had a 
status apart from the other European powers until the 1980s, when a debate broke out on the 
applicability of the “imperialism” heuristic to Dutch colonial practices. It was settled in the 
mid-1990s with the conclusions drawn by Maarten Kuitenbrouwer: the Netherlands were 
engaged in an expansionist project, but, uniquely, this imperialism took place within the 
boundaries of a recognized sovereignty over a region.
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Even more recent is the spate of literature investigating the role of technology and 
engineers in shaping Dutch imperialism—a pendant to Adas’s research on engineers in the 
Philippines. Van Doorn had already drawn attention to the fact that engineers were a distinct 
group within the colonial administration. The historian Wim Ravesteijn later pointed out that 
even though the BB had steadily been increasing its power against the indigenous political 
classes with the reforms that they set in motion in the 1870s onwards, the Bureau Openbare 
Werken (Bureau of Public Works, BOW) in Weltevreden had made significant strides in 
separating themselves from the authority of the other civil servants in the Indies. This was 
particularly true for the engineers working in the field of irrigation management. In an 1885 
proclamation, the so-called waterstaatsreglement, BOW was reorganized. The new 
institutional structure, the Indische Waterstaat (“Indies Water-state”, the colonial counterpart 
to the Rijkswaterstaat of the Netherlands), that emerged in the years after the proclamation 
attached great importance to the technical and scientific aspects of irrigation, and gave the 
irrigation engineers a large degree of operational independence and direct access to the 
funding mechanisms of the colonial state. This enhanced the status and power of the engineer 
corps, and by the close of the nineteenth century they launched the massive Solo works, 
which, in the colonial space, were almost unique in scale and ambition: the Solo river, the 
largest on Java, was to have its delta rerouted and thousands of acres of areal were to be 
irrigated by large canal systems.193
Following Van Doorn’s lead in thinking of the colony as a “project”, Ravesteijn edited 
a collaborative study in an effort to provide an overview of the distinct engineering projects in 
the Indies, such as the construction of deepwater ports, railroads, and sanitation works.
  
194 
Harry Lintsen, the most prominent historian of engineering in the Netherlands, was one of the 
instigators of this study, and in turn chaired another research project of his own that mapped 
the impact of various technologies, particularly in the sphere of agricultural practices, on the 
Dutch civilizing mission in the colony.195 In this recent research on engineering in the Indies 
colony the first two decades of the twentieth century are  described as a “golden age”196
                                                          
193 Wim Ravesteijn, De zegenrijke heeren der wateren: Irrigatie en staat op Java, 1832-1942 (Delft University 
Press, 1997), 148. 
 for 
194 W. Ravesteijn and J. Kop, Bouwen in de Archipel: burgerlijke openbare werken in Nederlands-Indië 1800-
2000 (Walburg Pers, 2004). Also available in English as W. Ravesteijn and J. Kop, For profit and prosperity: 
the contribution made by Dutch engineers to public works in Indonesia, 1800-2000 (Aprilis, 2008). 
195 The published results of the project led by Lintsen, titled “Technology and the Civilizing Mission: Dutch 
Colonial Development in the European Context, 1870-1970” and running from 2003 to 2008, are listed on the 
website of the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek at 
http://www.nwo.nl/projecten.nsf/vk2008/ned/1700115884. Accessed: November 3rd 2011. 
196 Ravesteijn and Kop, Bouwen in de Archipel, 42. 
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the engineers. Between 1898 and 1918 the number of civil engineers employed by the 
colonial government grew from 92 to 201.197 The overall growth of the profession made such 
an expansion possible, also because the trend that had set in during the mid-nineteenth century 
that a little over a quarter of all Delft graduates went on to find employment in the colony 
continued—a significant portion in any regard!198
The enormous economic boom that began with the take-off of business investment in 
the colony after 1905, and which would increase exports seven-fold in less than a decade and 
a half, also drew many other Dutch to the Indies.
  
199 These new arrivals, called totoks, found a 
colonial society that was at once both hybridized and divided ethnographically. The Dutch in 
the colony distinguished themselves from the indigenous population by identifying 
themselves as part of a “European” class in society, which had a separate civil status. Despite 
the fact that generations of intermarriage between the colonizer and colonized in the 
archipelago had given birth to a cohort of “Europeans” who looked very different from the 
pale-skinned arrivals from the Netherlands, the former still clung to their whiteness and the 
privileges it afforded them. The privileges these so-called Indos enjoyed went beyond the 
mere pragmatic legal benefits that being “white” accorded them. Those who could don the 
mantle of whiteness used it as the basis of their sense of superiority vis-à-vis the indigenous 
population.200
“Whiteness” also held benefits for the totoks. In the confused class relations of the 
colony, where the rules of the metropole no longer applied and upper- and lower class mixed 
in colonial outposts and on the office floor, whiteness afforded a new solidarity: the noblesse 
de la peau or “nobility of the skin.”
 
201
                                                          
197 Ravesteijn and Kop, Bouwen in de Archipel, 41. 
 This racialized aristocracy was gendered too: men 
could pass on their whiteness to their children, whereas women could not. The influx of new 
immigrants from the Netherlands – especially the women, who for the first rime arrived in 
large numbers – introduced new stresses to this ethnographic division of the colonial society 
by threatening the status of the mixed-race Indos of the archipelago with status erosion as the 
number of Europeans grew. The resilience of the old system nonetheless makes it fair to say 
that the recent arrivals to the Indies did not simply import the racial attitudes of the metropole 
but instead were for the most part absorbed into the existing social hierarchy of colonial 
198 Van Doorn, De laatste eeuw van Indië, 117. 
199 De Jong, De waaier van het fortuin, 401-402. 
200 Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas, 162-165. 
201 Ibid., 164. 
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society.202
 
 The Dutch engineers who made the trip to their new positions in the colony were 
thus confronted with this mesh of gendered, racialized, and classed social relations in the 
Indies, thus further complicating the gendered and classed identity formation process that, as 
we have seen, they so actively pursued in the Netherlands. 
 
                                                          
202 Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas, 162-165. 
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2.3. Similar civilizing 
 
The United States and the Netherlands each embarked on new colonial programs and 
civilizing missions in the years between 1898 and 1901: benevolent assimilation and the 
Ethische Politiek, respectively. At first glance these programs arose out of very different 
causes. The Spanish-American war had led McKinley to unexpectedly take control of the 
Philippines, whereas the writings of Van Deventer fit in a longer tradition of critiquing the 
excesses of Dutch rule in the Netherlands Indies. In addition, the long history of the Dutch 
presence in the Netherlands Indies points in the direction that the Dutch colonial state could 
draw on a long tradition of rule whereas the Americans in the Philippines could not. In fact, 
the introduction of a modern colonial state in the Netherlands Indies and the extension of 
control over the outer islands in a painful guerilla war took place almost contemporaneously 
with the American entry into the Philippines and the conflict with Aguinaldo and his 
supporters. Upon studying the long-term trends in Dutch and American society, as well as the 
rhetoric used by the leading participants on colonial policy in either country, a series of 
similarities become readily apparent.  
The civilizing mission gained the support of the polities in both metropoles because of 
the ascent of the politics of interventionism in either country. American Progressivism and 
Dutch social liberalism, both amenable to engineering rhetoric, went overseas. As the 
paternalist assumptions that the reformers in the Netherlands and the United States evinced 
towards the working classes they wished to “uplift” in their own countries were transferred to 
the colonial context, they became racialized: the colonial subjects were portrayed as savages. 
The rhetoric of the proponents of benevolent assimilation and the Ethical Policy was shot 
through with references to the supposed moral duty of civilized nations such as the Dutch and 
Americans to bring civilization to what they perceived as the world’s primitive peoples.  
Separated by only a few years, but by thousands of miles and political differences that 
were no less wide, Taft and van Kol both described the role that their respective nations ought 
to fulfill towards their subject peoples as that of a “guardian.” They made use of a metaphor 
prevalent in the colonialist discourse on both sides of the Atlantic which stated that the 
colonized subject was like a child in need of tutelage, so that it might one day become an 
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adult.203
As would befit the role of a good parent, education was a major pillar in both the 
Ethical Policy and the policy of benevolent assimilation. However, large sums in the colonial 
governments’ annual budgets in the Philippines and the Netherlands were reserved for public 
works projects. The civilizing mission thus did not merely hope to bring civilization through a 
spiritual transformation of the subject peoples; it sought to achieve this goal through a change 
in their material conditions as well. In the case of the Netherlands, Bloembergen and Raben 
have asserted that the search for order and systematization in the metropole, which Auke van 
der Woud has shown was so closely tied to the transformation of the public space by the 
engineers, was transplanted to the colonial sphere.
 This metaphor performed three roles. First, it meant that the Filipinos and 
Indonesians could not rule themselves – they were simply not yet ready for independence. 
Second, it established a hierarchy between them and the colonizers, establishing the latter’s 
superiority. Third, it positioned the duty to be performed by the Dutch and the American in 
their colonial archipelagoes in moral terms: leading a child into adulthood was the expression 
of the morality that underpinned the benevolence and ethics of their colonial programs. 
204 Michael Adas described the material 
transformation the Americans hoped to achieve in the Philippines as driven by an 
expansionism motivated by “technological imperatives”—i.e., the sense of obligation to act 
upon the possibilities made available by new technology.205
The rapid technological development that followed industrialization in the Netherlands 
and the United States, and the changes it wrought in the material cultures of these and other 
predominantly Western countries it affected, thoroughly transformed the Western societies in 
the late nineteenth century. The first chapter of this study showed to which political ideas the 
Dutch and Americans turned to cope with the pressures of onrushing modernity, such as 
greater government interventionism and the according of an important role for trained experts 
in the emerging bureaucracies.  
 
But the scientific and technological accomplishments of the era also transformed the 
outlook of them and other Westerners of their place in the wider world. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, scientific attainments gradually developed into the yardstick against which 
societies were compared and were used as indicators for the level of civilization of peoples. 
                                                          
203 Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood, 201; H.W. Van Den Doel, "Hubertus de Onstuimige: de reizen 
van Henri van Kol door de Nederlandse koloniën, 1902-1903," in Kerk, cultuur en koloniën: opstellen over 
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The hierarchy that was thus established affected the behavior of actors on either side of this 
asymmetry.206
The historiography has taken close account of the role of technology for late 
nineteenth century imperialism. Daniel Headrick described various “tools of empire”, such as 
steam powered ships, railways and the telegraph, that not only made the late nineteenth 
century European burst of imperialist fervor possible but also changed the motives of the 
European wielders of these tools.
 
207 In the context of the civilizing mission, these 
technologies became the tools of civilizing. Engineers were placed in positions of power 
within the administrations that governed the colonies and exercised influence over how those 
tools ought to be used. Technology, after all, does not speak for itself—the meanings 
technological artifacts convey are socially constructed, as are the shapes these artifacts 
take.208 Engineers had privileged access to the processes that imbued technologies with 
meaning. They leveraged their image as voices of science and reason to support particular 
applications of technology over others, staking their reputations on some projects while 
opposing others. Their continuous fashioning of themselves as trustworthy, reputable experts 
has led them to being called “empire-builders: active agents of political and economic 
empire.”209
 
 We now turn to how this process of empire building played out in the Netherlands 
Indies and the Philippines. 
                                                          
206 Adas, Machines as the measure of men. 
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Part 2: Daedalus in the tropics 
3. Method and vignettes 
 
In the first part of this study I have shown how the political landscapes of the Dutch and 
American metropoles were transformed as a growing faith took hold in both societies 
technology could be applied to guide social progress, and that governmental interventionism 
could be used to promote general welfare. This transformation played into the hands of the 
rising class of technologists – the engineers – who in both countries were engaged in a 
campaign to improve their social status by fashioning themselves as a rationally minded and 
politically independent professional class. This process of self-fashioning was geared towards 
positioning themselves as the providers of solutions to questions of governance that were 
supposedly superior to those offered by the existing political elites, who disproportionately 
had been trained as legal experts. At times the engineers also found support in the new 
political movements of American Progressivism and Dutch social liberalism that co-opted 
their rhetoric. Engineers took up positions of influence in the governing cabinets of the 
Netherlands and urban administrations throughout the United States. In the expanding 
bureaucracies of the modernizing states they contributed towards the formulation of policy. 
The engineers’ bid for greater social authority and professional independence pointed the way 
towards a political system run by engineering experts: the technocracy.  
Technocratic rule was not achieved in either metropole. But the articulation of the new 
civilizing missions of the Netherlands and the United States, which were predicated on the 
belief that Western technological superiority made it the duty of the Dutch and Americans to 
spread the tenets of modern science and technology to what they deemed to be primitive 
peoples, provided a new space where engineers could strive for such power. In the second part 
of this study I will present a series of cases where the technocratic ambitions of the American 
and Dutch colonial engineers were operative. By comparing and contrasting their rhetoric in 
these cases, those aspects that were shared or particular to the projects of the colonial 
engineers in the Philippines and Netherlands Indies will be elucidated. 
Rather than attempting to weave a single narrative out of these case studies, I treat 
these cases as vignettes that are emblematic of various tendencies of the American and Dutch 
engineers in their colonies. These tendencies will be teased out from the discursive 
productions of the colonial engineers: from articles in professional journals, letters submitted 
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to periodicals, circulars to government agencies, and speeches at commencement ceremonies 
and other festivities. The authors of these discursive productions made use of the prevalent 
ideas on race, gender, class, technology, and civilization of their day – and the power these 
ideas granted to their wielders – to claim authority in the colonial space. In so doing, they 
built up a shared vocabulary and a collection of rhetorical gestures.  
However, the meanings of these signifiers were not uncontested, as we have already 
seen: whereas the presumed “primitivism” of the Filipinos necessitated the guardianship of 
the Philippines according to the American imperialists, that same primitivism also produced 
the vehement opposition to annexation of the antis. And with “Java”, the Dutch projected an 
image of the island to American visitors that portrayed the island as a “Garden of Eden”, 
while at the same time the impoverishment of the indigenous population was decried by 
critics of the prevailing methods of Dutch rule such as Van Deventer and Brooshooft. 
I contend that the rhetoric of the participants in these debates cannot be discounted as 
opportunistic or out of touch with reality. In this sense I follow the methodological courses 
charted by Gail Bederman, Kristin Hoganson, and Michael Adas.  
Bederman argued that, to reiterate, “the ideas comprising any discourse will be 
multiple, inconsistent, and contradictory”210
The truths that engineers held self-evident, and their intentions to act on these truths, 
can be found by closely studying the conditions in which they used their rhetorical gestures 
and by contextualizing them in the broader web of ideas and assumptions of their users. 
Hoganson explained that in her view “[rhetoric is] something that illuminates motivations, 
convictions, and calculations of what is politically efficacious.”
; i.e., that a word such as “primitivism” may be 
invoked for different purposes. Therefore, no hegemonic meaning of a discourse can be 
constructed—instead, it is necessary to continually reassess its content to lay bare the roles it 
has performed in various settings, and the power it conveyed upon its user.  
211
Finally, Michael Adas made the case that the civilizing mission discourse was not 
merely a moral drape behind which the European imperial powers hoped to hide their naked 
 They are bids for power 
and authority, and deserve to be taken seriously as such. Actions do not speak louder than 
words, because words are in themselves actions. Hence, driving a wedge between the material 
reality and the discourses through which that reality is perceived by the actors living in it is 
not fruitful.  
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lust for power.212
The transformation of the material culture of these peoples was to be wrought by the 
West’s cunning technological architect, the engineer: the tropical Daedalus. In the vignettes 
that follow we shall see first how he coped with setbacks, and where he could finds allies and 
adversaries within the civil administration of the two colonies. Subsequently the primary 
developmental strategies particular to the two colonies, and the role of the engineers in 
shaping and formulating them, will be analyzed. This is followed by an investigation into the 
engineers’ claims to authority in social as well as well technical matters in the colony. Then 
the vision of the ideal colonial engineer – as dreamt up by the colonial engineers themselves – 
will be drawn into focus. Finally, the relationship between the American and Dutch engineers 
on the one hand, and the colonized Filipinos and Indonesians on the other will be 
reconstructed.  
 Instead the missions were the expressions of a sincere belief that the 
“civilized nations” of the world had a duty to go out and spread modern science to those 
peoples who supposedly lacked it.  
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3.1. Or Icarus? The failure of the Solo works in the Netherlands Indies 
 
In 1895 Pieter Brooshooft’s editorship of De Locomotief, the periodical published in 
Semarang that blossomed under his editorship between 1887 and 1895, came to an end when 
his contract was not renewed. In the years that followed Brooshooft acted as editor-in-chief of 
several publications in the Netherlands, but he was unable to equal the success he had enjoyed 
during his journalism career in the colony. This disappointing intermezzo lasted three years 
and ended when he managed to secure his return as editor-in-chief of De Locomotief, where 
he could once again devote himself to investigating the effects of the Dutch administration of 
the colony.  
Brooshooft continued to demand that more efforts be made to promote the welfare of 
the indigenous population. In 1901 he authored a long pamphlet titled “De ethische koers in 
de koloniale politiek” (“the ethical course in the colonial policy”) in which he reflected on the 
newfound calling of the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies. He was motivated to write his study 
because of what he deemed was a complete lack of interest towards the colony in the Dutch 
legislature, something Brooshooft had witnessed firsthand in the 1901 election campaign 
which took place during a medical furlough he spent in the Netherlands.213
 The pamphlet did receive some coverage in the Dutch press, but was generally not 
treated in depth. This was decried by R.A. van Sandick, editor-in-chief of De Indische Gids 
(The Indies Guide), the prominent monthly dedicated to the economic, political and literary 
issues pertaining to the colony. In the section on colonial literature Van Sandick opined that 
were he to choose a book of the month, Brooshooft’s long pamphlet would be deserving of 
this honorary title for months and months on end. He was also shocked to find that the public 
in the metropole did not share his opinion: “that it was not the book of the month for many 
people in our Netherlands, is a terrible charge against our people, which truly is not deserving 
of colonies, if it has so little interest in them, that even a book such as this does not attract an 
unusual amount of attention,” he wrote.
 
214
                                                          
213 E. Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in fragmenten (HES Publishers, 1981), 37-38, 44-45. 
 Van Sandick found so much to like in his review of 
Brooshooft’s study – which demanded large irrigation programs, the end of the corvée of 
indigenous laborers, greater emancipation and expansion of the indigenous political 
administration, expanded credit for farmers, and the improvement of medical care and 
214 R.A. van Sandick, “Naar aanleiding van Mr. P. Brooshooft’s ‘De ethische koers in the koloniale politiek,’” 
De Indische Gids 23 no. 2 (1901): 1126-1137, 1126. 
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education215 – that only the impropriety of reprinting the piece in full, which he admitted 
would be plagiarism, led him to publish just excerpts from the piece.216 He concluded his 
praise for the pamphlet by listing Brooshooft’s proposals—of which the first three items on 
the list all pertained to irrigation and hydrological works.217
 One of these listed items was the resumption of the irrigation works in the Solo valley, 
which had also received a mention in Van Deventer’s article “Een Eereschuld.”
 
218 This 
enormously ambitious project had been launched in the late 1880s and aimed at rerouting the 
river’s estuary and constructing dams and irrigation canals that could provide water to a 
massive 150,000 hectare areal.219 Cost overruns due to technical difficulties led to an 
escalating price tag for the project, and construction was put on hold in 1898 by the minister 
of colonies.220
A four-man commission was set up to determine the future of the Solo works. J.E. de 
Meyier, the director of the Bureau Openbare Werken between 1898 and 1901, was its only 
member residing in the colony itself and developed into a staunch opponent of the works. 
Although De Meyier agreed with the other three members of the commission that the project 
was technically feasible, he feared that the current design was at risk of eventual failure due to 
excessive depositing of silt, which he considered likely. He was also alone in his reservations 
about the expected rentabiliteit or profitability of the plan, which he argued was not in line 
with the enormous fifty million guilder investment required—a sum that was equal to the 
average annual net exports of the colony in the last five years of the nineteenth century, and 
hence an enormous strain on the colony’s finances.
  
221 Ethical thinkers such as Van Deventer 
and Brooshooft, who argued from the position that the Dutch still had to reimburse their 
ereschuld to the Indonesians, were less daunted by such sums because the indemnity of the 
Netherlands to the colony could pay for the project many times over. They therefore 
continued to support it.222
Against the wishes of other prominent colonial engineers
 
223
                                                          
215 Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in fragmenten, 45. 
 who had already delivered 
significant irrigation projects (though never of the size of the uniquely ambitious Solo works), 
216 Ibid., 1128-1129. 
217 Ibid., 1136. 
218 Ravesteijn, De zegenrijke heeren der wateren, 200. 
219 Ibid., 181. 
220 Ibid., 184. 
221 Burger, Sociologisch-economische geschiedenis van Indonesia, 89. 
222 Ravesteijn, De zegenrijke heeren der wateren, 200-201. 
223 These were the later directors of BOW P.J.Ott de Vries (1914-1920), and J.Homan van der Heijde (1911-
1914); and the professors of Irrigation Engineering at Delft A.G. Lamminga (1910-1911) and W.Elenbaas (1911-
1913). Ibid., 195-197. 
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and who would later serve as professors of irrigation studies at Delft or directors of BOW in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Solo works were shut down indefinitely in 
1903 by Idenburg, then minister of colonies and the later “ethical” Governor General of the 
Netherlands Indies.224 This was a victory for De Meyier, whose opposition to the project was 
described in a later analysis as a “crusade.”225 This crusade was launched not just from his 
seat as director of BOW, but also from the pages of his publications. In a twist of fate he had 
been provided with a platform to disseminate his critiques by the Solo-supporter Van Sandick, 
who stepped down as editor-in-chief of the Indische Gids in 1902 and passed the torch on to 
De Meyier.226 Van Sandick had been appointed the head of the editorial board of De 
Ingenieur two years earlier, which had been repurposed as the joint publication of the KIvI (to 
which Van Sandick belonged) and the VDI. In the inaugural issue of his editorship De Meyier 
unleashed a broadside on the plans for the Solo Works with an article titled “Irrigation-
Fanaticism,” in which he argued in favor of smaller irrigation works rather than those with the 
enormous scope of Solo.227
The discontinuation of the Solo works, which effectively meant its failure, was 
damaging to the authority of the irrigation engineers in the Netherlands Indies. In practice the 
administrators who identified with the Ethical Policy did not reason with the ereschuld as 
point of departure; the rentabiliteit was of greater importance. A committee, the 
rentabiliteitscommissie, in which aside from the engineers members of the BB also took seats, 
was instituted in 1897 to assess whether the economic benefits accrued from public works 
could justify the costs of initial investment.
 
228 Although some projects of questionable yield 
continued, the great ambition of the engineers was held in check by the BB, which clawed 
back some of its authority in the wake of the Solo failure.229 Just how great the ambition of 
the engineers was in general can be gleaned from the fact that the majority of KIvI members 
attending a series of meetings in 1902 where the future of the project was discussed remained 
in favor of seeing the plan through to the end. De Meyier, who was present at one of these 
meetings, was well aware of the relative isolation his opposition put him in, and refrained 
from joining the Institute because of this.230
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 The vast scale and ambition of the Solo irrigation 
plan, which would irrigate a surface area equivalent to two-thirds of the projects commenced 
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in the previous half-century231
Meyier’s “crusade” showed to the outside world that there existed technical grounds 
that supported dismissing the Solo plans, giving him a key role in the political dynamic that 
led to its discontinuation. His argument that small works were superior to the kind of massive 
plans like Solo that foresaw in the rerouting of entire river estuaries was also grist on the mill 
on the rising class of agricultural experts in the colony – a Department of Agriculture would 
be set up by Idenburg in 1904 – who preferred small-scale projects in which outreach to the 
indigenous farmers and education played a significant role.
, kindled the enthusiasm of the engineers—and perhaps made 
them in equal measure fearful of the consequences that such a massive failure might entail. 
232
The black eye that the Solo works dealt to the BOW and its irrigation engineers was 
thus to an extent inflicted by its former head De Meyier. His strategy of fighting the project in 
the pages of the Indische Gids and through other publications shows that periodicals were as 
important as a tool for effecting change for the engineers as they were to Van Deventer. De 
Meyier even spread his message of the new focus of the Dutch on small-scale irrigation 
engineering on Java to an international audience when he delivered a lecture to the 
participants of the International Engineering Congress held in Saint Louis in 1904 by the 
ASCE.
 The engineers showed much 
less concern for the practices of the farmers; instead, they wanted to revamp the material 
environment of those who tilled the soil and provide them with an abundance of water, which 
they thought of as the crucial resource for bountiful harvests in the colony. 
233
The failure at Solo threw a spanner in the works of the irrigation engineering 
community in the Netherlands Indies, which since the 1885 waterstaatsreglement had seen its 
authority and independence grow. Funding for this subdivision of the public works 
department, the largest within the BOW, remained stagnant for a decade.
 The lesson learned from the Solo debacle was clear: irrigation engineers could not 
rely on their works to speak for themselves and prove their worth to an observer. The 
effectiveness of the technical artifacts needed to be propagandized in order to make their 
construction possible and prevent them from being shut down by competing interest groups in 
the colonial administration. 
234
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A period of introspection began among the Dutch colonial engineers, who were 
shocked by the discontinuation of their most ambitious project and who felt the wheels were 
spinning under their plans to bring irrigation to all of Java. The irrigation engineer A.G. 
Lamminga, who would later be celebrated as one of the founding fathers of the new approach 
to irrigation in the archipelago, was one amongst many who would continue to lobby for the 
resumption of the works after 1903. Lamminga held sway within the irrigation engineering 
community as the designer of one of the archipelago’s new “complete” irrigation works, the 
30,000 hectare Pemali irrigation project constructed between 1893 and 1903. The project had 
entailed the construction of a main channel and the secondary and tertiary waterways which 
distributed the water, as well as the creation of a management system that decided how water 
would be distributed and works maintained.235 The Pemali project set the example that was to 
be followed in later projects.236
The Solo issue was part of Lamminga’s inaugural speech as professor of irrigation at 
Delft, a chair he took up in 1910. He contended that the economic rationale used by the 
rentabiliteitscommissie to shut down the project was flawed: whereas the committee judged 
the proposed construction of irrigation works on the basis of the expected increases in land 
rents that were to follow completion, Lamminga was of the opinion that the raw increase of 
crops should be the actual measure of rentabiliteit. He used the example of his Pemali works 
to illustrate the point: crop size had more than doubled after irrigation, but because land rents 
had not been raised – which had been the result of what he sarcastically called “a peculiar 
philanthropic notion” – the increase rentabiliteit appeared to be insignificant. From his point 
of view rents ought to keep pace with the technical improvements to reveal the actual 
improvements in crop yield that irrigation provided.
 
237
Lamminga’s critique, which came from one of BOW’s old hands and was delivered 
almost a decade after the discontinuation of the Solo works, reveals just how painful and 
frustrating a blow the discontinuation of the project had been to the ambitions of the colonial 
engineers. J. Homan van der Heide made attempts to restart the plan when he became director 
of BOW in 1911, but once again ran into De Meyier’s staunch opposition and ultimately 
decided to launch several smaller (but still relatively large, at approximately 40,000 hectares) 
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projects elsewhere in the archipelago.238
 
 What this episode shows is that the most ambitious 
of the Dutch technologists were not willing to adjust their outlook on how the material 
transformation Netherlands Indies ought to be performed. Even after the failure of Solo, their 
zeal was undiminished. 
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3.2. Defalcations and trust in the Philippines 
 
A central tenet of the American program of benevolent assimilation was the democratic 
tutelage of the Filipinos. This planned political education entailed the introduction of suffrage, 
though only to the literate and propertied ilustrado classes at first, and the induction of 
Filipinos who passed civil service examinations into the American-led civil administration of 
the Philippine Islands. The local and municipal elections put them into the office of mayor 
and councilor only a few years after annexation, with their fellow countrymen serving as their 
staff. The intent of this early devolution of power to indigenous officials was to guide them in 
the practice of self-administration and provide them with the experience of governance. In 
that capacity they were still under the guardianship of the colonial authorities: American 
provincial treasurers kept a close eye on the finances of these local administrations and were 
tasked with reporting any aberrations in an effort to stamp out corruption.239
In early annual reports submitted by the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of 
War in Washington the authors made mention of the growing number of Filipinos passing the 
civil service examinations and taking up positions in the administration. They commended the 
new recruits for the speed at which they were mastering the English language – considered a 
prerequisite for positions in the government – and expressing the hope that their share of the 
total administrative personnel would continue to increase rapidly in the future. However, a 
“humiliating experience” had befallen the American side of the administration in 1903.
  
240 The 
government had specifically appointed Americans alone to “positions of pecuniary trust”, 
such as the office of treasurer, but now found itself confronted with a series of “defalcations”: 
the embezzlement of funds. The administrators of the colony immediately realized the grave 
blow this dealt to the image of the Americans, who had made the fight against corruption an 
important pillar of their campaign to civilize and uplift Philippine society. Prosecutions were 
launched, but were not always successful; in one case a treasurer succeeded in escaping to the 
United States where he was safe from punishment because no extradition treaty was in place 
to bring him to justice.241
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The 1903 report suggested several causes for the defalcations. First, the transition from 
military rule to civil rule in the previous years had led to a quick turnover of personnel as 
military officials were relieved and civilians took their place. The speed of the transition and 
the immediate need for the replacement of personnel due to the indispensability of American 
“tutors” in the administration had made a thorough investigation into the backgrounds of the 
new recruits of the civil service impossible. Later investigations into the backgrounds of those 
individuals who were suspected of fraud revealed that some of them had entered the 
Philippine administration under false names to hide patterns of “dishonesty” in their past.242
The second perceived cause of the defalcations was the situation in the Philippines 
itself. As the authors found, “[in] the very unsettled conditions which have prevailed here, 
men who would not have yielded to temptation to dishonesty in the States were unable to 
resist it here.”
 
243
But financial considerations alone did not drive their criminal behavior. The “Tropics” 
of the Philippines were hazardous to the Americans who came there, so that “liberal leaves of 
absence” were necessary to preserve their health. This dangerous “tropicality” was not just 
natural—it was also social: “The lack of ordinary, rational, and healthful amusements for one 
engaged as a provincial officer in the country itself turns the minds of not overstrong natures 
toward vicious pursuits and enjoyments like those of gambling and licentious association with 
native women.”
 They cited an excerpt from the first Philippine Commission Report which 
they considered relevant. It stated that the great distance between the archipelago and the 
home of the officials in the United States was thought to induce a greater ambition in them to 
quickly amass wealth to make the investment in such a long voyage pay off. It was suggested 
that paying officials good wages might help them fight off the temptation to resort to fraud.  
244
This passage reveals the gendered dangers of the Philippines to the exclusively male 
actors driving the civilizing mission. Aside from providing incentives such as better pay and 
generous furloughs to the men staffing the archipelago’s administration to avoid them from 
falling prey to native women, the authors of the report stressed that a rigorous selection 
process was needed to weed out those applicants who suffered from weak minds: only those 
aspiring administrators who were in possession of a “good moral character” should be 
admitted to the government of the colony.
 
245
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Character, as the presidents of the ASCE would have it, was what the exemplary 
engineer possessed in spades. In his 1902 address at the annual convention of the ASCE, the 
Society’s president Robert Moore stated that character was necessary “for real success in any 
calling, be it that of the professional man or the man in political or commercial life.” It could 
not be learned from books or taught in classes, but was “partly the result of inherited qualities 
and partly the result of daily contact with men and things.” As if to make sure that the 
masculine idealism of character was not lost on his audience, he followed this up with the 
observation that to make character development work, “we must, first of all, have a strong and 
worthy man.” But even in this raw form, the “manly qualities” had to be developed, and it 
was in that regard that the daily practice of engineering made the profession stand out from all 
others in its advancement of the masculine individual, because engineers supposedly had a 
greater dedication to truth than any other profession. Moore explained that whereas the 
history of medicine was replete with quacks and snake oil, and even law and theology had 
cherished falsehoods that had gone undetected for millennia, engineers had to abide by the 
truth because any structure erected or machine assembled on the basis of false theories was 
destined to fail.246 In short, America’s engineers, more than any other profession in the 
country, fashioned themselves as deserving of the public’s trust—and this claim to authority 
was supplemented with the argument that they embodied the masculine ideals to boot. We 
have already seen that this fashioning process was to an extent successful in the Philippines: 
on each provincial board an engineer acted as supervisor.247
These gendered ideas on the nature of the profession voiced by Moore became 
intertwined with ideas of class and racial superiority in the colonial space, where engineers – 
like many other officials who enjoyed an elevated status – expressed distaste for those 
Americans who entered into the kind of “licentious associations” with indigenous women that 
the Philippine Commission Report had warned of. Using frontier-terminology, they and others 
derisively called these Americans, who were often former soldiers, “squaw men.” Colonial 
engineers’ academic qualifications and relatively high wages put them a cut above most of the 
other Americans in the colony, so that class issues further elevated their sense of 
superiority.
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But several high-profile failures of public works in the Philippines damaged the image 
that Moore had projected of the engineers’ scientific power and mastery over nature. By 
extension these failures hurt the authority of American colonial rule in general, as the history 
of the Baguio road shows. The city of Baguio, located some 250 kilometers north of Manila in 
a cooler mountain climate, was selected by the Philippine Commission to function as a 
summer capital where the heat-averse American officials could recuperate from the strenuous 
tropical climate.249 They followed the examples of the European empires in Asia with this 
decision; the Dutch had selected Buitenzorg (and later Bandoeng) on Java, near the capital of 
Batavia. The construction of a road leading to Baguio was a financial disaster, costing upward 
of two and a half million dollars, and aroused the ire of Filipino nationalists who saw the 
archipelago’s coffers being drained to suit the needs of the Americans.250
But cost overruns were hardly the worst of the problems faced by colonial engineers. 
The first irrigation project launched by BPW, the San Miguel project of 1909 in Tarlac 
province, failed in July of 1911 when a dam burst due to flooding following a typhoon.
  
251 The 
investigation into the cause of the burst concluded that the design contained several grave 
errors, with the dam being improperly located and inadequate for its task. Personnel changes 
were made and the irrigation division was reorganized in hopes of preventing such mistakes 
from recurring in the future.252 The next year another dam failed its task, this time belonging 
to Cebu City’s Osmeña waterworks. It had been named after Sergio Osmeña, a young Filipino 
nationalist who had made an impression on the American administrators, and who was 
appointed governor of Cebu province between 1901 and 1907.253 A cholera epidemic that 
struck Cebu City in 1909 took the lives of hundreds of its inhabitants, and Governor-General 
Cameron Forbes who had been appointed in that same year was pressured by the local 
population to provide a clean source of drinking water. To create a water reservoir, a dam was 
designed by the young engineer E.J. Halsema, a native of Ohio who had made his way into 
BPW’s service in 1908. The works were opened with great fanfare on February 17th of 1912: 
the day was designated as a public holiday in the province and Forbes was present to celebrate 
the momentous occasion, which was hailed in the press.254
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Working from limited funds, and based on previous meteorological data, it had been deemed 
unnecessary to reinforce the surroundings of the structure.255
These disappointing events cast doubt upon the notion that the engineers’ “esoteric 
knowledge” of science kept them from making mistakes. The geographical challenges 
particular to the Philippine islands, the young engineer corps’ inexperience with building 
dams, and general unfamiliarity with the unpredictable weather patterns of the archipelago all 
worked to challenge the image of the engineers as a professional class immune to mistakes. In 
the lead-in editorial to the Quarterly Bulletin distributed in January of 1914, Clarence 
Hubbell, at the time Chief Engineer of BPW, made attempts to salvage the reputation of the 
engineers by pushing back against the idea that his personnel was infallible. Under the title 
“Who pays the bill?”, Hubbell opined that neither individual engineers nor BPW could be 
held financially responsible for those cases in which structures such as buildings, dams, and 
bridges collapsed. Going against the ideas articulated by ASCE president Moore in the past, 
Hubbell argued that “[t]here is a curious misconception that engineering is an exact science 
and therefore an engineer should make no mistake. Nothing could be further from the truth.” 
Engineers used formulas to obtain approximations, not exact figures; hence, “[a]n engineer 
pits his training, experience, and skill against the unknown in nature.” Furthermore, building 
indestructible buildings would be prohibitively expensive; building more economical 
buildings that were not over-engineered was in the interests of greater “efficiency”, Hubbell 
contended.
 
256
Hubbell’s writings can be understood as an attempt to reorient the image of the 
engineers as experts not of the exact, but of the experimental. Experimentation had the 
positive connotations of being related to innovation and progress, while simultaneously 
allowing for the fact that experiments might fail to return the results hoped for. As such, the 
“experiment” formed a defensive discursive bulwark against critics of engineering practices, 
and was a rhetorical gesture used by many engineers to protect their image as trustworthy 
experts even when their works did not live up to the expectations of the public.
 
257
Contrary to the experiences of the Dutch irrigation engineers in the Netherlands Indies, 
where the BB felt that its traditional primacy was being assailed by the rising class of BOW 
engineers and their Waterstaat, and where even the ethically minded Minister of Colonies 
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could not muster support for continuation of the Solo works, the American engineers had less 
to fear of Philippine Commission bureaucracy in terms of curtailment of their ambitions. This 
was in part because the interests of the highest levels of civil administration of the Philippines 
and the engineers’ ambitions ran in parallel. It had been the Philippine Commission itself that 
had made the material transformation of the recently annexed islands one of its highest 
priorities. Engineers received great support from Taft’s Commission during his tenure as 
Governor-General (1901-1904). Their work even increased in importance under his 
successors James Smith (1906-1909) and William Cameron Forbes (1909-1913).258
Forbes was particularly dedicated to vigorously developing the archipelago’s 
infrastructure, likely due to the fact that prior to obtaining the seat of Governor-General he 
had served as the Commissioner of Commerce and Police. In that role he was tasked with the 
oversight of the BPW, which sent him detailed annual reports of its latest achievements. His 
familiarity and affinity with the Bureau’s plans meant that even the failure of the Osmeña 
works – where he, to the public, had been a visible participant in the process that led to its 
construction – was perceived as a momentary setback, rather than a moment to tighten the 
reins on the engineers.  
 
However, at other levels in the civil administration the authority of the engineers was 
contested. In 1913 the Philippine Assembly debated the merits of an act which would allow 
provincial boards to break contracts, discharge district engineers at the end of their contracts, 
reduce salaries, and, more threateningly, hold them personally liable for failures. The district 
engineers expressed their opposition to these plans at their conference held in Manila in 
February 1913, fearing that they would have to obey the orders of their “two ‘masters’” on the 
three-man provincial boards if the act would pass.259
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3.3. Developmental strategies compared 
 
When the Second Philippine Commission, headed by Taft from 1901 to 1903, began its task 
of governing the islands it found the public infrastructure to be in a deplorable state. Aside 
from such issues as the underdeveloped port facilities in Manila – where, lacking a protected 
anchorage, ships could find no shelter from the seasonal storms – it found the roads to be in a 
particularly decrepit condition. Because the archipelago’s climate lashed the roads with heavy 
rains, continual maintenance was of great importance to keep them in a usable state. However, 
due to the guerilla war, this had not been possible in previous years, and the transport 
network, already weak in Spanish times, had degraded considerably. It was obvious that the 
absence of a working logistical network would frustrate the Commission’s plans for 
developing the economy of the colony: without decent transportation, the Commission’s push 
for lower tariffs on products from the Philippines entering the United States (to raise demand), 
and the encouragement of investment in the islands (to increase production) would come to 
naught if products could not be moved out of the colony. Aside from improving Manila 
harbor, a great deal of attention was thus devoted to developing the overland transport 
capacity of the islands.260 James Wallace Beardsley, the consulting engineer for the 
Commission, stated in 1901 that to him “[t]he general subject of improved transportation 
occupies a primary position.”261
  Roads had more than just economic value for Beardsley and the Commission. They 
were also considered an indicator of the level of civilization, as expressed in the 
Commission’s 1900 report: “It may be asserted as a truism that people without roads are 
necessarily savage, because society is impossible; and just to the extent that roads are lacking 
or defective, real progress is retarded and prosperity hindered.”
 
262
In this chapter the developmental strategies used by the Americans in the Philippines 
and by the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies will be examined in closer detail. By focusing on 
the meanings invested in the technologies that the engineers brought to island chains to 
 By constructing roads, the 
Americans believed they were providing the Filipinos with this prerequisite for civilization 
and uplifting them from their state of savagery.  
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transform the material environment of the two colonies, their specific visions for the 
development of the archipelagoes will be drawn into focus. 
 In the Philippines the progress of road policy was slow during the first years due to the 
limited funding the administration had at its disposal. Forbes, who became secretary of 
commerce and police in 1904 and as such counted infrastructure development amongst the 
responsibilities in his portfolio, hoped to speed up construction with a bill he drafted that 
demanded that able-bodied men provide five days of labor annually for road construction. 
However, implementation was delayed and resisted at the provincial level due to this 
compulsory aspect because it was reminiscent of Spanish coercive practices. In 1906, the 
recently installed Governor-General Smith provided an alternative legislative framework with 
several bills of his own. These prescribed that provincial boards that agreed to double the 
cedula tax (a poll tax) for road construction would receive additional funding from the central 
colonial government. This incentive led to the rapid adoption of the higher taxes, and all 
provinces had implemented the bill by 1909. That year Forbes leveraged his close relations 
with Taft, who had succeeded in winning the presidency after Roosevelt had finished his 
second (though first full) term, to take over as Governor-General from Smith.263 During the 
four years of Forbes’ tenure the mileage of first-class roads more than quadrupled and second-
class roads almost doubled.264
 Forbes explained his motivations for attaching such importance to the issue of road-
construction in a 1908 circular to officials involved with road policy on the Philippine Islands. 
He introduced his ideas by stating that “[n]o matter how rich, fertile, and productive land may 
be, the owners and inhabitants of it can only realize a fraction of its value if there is no market 
for its products. They are thrown back into the primitive state of living where each person 
instead of producing the things which he can produce most economically and selling them, 
and with the money buying things he which others can produce economically, will produce 
for himself a poor class of [goods]… The construction of a road immediately puts the vigor of 
life into the agriculture and industry of the region which it opens.” Roads, he contended, were 
the measurement by which it was possible to ascertain the “merit of a government and the 
degree of its administration.” And while Napoleon “is considered one of the greatest 
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administrative officers that ever lived” according to Forbes, in his eyes the most tangible 
remaining artifacts of the French conqueror’s administration were his roads.265
 In other words, roads performed three roles according to Forbes. First, improved 
transportation expanded the scope of the economy and allowed for more exchange. These 
market forces would allow for greater specialization by laborers, transforming them from self-
sustaining workers into more efficient market-oriented producers and consumers. This 
element of the plan for economically developing the islands through increased exchange was 
supplemented with the construction of reinforced concrete market buildings throughout the 
archipelago’s municipalities. By 1908 a special market construction program was launched by 
the BPW that built these marketplaces using standardized designs.
 
266
 Second, well-kept roads projected a sense of development, and acted as a source of 
legitimacy for a government. This played into the third final element of Forbes’ vision: once 
roads were established and had proven their value to the populace, they acted as permanent 
improvements. As with the switch to reinforced concrete for the market buildings, Americans 
constructed roads using techniques that were in use throughout the West: following the design 
recommendations of the ASCE, tar macadam roads were laid out throughout the Philippine 
Islands, while at other times this technique was combined with the concrete highway 
foundations in use with the New York State Highway Commission.
 
267
 The engineers of the Bureau of Public Works shared Forbes’ enthusiasm for road 
work. We have already seen that Beardsley, prior to serving as the first director of the BPW 
from 1905 until 1908, thought that improving transportation was of great importance. After 
his departure from the post, the personnel of the Bureau continued to expend great sums on 
road works: during the 1911 fiscal year almost half of their total budget of close to ten million 
pesos was dedicated to road improvement, with building work coming in second at 
approximately thirty per cent of the budget.
 Though he did not use 
as many words, Forbes clearly was under the impression that the roads the engineers were 
constructing would be permanent monuments to the improvement wrought by the Philippine 
Commission’s administration. 
268
                                                          
265 W. Cameron Forbes, “Letter of the Secretary of Commerce and Police to all provincial, municipal, and other 
officials relative to the present road policy in the Philippine Islands,” Manila, June 16th 1908;  Public Works; 
General, 7152; Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, 350; National Archives at College Park, MD. 
  
266 “Market construction program,” Bureau of Public Works Quarterly Bulletin 2, no. 3 (October 1st 1913): 9-15. 
267 C.E. Gordon, “An experiment in macadam asphalt construction,” ” Bureau of Public Works Quarterly 
Bulletin 1, no. 4 (January 1st 1913): 19-21, and H.V. Miles, “Concrete Highways,” ” Bureau of Public Works 
Quarterly Bulletin 1, no. 4 (January 1st 1913): 21-24. 
268 Insert contained between pages 12 and 13 in Greene, "Annual Report of the Director of Public Works, 1911." 
75 
 
 
 
In addition, the engineers also infused their work with the supposed civilizing power 
of roads. The pages of the Quarterly Bulletin were filled with articles on road work, and even 
though the majority of these submissions were of a technical kind – detailing the costs 
incurred during construction, or the method of labor management used – many were also of a 
more general nature, revealing the engineer’s belief in the transformative power of their work. 
Particularly noteworthy in that regard are the poems that litter the Bulletin’s pages, which 
were often reproduced from magazines printed in the United States. In one stanza from a 
poem lifted from Highway Magazine, the author distanced himself from the “hermit souls that 
live withdrawn” and instead implored: 
 
“Let me live in a house by the side of the road, 
Where the race of men go by, 
The men who are good, and the men who are bad, 
As good and bad as I. 
I would not sit in the scorner’s seat, 
Or hurl the cynic’s ban— 
Let me live by the side of the road, 
And be a friend to man.”269
 
 
The poems always included mention of roads, and were almost without exception equally 
endearingly clumsy. Each described the world from the engineer’s perspective, and described 
the role their works and profession had on the society that lived in the environment they 
created.  
Other submissions took the form of lengthy travelogues interwoven with tables 
detailing such items as the increasing road mileage in the archipelago, or new plans for 
extending the transport network into still to be unlocked hinterlands. Like most of the articles 
in the Quarterly Bulletin’s glossy pages, these reports were designed to be visually 
stimulating; the BPW provided its personnel with cameras, allowing many photographs to be 
inserted into the narratives.270
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account of a group of American mountaineers who had scaled its peak. Included in the aside 
were photographs of the landscapes they encountered and the hardship they endured along the 
way: in one shot a member of the expedition could be seen squeezing the moisture from moss 
growing on the rocks for nourishment.271 Such an article full of adventure must have appealed 
to the engineers reading the bulletin: they would likely have grown accustomed to seeing the 
members of their profession depicted as conquerors of space and as cowboy-like 
frontiersmen, as they were in a growing body of American literary works from the 1890s 
onwards.272
Von Schmeling also used his travelogue to make several claims about the political 
environment in which public works were built. He opined in several of its opening paragraphs 
that “[i]n all countries of the world where this class of public work [road work] is carried on, 
with funds secured by a personal tax collection, an element of favoritism, for political 
interests, influences detrimentally the progress of the undertaking… Satisfactory results will 
be obtained only when broadminded officials put aside their whims or speculations, adopt a 
definite policy and program, and carry it out systematically, overcoming all obstacles.” Von 
Schmeling contended that the self-interest of the taxpayers often stood at odds with the 
government’s role of acting as the “father of a large community with mutual interests.” He 
found that in the Philippines, however, the government had succeeded in establishing a policy 
that overcame these obstacles—a policy that was to a large extent crafted and implemented by 
the BPW’s personnel. Together with railroads, the roads would serve as the “arteries, giving 
life to the entire body” of Philippine society.
 
273
As the years went by the traffic arteries fed a larger and larger area of the Philippines. 
Hoping to provide further incentives for both the civil engineers involved in road works and 
the provincial governments that funded their activities, the secretary of commerce and police 
began awarding cash prizes from 1910 onwards to provinces that had succeeded most in 
maintaining or extending their road networks. The director of the BPW served as the chief of 
the committee of Filipino Assembly members that doled out the awards.
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E.D. Smith, working in the Ilocos Sur province, became the recipient of a Michelin gold 
medal. The prize would proudly be figured on the cover of the Quarterly Bulletin.275
Railroad construction, the “main artery” in Von Schmeling’s vision for the 
Philippines, lagged well behind the extension of the road network in the archipelago. 
Legislation passed in 1905 that gave the Philippine government a role in efforts to build more 
railways, and in the following year concessions were granted to two syndicates from the 
United States. Under the agreement the Philippine Railway Company and Manila Railroad 
Company were expected to expand the small network in the Philippines that had existed since 
Spanish times to a combined total of 1,183 miles.
 
276 By 1912 the Manila Rail Company had 
succeeded in realizing less than two-thirds of the mileage agreed upon, and the work of the 
Philippine Railway Company had stalled entirely that year; the latter even attempted to have 
its concession revised to get out from under some of the projects it had agreed to build.277
This stood in sharp contrast to the veritable railway boom that held the Netherlands 
Indies in its grip at the time. The railways in the colony were initially off to a slow start: in the 
late 1870s the network on Java was less than 200 miles in total, while Britain’s India was by 
then already furnished with over 8,000 miles.
 
Roads thus remained the most visible public works improvements in the Philippines. 
278 In the years that followed the pace of 
construction picked up, and an 1899 map of Java shows that by then the network had grown 
fourfold compared to two decades earlier.279 The colonial government had an important hand 
in achieving this feat: a lack of private interest in the concessions granted on the island made 
government involvement necessary.280 With the rapid expansion of the colony’s exports after 
the turn of the century, more investment originating from private sources became available, 
but the Staatsspoorwegen (State Railways) would remain the largest railway company on the 
islands by far, exploiting over 1,600 miles of railroads on Java alone by 1925.281
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these failed in a formal sense as they were absorbed into the bureaucracy—but in practice, 
they operated highly autonomously vis-à-vis other institutional structures, which led Van 
Doorn to label them the first bloc of technocratic power to be established in the colony.282
Despite the importance of the railways in furnishing the increasing exports and 
expanding the colonial economy of the Netherlands Indies, many did not consider the 
growing railroad network to be an example of “ethical” policy. In the Dutch chamber of 
representatives the Indies Specialists Van Kol and Van Deventer registered their concern that 
the expensive railways were sapping precious funding from irrigation projects.
 
283 Although 
sharply diverging figures for the annual expenditure on the two technical fields exist in the 
literature,284 there can be no doubt that railway construction was an especially capital 
intensive industry. The locomotives were bought from manufacturers in Britain, Germany and 
the United States due to the lack of an equivalent industry in the Netherlands.285 The absence 
of steel mills in the colony also necessitated the importation of the steel required for the rails 
and bridges that carried the heavy trains, with the shipping of these items to the colony further 
adding to the cost.286
Aside from the cost aspect, Van Kol was also convinced that the railways served the 
business interests in the Netherlands Indies instead of the welfare of the local population. It 
was certainly true that the railways on Sumatra, where the growth of plantation exploitation 
and the railway network was particularly vigorous in the early twentieth century, were built 
primarily to support the interests of the plantation owners. Van Kol denounced these motives 
in the strongest terms in a 1900 speech on the budget,  when he asserted that railway building 
ran in parallel with the capitalist exploitation of the colony.
 
287
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beholden to the interests of the European class in the Netherlands Indies. A 1904 government 
investigation into the use of passenger trains in the colony revealed that the number of 
Indonesian passengers was increasing explosively.288 Nor was Van Kol himself immune to 
the charm of railway travel in the archipelago. In 1903, during an extensive tour of the island 
chain, he marveled at the fact that he could travel safely by train through Aceh, which had 
only shortly before been the theatre of colonial warfare, leading him to be labeled “truly a 
pure-idea model colonial passenger” by the historian Rudolf Mrázek.289
The prominent colonial irrigation engineer J. Homan van der Heide – head of BOW’s 
Irrigation Brigade and later also director of the BOW from 1911 until 1914 – was not dazzled 
by the railways. He sharply agitated against the idea that railways and other transportation had 
as direct an impact on the welfare of the indigenous population as irrigation works. Far from 
being the life-giving arteries to the social body that railroads were in the eyes of Von 
Schmeling a little over a decade later, Homan van der Heide described railway-heavy Java in 
a long 1899 pamphlet in which he expressed his support for the resumption of the Solo works 
as a “colossus with a large, shiny head, and an even larger, empty stomach, and weak arms 
and legs.”
  
290
In the following years irrigation became a plank of the ethical policy whereas 
transportation development did not, a point the irrigation engineers continued to hammer 
home. At the general conference of the KIvI engineers working in the Netherlands Indies, 
held on December 21st of 1904 in Batavia, the member Ligtvoet gave a presentation on a 
report he authored concerning the feasibility of railway construction on southern Sumatra. He 
ended by noting that improving the transportation network would lead to greater prosperity on 
the island, which elicited a reaction from the engineer Meijers seated in the audience. Meijers 
made reference to Homan van der Heide’s comparison in the years before of the nut (utility) 
of railways on the one hand and irrigation on the other, which he thought was a commendable 
effort, though he was wary of the rivalry these comparisons might breed. Nevertheless, he 
made a point of asserting that railroads had little to do with the “ethical duty” of the Dutch. 
The Sumatra railroad was more likely to be about private enrichment, a goal he certainly did 
not oppose, but this should not be confused with the uplift of the colony’s indigenous 
population.  
 He used the somatic metaphor to argue that from his perspective a lack of 
nourishment rather than impaired mobility was what ailed the colonial body. 
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Meijers then went on to propose four motions to be debated at the next gathering, with 
one of them stating that Ligtvoet’s railway on Sumatra could not be said to fulfill the ethical 
duty of the Dutch toward the Indonesians. His proposal was accepted, but at the gathering in 
the following month the members consented almost unanimously not to bring these motions 
up to a vote. Although this was decided under the guise of the fact that the motions pertained 
to social rather than technical issues – to which Meijers and another member objected, stating 
that social issues were certainly relevant to their professional practice – it is not at all unlikely 
that those present did not wish to see their society split by the rivalry of the two competing 
lobbies.291
The claim of the irrigation engineers that their works were more in line with the needs 
of the indigenous population was underpinned by pointing to the long history of the practice 
on Java. In a speech held at the Colonial Agricultural Exposition held in the Netherlands in 
1912, the editor of De Ingenieur Van Sandick – himself an ex-employee of the waterstaat in 
the Netherlands Indies – told his audience that it had not been the Dutch who made the 
Javanese turn to irrigation; the latter had made that commitment themselves when they began 
growing rice in paddies. What the Dutch engineers were doing was improving the indigenous 
practices: the Javanese lacked the technical capabilities to build systems that could withstand 
the onslaught of nature, which often took the form of the dreaded bandjir, making the 
technical acumen of the Dutch engineers necessary to create works of a permanent nature.  
 
Van Sandick claimed in his speech that the BB deserved the blame for the engineers’ 
lack of success throughout most of the nineteenth century. During that time the administrators 
of the BB were unwilling to provide the funding required to build integrated systems, so that 
chaotic and disjointed headworks were thrown up throughout the agricultural regions. In 
addition, the engineer was often sent off once the main works were completed, leaving the 
local population to fend with the problem of building the secondary works and administering 
the water flows.292
In fact, engineers often simply proved as unable as the Javanese to build structures that 
could weather the force of the bandjirs. In the Sampean delta, where the most disastrous 
attempt at “permanent” improvement took place, a dam built in 1852 gave way after five 
years and had to be repaired annually. The enormous amounts of manpower expended in the 
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process, in combination with the failure of the irrigation works to increase the harvest, 
actually ended up impoverishing the local population. It would take until 1900 for a 
permanent solution to be built.293
But to Van Sandick, the stinginess and technical ignorance of the BB was the root 
cause of this disappointing period in colonial irrigation engineering. In his speech he 
welcomed the changes of the waterstaatsreglement of 1885 which gave engineers the 
resources to make detailed technical studies and use Western construction techniques that the 
BB had deemed too expensive. The fact that the irrigation engineers also gained control over 
the management and maintenance of the works after completing them, through the irrigatie-
afdelingen (irrigation departments) set up in the years after the waterstaatsreglement was 
adopted, was also a positive development according to Van Sandick.
 
294 These new 
institutional arrangements indeed led to the very real shift of authority from the BB to the 
technical experts of the BOW.295
The practices of the Dutch irrigation engineers in the Netherlands Indies had also 
improved considerably in those years. After the waterstaatsreglement came in force the BOW 
began to perform in-depth technical studies of the regions they were tasked with improving. 
These preparations were followed with detailed plans that went beyond the construction of the 
primary headworks, and came to include the secondary and tertiary canals and the sluices that 
controlled water flow. An integrated, “systematic” approach emerged.
 
296
The irrigation engineers did not behave as an insular community when they developed 
these new methods. They instead continually compared the practices in use in other irrigated 
zones across the globe with their own. British work in Egypt, and particularly India, appeared 
often in these treatises, but the Dutch did not restrict their views merely to the colonized parts 
of the world. Van Sandick introduced the American irrigation engineering space to his 
audience with a presentation at the conference of the KIvI in 1906, with the text being 
reprinted in De Ingenieur. He drew from his experiences traveling to the Engineering 
Congress held in Saint Louis in 1904, where De Meyier had contributed to the panel on 
irrigation. Van Sandick’s presentation on the legal arrangements pertaining to irrigation in the 
United States was emphatically organized around the idea that lessons might be drawn from 
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the American practices for the benefit of the Netherlands Indies.297 The account would inspire 
the later director of the BOW P.J. Ott de Vries to use his 1907 furlough to travel to the United 
States to witness these methods firsthand. He published a long report of the insights he had 
gained in the periodical of the KIvI members of the Netherlands Indies, headlining it with 
Roosevelt’s remark to Congress that “[n]othing could be more unwise than for isolated 
communities to continue learning everything experimentally, instead of profiting by what is 
known elsewhere.”298
Nevertheless, the Dutch remained wedded to the idea that improvements in agriculture 
would uplift the peoples of the Netherlands Indies best, whereas the Americans in the 
Philippines sought to transform their colony through the construction of roads. The causes for 
these different strategies can in part be ascribed to the very different population densities of 
the colonies. Because many considered Java to be nearing overpopulation, emigration of 
Indonesians to the outer islands became one of the elements of the Ethical Policy, with 
irrigation serving to improve the fortunes of those who stayed behind. The Philippines, with 
its much smaller population and lower population density, faced no such problems.  
 It is one of the many examples that show that, in terms of the 
techniques they were applying, the Dutch irrigation engineers in the Netherlands Indies – and, 
going by De Ingenieur, the engineers of other fields in the profession in general – were not 
beholden to a parochial perspective. 
Remarkably, the supporters of these differing visions in either colony often took to 
grounding their visions in historical precedent to further strengthen their arguments for the 
policies they wished to pursue, with Forbes pointing to Napoleon’s legacy in Europe and Van 
Sandick to the Javanese indigenous practices. Some engineers of the BPW and the BOW 
looked even further into the past, finding continuity in their present efforts with those 
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practiced by ancient civilizations.299 The government of the Netherlands-Indies even resorted 
to sending engineers to Italy to study the tradition of irrigation there.300
Another aspect of this focus on history was the hope of the engineers in either colony 
to bring “permanent improvement” to the material cultures of the indigenous peoples they 
worked to uplift. This permanence was in turn a legitimating force for colonial rule—but like 
the Roman aqueducts and the Napoleonic roads, they might continue to serve the populace 
long after the empires that built them had disappeared. In that regard the words spoken by Ott 
de Vries at the celebrations in honor of the 75th anniversary of the KIvI were prescient: 
“should our nation unexpectedly be destined to one day leave the Indies for good, then the 
Dutch people can thank their engineers for the fact that the Indonesians must say: yes, the 
Dutch may have left, but they have left their monuments behind.”
  
301
These different technological preferences of the Dutch and American engineers, and 
the different material outcomes their works were expected to produce, were also intended to 
produce different social outcomes. On the economic front, the American administration of the 
Philippines and its engineers hoped to transform the archipelago into an integrated market that 
could more efficiently allocate its (agricultural) products amongst the populace and in so 
doing elevate the general level of prosperity. In terms of social development, roads were 
considered the bearers of civilization: the savagery of the isolated communities would come 
to an end once they were connected to the road network. The Dutch government of the 
Netherlands Indies on the other hand focused on increasing the total agricultural production, 
rather than attempting to more efficiently balance supply and demand. The irrigation 
engineers constituted their work as an ethical and civilizing practice under the motto 
“civilization begins at the stomach.”
 Some engineers therefore 
believed they were creating something more than practical works—they were building 
monuments to their own ingenuity. 
302
It is striking that in the American colony the plans of the civil administration and those 
of the engineers of the BPW ran in parallel: both embraced roadwork, especially during the 
time that Forbes was responsible for the operations of the Bureau. In the Netherlands Indies 
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the competition between the railway engineers and the irrigation engineers did not produce a 
practical primacy of one technical field over all others as it did in the Philippines. But the 
“lobby” of the latter group did succeed in portraying and securing irrigation as a uniquely 
ethical practice, an image the irrigation engineers vigorously policed and protected. 
Consequently, the vast majority of the BOW directors were drawn from its cadre of irrigation 
specialists. 
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3.4. Additional developmental strategies 
 
The fact that roads and irrigation emerged as the respective core civilizing tools of the 
engineering Bureaus in Manila and Weltevreden did not mean that other technical fields could 
not be considered “benevolent” or “ethical” too. The engineering projects that were closely 
related to the efforts to improve hygiene in the colonies come to mind as clear illustrations of 
this point. Sanitation infrastructure and clean water supplies were geared towards preventing 
outbreaks of epidemic disease like cholera and dysentery, while improvements in drainage 
also helped to combat malaria. The boring of artesian wells to provide clean water had a long 
history in the Netherlands Indies, dating back to the seventeenth century, and the BOW took 
up the task of drilling the wells for the indigenous population from the earliest days of the 
Bureau.303 The many mentions in the Philippine Commission Reports and the Quarterly 
Bulletin of artesian well boring for the promotion of the well-being of the Filipinos, and the 
process that led to the building of the Osmeña waterworks, indicate that the American 
colonial government and the BPW also expended considerable effort on providing clean 
water.304
Furthermore, American and Dutch colonial engineers were at times inspired by the 
progress made in public works abroad and sought to emulate those achievements in their own 
locales. We have already seen in the segment on “Java” how the personnel of the BPW looked 
to the examples of British India and especially Java in search of ways to enhance the 
agricultural output of the Philippines. When Forbes replaced Beardsley with James F. Case as 
director of the BPW in late 1908 – because Forbes, then still secretary of commerce and 
police, found Beardsley’s management of the Bureau insufficiently dynamic 
 
305 – the former 
head of the Bureau was sent to study the irrigation methods in use in several colonies, 
including Java.306
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 He submitted his report in 1909, and in the years that followed the 
Americans steadily ramped up their ambitions in the field. They proudly featured their plans 
on a two-page spread in a glossy pamphlet propagandizing the work of the BPW which they 
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distributed at the Philippine Carnival of February of 1911.307
The limited progress of irrigation would long continue to disappoint, at least going by 
the leading article that Chief Designing Engineer of BPW C.E. Gordon penned for a 1916 
issue of the Quarterly Bulletin. While development in the fields of sanitation and health had 
been “excellent”, he found that “[t]he great and outstanding shortcoming of the present time is 
the development of the agricultural potentialities.” BPW personnel would do well to follow 
the meticulous planning methods in use in India and on Java, where Gordon saw a much 
better record of success, adding that “[e]mulation in [sic] the better activities of foreign states 
is not derogatory, but desirable.”
 However, just four months later 
their first large project at Tarlac failed, leading to the reorganization of the irrigation division.  
308
The Dutch personnel of the BOW in turn saw public works being constructed in the 
Philippines that drew their attention. The American engineers in the Philippines had taken up 
the issue of sanitation engineering immediately after their arrival. The Philippine Commission 
had found that “[t]he sanitary condition of the city of Manila at the date of American invasion 
resembled that of European cities in the seventeenth century.”
 
309 They met the challenge 
head-on and with considerable success: mortality rates due to infectious disease had declined 
sharply in their wake. It would take much longer for their colleagues in the Netherlands Indies 
to put sanitation on the agenda: only in 1915 was a separate division set up for the task within 
the BOW.310
Support for greater engineering intervention in the public health programs had been 
growing among the Dutch engineers in the preceding years. In the metropole the Sociaal-
Technische Vereeniging van Demokratische Ingenieurs en Architecten (Social-Technical 
Society of Democratic Engineers and Architects) was founded in 1904 to promote technical 
solutions to improve the wellbeing and prosperity of the population.
  
311
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Charles G. Cramer in 1914 on the socio-technical role of the engineer in the Netherlands 
Indies.  
Cramer was an irrigation engineer in the colony, and was the secretary of the 
Vereeniging van Waterstaats-ingenieurs (Society of waterstate engineers) in the Netherlands 
Indies. The society had been founded in 1913 and gradually enticed almost every irrigation 
engineer working in the archipelago to join its ranks.312 During his time on furlough in the 
Netherlands Cramer acted as the Society’s representative, so that the opportunity to speak at 
the alma mater of nearly every Dutch engineer was a fine opportunity to propagandize the 
work in the colony. He cited the harrowing mortality figures caused by epidemic disease 
among the indigenous population living in the large cities of Semarang and Batavia to argue 
for more improvement in sanitation.313 He revealed his technocratic tendencies by claiming 
that issues of hygiene could only be dealt with adequately by engineers and medical 
professionals because the BB was – one detects a hint of sarcasm in his speech – “too busy 
with all kinds of administrative work.”314
Cramer’s hosts published his speech as a booklet (in part to boost the chapter of their 
society they had set up in the colony in the same year) and, not unexpectedly, it received a 
favorable review in the journal of the Vereeniging van Waterstaats-ingenieurs.
  
315 But even 
though the journal was conceived as a platform for promoting the parochial professional 
interests of its members, it still had an outward-looking interest in engineering practices in use 
elsewhere. For example, its editors were favorably impressed by the work of the corps of 
sanitary-engineers working in the Philippines, and suggested that a division might be set up in 
the Netherlands Indies along similar lines.316
Dutch colonial engineers, like their American colleagues, thus expanded their arsenal 
of technical solutions to social problems and developed their ideas in a context that was 
broader than their own respective colonies and metropoles. Furthermore, prominent 
employees of either public works department – particularly in the Netherlands Indies – 
claimed to possess a special mandate to deal with the issue of public health. To support this 
technocratic claim, the engineers referred to the belief their profession had a powerful 
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component of social as well as technical authority: they were supposedly experts of the 
improvement of society as well as technology. 
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3.5. Shortages of personnel: only vigorous men need apply 
 
James Wallace Beardsley was faced with a daunting challenge as the chief consulting 
engineer of Taft’s Philippine Commission: he had to create an engineering bureau from 
scratch and staff it. Finding sufficient numbers of trained engineers was particularly difficult, 
and the issue of personnel shortages was a problem that would continue to dog the BPW 
throughout much of its existence. At the BOW, the situation was no different. Even though 
the number of trained irrigation engineers more than doubled between 1910 and 1920 (after 
having remained steady at slightly less than one hundred men in the preceding decade) many 
articles in De Ingenieur and De Waterstaats-ingenieur were dedicated to uncovering the 
causes for the apparent difficulty of attracting staff in adequate numbers. In their written 
correspondence and journal submissions on the topic, the personnel of both Bureaus and those 
sympathetic to their cause articulated their vision of what the ideal recruit – and by extension, 
colonial engineer – looked like and how they could be drawn to the colony. This section will 
draw into focus what that vision was, and explore the strategies the engineers turned to in 
their search for new recruits. 
 Beardsley could count on the support of Taft in the years that the latter was seated in 
the Philippine Commission. Taft submitted a request in early 1901 to the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs (BIA) asking it to reach out to engineering colleges to entice recent graduates to come 
to Philippines. The BIA followed up on the request in May by sending letters to the presidents 
of the engineering departments of some seventy approved schools. Not all schools on the list 
were American: the School of Practical Science in Toronto and the Technical University in 
Munich were also included, though they were added to the list later in handwriting.317 But 
even when the BIA appeared to have succeeded in its recruiting effort, it still suffered 
setbacks: from the first batch twelve engineers it had selected two withdrew in the weeks that 
followed.318
Because engineers working for the Philippine Commission were to be employed by 
the federal government, their hiring took place through the system of the Civil Service 
Commission. By demanding that aspiring applicants for federal jobs pass examinations, this 
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institution saw to it that they entered into service on the basis of their merits rather than 
through patronage relations. But in 1902 none of the men on the Civil Service Commission’s 
list of available personnel were willing to take up a post in the Philippines.319 This pattern of 
eligible men declining jobs in the colony continued in the years that followed, so that assistant 
chief of the BIA Frank McIntyre began looking to the workforce of other federal departments 
such as the Reclamation Service in hopes of finding suitable personnel for service in the 
archipelago. These efforts failed on account of the wages offered being too low.320 The 
difficulties in attracting adequate numbers of staff must have been well known outside the 
BIA because McIntyre was approached in 1907 by headhunting agencies in the United States 
offering to supply him with the men he needed.321 But even their mediation was no panacea: 
McIntyre found that the men put forward by the “brain brokers” of Hapgoods Inc. in most 
cases were not trained for the specific tasks that awaited them in the Philippines or were too 
old,322 whereas none of those recommended by the Cleveland Engineering Agency (which 
submitted a sample list of candidates it described as “live” and “capable”323) had passed the 
civil service exams.324
Frustration with the troublesome state of affairs was mounting in Manila. Beardsley, 
who had personally gone on the hunt for suitable candidates in late 1906 when he made plans 
to visit several technical colleges in the United States,
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continued shortage of personnel in his 1907 report as director of the BPW to the Philippine 
Commission. He acknowledged that pay was too low and career perspectives too limited to 
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compliance with the regulations of the Civil Service imposed costs aside from the benefits.326 
Those costs stood in the way of finding what the Philippine service needed: “more 
particularly young men, recent graduates, healthy morally and physically.”327
W.S. Washburn, at the time the head of the Civil Service Bureau in Manila, rejected 
this kind of criticism of the examination system. In a personal letter he wrote to McIntyre to 
specifically address the staff problems at the engineering department, he presented what he 
perceived to be the causes of the problematic situation. For one, the negative portrayals in 
American periodicals of the conditions in the archipelago appeared to be hampering the 
recruitment effort. Washburn was under the impression that the authors of those depictions 
“have been industriously writing about the climate of the Philippines, emphasizing its 
unhealthfulness and the dangers upon attending residence here by the white men”—even 
though he believed the statistics made available by the Bureau of Health on the islands did not 
support such assertions. These negative depictions of the islands turned away otherwise 
interested applicants. Furthermore, open positions were insufficiently announced in 
engineering periodicals. Washburn feared that unless action was taken to countermand these 
problems – for instance by having the War Department publish reports detailing the benign 
conditions in the archipelago – the civil service selection system was in danger of being done 
away with. Due to his conviction that the professional challenges of the work in the 
Philippines were greater than those faced by engineers working the United States, he stressed 
that it was vital that “superior men” of above average qualities be found for the service, 
something only the selection system could guarantee.
 
328
Washburn’s fears were not unfounded. In the following years the engineers in the 
Philippines indeed attempted to partially circumvent the Civil Service System—but they 
managed to gain an endorsement of their plans from Washburn’s successor B.L. Falconer. He 
underwrote a 1910 plan of Chief Engineer of the BPW C.M. Pritchett to send letters to 
professors at ten engineering colleges, asking each of them to provide the names of two 
promising students equipped with “good ordinary horse sense” and capable of working 
independently. The students would be promised positions at the BPW prior to completing the 
Civil Service exams. The letter concluded by praising the opportunities afforded by the 
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Philippine Service, and in a slightly unsettling attempt to allay any concerns about life on the 
islands, ended with Pritchett’s remark that “[t]he tropical climate is delightful, and the death 
rate among Americans is far lower than any state I know of in the Union.”329
Only two letters were sent before Clarence Edwards, the Chief of the BIA, caught 
wind of the scheme and sent an urgent memorandum to the Secretary of War, requesting that 
he be allowed to alert Governor-General Forbes to “in order that we may prevent the spread 
of this evil against civil service principles.”
  
330 Ironically, Edwards had himself had 
contributed to the search for potential recruits for the Philippine engineer corps a decade 
earlier, and perhaps it was this perceived insult of being circumvented that made him resort to 
such hyperbolic language. Regardless, it was effective: communications between Washington 
and Manila and within the administration of the colony itself show that the BPW was put back 
in line with the civil service regulations.331
Despite the various obstacles to recruitment, American engineers had begun to make 
their way to the Philippines in significant numbers in the years prior to the dust-up between 
the BPW and the Civil Service. One of them was Halsema, the later designer of the Osmeña 
waterworks. He had spotted an ad for the position of civil engineer in the colony in a March 
1908 issue of Engineering News, did well on the exams, and embarked for Manila less than 
half a year later with seven other recruits. Not all of them were Americans; he was 
accompanied by a Russian and a Swedish colleague.
 
332 They officially joined the BPW the 
following year, when some fifty-four new engineers in total joined the Bureau. Its personnel 
now numbered 860, twice the figure it had been just twelve months earlier.333
Although this enormous growth rate tapered off in the years that followed, the Bureau 
could boast over 1,600 employees by mid-1912, when it was at its largest; a slow but steady 
decrease set in thereafter.
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Bureau employment peaked, were almost exclusively Americans. The attrition of personnel 
was also slowing over the course of this period, with the average duration of time employed in 
the colony doubling to almost four years in the 1911-1915 period.335 Interest in their work 
was also growing in the United States itself: articles on their efforts appeared in leading 
journals, and Beardsley was invited to speak at Clark University to tell of the progress in the 
field of public works in the Philippines.336
The American engineers who left for the Philippines did not receive any kind of 
preliminary training for their new work environment: Halsema, for example, had to learn 
Spanish while being there.
 Unbeknownst to the Americans working for the 
BPW, these would be their golden years at the helm of the Bureau.  
337 The Dutch engineers, one the other hand, had the option of 
taking classes on Javanese during their studies in Delft, unless they enrolled in the irrigation 
curriculum: in that case learning the language was actually a mandatory part of their 
education.338
De Roever, born in the Dutch city of Den Helder, had traveled far and wide by the 
time he committed his experiences to paper in Santiago in 1909. Prior to his voyage to the 
colony, had been employed by the Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg 
Maatschappij, a railway company in South Africa. His employment there ended when the 
outbreak of the Boer War led to his expulsion from the country. De Roever, by then already in 
his late thirties, and his wife Lientje thereupon decided to try their luck in the Netherlands 
 Those who arrived unprepared in the Netherlands Indies might face trying times 
during their time in the colony. One individual who became particularly embittered during his 
years in the archipelago was the railway engineer Bastiaan de Roever, who wrote a 
retrospective of his three years in the colony for his wife. Although he appears as a deeply 
cynical man, finding fault with almost everything, everywhere and anyone – with the 
exception of the city of Paris, where he spent a week and for once did not complain of the 
boredom that plagued him everywhere else – his fascinating outsider account deserves to be 
treated in detail because it illuminates the sense of isolation and exclusion that a person 
unfamiliar with Dutch colonial society might feel. 
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Indies where he had found a job at the Semarang-Cheribon railway. Traveling south through 
Europe in late 1901 on the way to the port of embarkation in Marseille, he had his first 
experience with the racial boundaries that defined personal relations in the Netherlands Indies 
when he met an “Armenian” who hailed from the colony and was on a return voyage to 
Soerabaja. De Roever made pleasant acquaintance with the man who told him he had made 
his fortune in trade and, opening up about his personal life, told him that his hopes to marry 
the daughter of a Dutch army officer had recently been dashed when her family rejected him. 
The reasons for the rejection would become clear to De Roever when he experienced social 
relations in the colony firsthand: the Armenian, with his dark skin tone, was not accepted by 
the European caste in the Netherlands Indies society that was so bound up in its obsession 
with “whiteness.”339
De Roever would soon learn that the boundaries were not only of a racial, but also of a 
class nature. Arriving in Batavia he was struck by how posh the Dutch comported themselves 
and how infectious this behavior was. When Lientje ran into their old friend Bloem, a jovial 
fellow when they had last seen him six years before, and jumped at him to greet him, he took 
off his hat, bowed, and greeted her with “madam.” To De Roever’s regret, Bloem had been 
transformed into a “gentleman”—but obviously not in a good sense.
 
340 He soon discovered 
what appeared to him to be the strict rules that governed personal relations: in order to elicit a 
greeting from anyone, it was first necessary to make a formal visit to their home and make 
acquaintance; and when passing in the street the party with the lowest salary was expected to 
extend their greetings first. The incessant and obligatory social gatherings that defined 
evening life also appeared to De Roever to follow a strict script. When the company was 
entirely European, then all would complain about the Indonesians and laugh at their expense. 
But when company was mixed, a paranoid pall fell over all who were present, and in this 
atmosphere of distrust the only permissible topic of discussion was careerist talk of salaries 
and promotion.341
As a “baroe” or newcomer in the colony, De Roever felt like he was being deliberately 
left to his own devices to learn these rules.
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 This sense of exclusion was exacerbated by 
what he felt was the unbridgeable distance between the Europeans and the Indonesians. When 
he asked an indo for directions the reply came with a “sweet smile”, but he had no doubt that 
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the man “was cursing me in his heart.” He believed that the Javanese were “a people that has 
never been understood by a European and never will be,” revealing that he was not sanguine 
about the chance that the Dutch project to uplift the colony might succeed. The yawning 
divide between himself and the indigenous population developed into a feeling of pressing 
claustrophobia, especially at night: “outside it is dark, pitch dark when there is no moon, 
Javanese shuffle on by, invisibly. Lizards on the ceiling, against the wall, a gecko chatters, 
laughing at the European lost so far from home.”343 Bastiaan and Lientje came to detest the 
nights, when it always felt like an “invisible force” pressed upon him.344
De Roever’s professional life could not improve his mood either. The bureaucratic 
formalities that accompanied work, the never-ending streams of official communications, and 
the posh behavior of his colleagues stood in the way of getting the job done. On several 
occasions De Roever acted promptly and of his own accord to repair damage done to the 
tracks by bandjirs, each time on the way back meeting his colleagues who had spent the 
previous hours and days in intense deliberations on how to solve the problem only to find it – 
to their anger – resolved already.
  
345 When the promised pay raises and promotions were not 
forthcoming, De Roever and Lientje left Semarang, “that accursed mosquito ballroom”, for 
the Netherlands.346 Standing on the deck of their ship, they watched the islands disappear 
behind the horizon, “where we lost three years of our lives.”347
Looking back on his miserable time in the Netherlands Indies, De Roever felt that his 
relatively advanced age had made his attempts to adapt to society in the colony difficult. That 
task was further complicated by the perceived unwillingness of the other Dutch in the colony 
to introduce a baroe like him to their ways. His experiences were apparently part of a larger 
problem: those who wanted to work in the colony, even if they were enthusiastic about the 
prospect, had to surmount several obstacles. For instance, when a Dutch journalist returned 
from the colony and wrote an article in 1909 stating that “the Indies need vigorous young 
men”
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, he received a hundred letters from youthful male readers who were interested in 
working in the colony and inquired whether the author could help them secure a position. The 
author found their request surprising, as Minister of Colonies van Heutsz (the military officer 
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that pacified Aceh held the post between 1904 and 1909) had often lectured that too few 
Dutch made themselves available for working overseas. Clearly, the supply and demand of 
labor for the colony were not operating in tune.349
That problem would also emerge at the BOW around the same time. The Bureau drew 
its personnel almost exclusively from the Technische Hoogeschool in Delft, but even though 
students of civil engineering could follow a curriculum on irrigation and learn Javanese there, 
much would remain to be learned once they ventured to the Netherlands Indies. In his 
inaugural address as the first professor of irrigation studies at Delft (the special chair was not 
set up until 1906), P.Th.L. Grinwis Plaat told his audience precisely that. The unfamiliar 
climate, uncharted terrain, and high degree of operational independence that was immediately 
required of new recruits all conspired to make work in the colony much more challenging for 
a young engineer than in the Netherlands. However, Grinwis Plaat reminded all present of the 
broader horizons that awaited anyone willing to make the leap to the Indies—and that from 
now on, as the special chair of irrigation studies he would help ease any future difficulties 
they might face by making his own experiences as former employee of the BOW available in 
the Delft classroom.
   
350
Despite the propagandizing of the engineering occupation in the Netherlands Indies by 
Grinwis Plaat and his successors, the BOW faced a sharp shortage of irrigation engineers in 
the years that followed. By 1912 the shortfall was estimated at 30 to 35 engineers.
 
351 The 
corps of railway engineers in the Netherlands Indies was also short many hands. This 
mounting problem was not unexpected, nor had it gone unnoticed in the Dutch engineering 
community. As early as 1907 the Vereeniging van Delftsche Ingenieurs established a 
committee, in which Grinwis Plaat was also seated, to investigate how the need for engineers 
in the colony could best be met. Their findings were used by the VDI the next year when it 
sent a missive to Van Heutsz warning him about the high attrition rate at the Bureau and 
Staatsspoorwegen. Four years later they repeated their concerns to his successor Idenburg 
when circumstances were still dire, reprinting their letter to the minister in their journal De 
Ingenieur that they co-published with the KIvI.352
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and transcripts of the conferences where the subject was inevitably brought up. Most were in 
agreement that the wages paid during the first years of employment by the government were 
not competitive with those of the booming private sector in the Netherlands and the colony.353
But many of those writing in the pages of De Ingenieur believed that the issue of high 
tuition costs at Delft was an even greater problem that the unfavorable conditions of 
employment. They contended that instead of trying to obtain a higher share from the pool of 
graduates for the colony, the size of the graduate pool ought to be enlarged by attracting more 
students. Many schemes were floated to help aspiring engineers overcome the hurdle that 
tuition posed. The  VDI argued in favor of reintroducing the old system that allowed students 
to enter into employment agreements with the government while their education was still 
ongoing in return for an annual stipend; others favored a scholarship for all who attended 
classes at Delft.
 
354 The exponents of the various plans each extolled the virtues of their 
specific solutions. For example, J. de Booy, a former chief engineer of the waterstaat in the 
colony, supported the introduction of a large lump sum to be paid out upon graduation. He 
disapproved of the incentives created by re-introducing the offers of early employment; he 
contended that those students who consented to these kind of schemes effectively allowed 
themselves to be “sold”, which he considered a sign of bad character. Instead, “what is needed 
over [in the Netherlands Indies], are assertive men of character, with knowledge of the world, 
life, and the people in it. The highest percentage of them can be found amongst those who 
have sacrificed one or more years to extracurricular activities – by committing themselves to 
special studies, through vigorous participation in fraternity life, etc.” By postponing payment 
until graduation, such “men of character” who hailed from the halls of Delftsch Studenten 
Corps could be secured for colonial service.355
The sense of urgency expressed in De Ingenieur for finding ways to resolve the 
personnel shortage at the BOW was strengthened by the recent affront the colonial engineers 
suffered at the hands of the Dutch government: the latter had begun to hire foreign engineers 
for the colonial service. In 1912 the BOW gained twenty-nine foreign recruits, and the 
Staatsspoorwegen twelve. Two years later twenty per cent of all BOW-personnel were 
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Danish, German, Austrian or Swiss.356 Van Sandick and the board of the VDI, as well as 
many of its members, found this to be an appalling turn of events. They were of the opinion 
that the government, instead of increasing the inadequate wages that had contributed to the 
personnel shortage, was dodging its responsibilities by attracting cheap foreign recruits to fill 
the empty positions.357
That was certainly how it was perceived by the irrigation engineers working in the 
Netherlands Indies, who were becoming increasingly disgruntled with their employer. In 1913 
they set up the Vereeniging van Waterstaats-ingenieurs to promote their “common interest”, 
an agenda that during its first years was synonymous with their demand for 
“positieverbetering”: an improvement of their terms of employment. The campaign had 
originated with Cramer,
 
358 who articulated the hopes and grievances of the waterstaat 
personnel in the colony to an audience of VDI members during his 1913 furlough in the 
Netherlands. He lectured them on how the government had recently reneged on promises 
made to long-serving BOW-personnel when it instituted new, unfavorable rules on 
promotions and pay raises.359 This had soured the atmosphere at the Bureau, a worrisome 
development in and of itself.360
After presenting solutions to the problem, Cramer moved from the “prozaic 
materialistic theme of reimbursements” to another one close to his heart: “the invasion of the 
Indies by engineers with foreign diploma’s and the army corps of engineers.”
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would attract students from lower class backgrounds and degrade the quality of the graduate 
pool. Cramer believed that if the scholarships were sufficiently generous then “the young men 
can become members of the Student Corps, participate in student life more vigorously, and 
rub shoulders with colleagues hailing from more civilized and developed backgrounds.”362 
Cramer and his successor as the representative of the Vereeniging van Waterstaats-ingenieurs 
would meet several times with the Minister of Colonies in the following years to 
communicate their ideas to the upper echelons of the Dutch government, so that their 
grievances were well known outside the engineering community too.363
There is no doubt that the discontent at the waterstaat (and the Staatsspoorwegen) in 
the Netherlands Indies was widespread and founded in very real disagreements on wage 
compensation. But a more proximate cause for the personnel shortage was the fact that the 
BOW was quickly ramping up its activities from the start of the second decade of the 
twentieth century onwards. In the two years prior to Cramer’s lecture the total number of 
irrigation engineers employed by the Bureau had surged by more than forty per cent to 166 
men. Between 1910 and the day Cramer spoke they had irrigated more land than in the entire 
previous decade, increasing the total areal furnished by modern irrigation by more than 
half.
 
364
What seems to have aroused the anger of the leading engineers of BOW most, then, 
was the fact that the Dutch government was changing the make-up of its personnel—hence 
their anger at the appointment of foreign engineers. They believed that the Dutch government 
had an obligation to serve the interests of the engineers trained in the Netherlands. Prior to the 
hiring of the foreigners, the Bureau had effectively been a forward post of the Delft engineers, 
a status they wished to protect. This defensive, guild-like behavior of the employees at the 
waterstaat in the colony explains why they could on the one hand express satisfaction in 1917 
that they had made further entry in to the service of foreigners impossible (erroneously, as the 
number of foreigners would almost triple in the following years) while also railing against the 
Dutch government for causing the Bureau to be understaffed.
 In other words, the Bureau was growing faster and achieving more than ever; by 1920 
it employed more than twice as many irrigation engineers and grew the areal sixfold 
compared to the start of the century. 
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The Delft identity was made all the more important by the fact that almost all of the 
old hands at the BOW who had risen to the upper reaches of the Bureau hierarchy had been 
members of the Delftsch Studenten Corps. Just how strong this additional axis of their identity 
was can be gleaned from the inaugural speech of one of Grinwis Plaat’s successors in the 
irrigation chair of the Technische Hoogeschool: he could not neglect to mention to his 
audience that the two of them had belonged to same jaarclub (yearclub) sub-division of the 
DSC.366
It can be deduced from the absence of complaints about foreign invaders in the 
Philippine Commission Reports that no exclusionary attitudes of similar strength operated at 
the BPW in the Philippines. The high rank of division engineer that Burckhardt von 
Schmeling attained during his service also supports such a conclusion. Furthermore, during 
his five years in the service of the Bureau he became a beloved colleague of his fellow 
engineers. Nor was he entirely Americanized. “Von”, as he was known to his friends, traveled 
to the United States on a furlough in 1914, married, and continued on a honeymoon to 
Germany. When war broke out, he tendered his resignation to the Bureau in order to join the 
imperial army, but not before consulting with his friends in the Philippines and seeking 
approval for his decision. They showed understanding, with one of them sending a letter 
stating that “the slogan, ‘my country right or wrong’ [is] the only principal which should 
control true men.” Just half a year later Von lay dead on the European battlefields. His 
colleagues reserved a full page in the Quarterly Bulletin for the obituary of their friend.
 No doubt many of De Roever’s colleagues at the Semarang-Cheribon railway had 
also been members, and their behavior as members of life-long close knit community, to 
which De Roever had not belonged, may very well have contributed to his sense of isolation 
during his time in the Netherlands Indies. 
367
Aside from this glaring difference, a comparison of the responses by the staff of the 
BPW and the BOW to their personnel shortage yields several similarities. Initially, their 
recruitment efforts were hampered by the low wages paid by the central governments. The 
colonial engineers therefore often painted Congress in the United States and the Ministry of 
Colonies in the Netherlands as antagonists to their cause for making too little funding 
available. Cumbersome bureaucracies and red tape posed further difficulties, so that the 
Bureaus made attempts to either evade these restraints, as was the case in the conflict with the 
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Civil Service and the BIA, or relentlessly petitioned and pressured the government, as Cramer 
and his colleagues did. 
These efforts were generally led by the higher-ups of the Bureaus who had already 
established themselves within the colonial service. During their search for new employees 
they zeroed in on the technical colleges, where they hoped to find their ideal recruits: young, 
vigorous men who could adapt to the social and climatological conditions in the colony. In the 
United States, professors at the universities were called upon to aid in the effort, whereas at 
Delft former irrigation engineers could take up the special chair for their technical field and 
propagandize the work in the Netherlands Indies in the classrooms themselves. Additional 
strategies were also tried: the BIA pored over the lists of men made available by headhunting 
agencies and Beardsley went on a campus speaking tour to entice students to join his Bureau; 
in the Netherlands informational booklets on colonial engineering were distributed to attract 
more interest.368
Many of those close to the process believed colonial engineering to be particularly 
challenging so that only those men who possessed outstanding “character” and “vigor” could 
be expected to successfully perform their duties. Engineers revealed their belief that they 
belonged to a special occupation in their willingness to operate outside of the normal 
recruitment channels used by other branches of the colonial government. In the case of the 
Dutch, this occupational identity was further strengthened by their attachment to their alma 
mater in Delft and the Delftsch Studenten Corps which most of them had been members of. 
This leads to the interesting observation that while the BPW personnel’s occupational identity 
is a sufficient explanation for their attempts to circumvent the Civil Service system, the long-
serving personnel of the BOW developed an additional guild-like identity that operated in 
tandem with their engineering identity. 
 The search for new recruits was a constant topic of discussion, with special 
committees being set up to investigate the causes of the shortage and a flurry of 
communications being sent to the central government.  
The Delft guild did not succeed in their efforts to maintain the BOW as an exclusive 
bastion of Dutch engineers. But at the same time the Bureau’s staff grew tremendously, 
concurrently with the expansion of the BPW in the Philippines. At the start of the second 
decade of the twentieth century, a new dynamism gripped both Bureaus, and irrigation and 
roadwork were performed at a faster pace and greater scale than ever before.  
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3.6. Relations with the Filipinos and Indonesians 
 
For three years, starting in 1911, the Resident G.L. Gonggrijp wrote letters to the editor of the 
Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad in which he commented on his work in the Netherlands Indies. Like 
nearly all civil service members wishing to speak freely about their line of work, he wrote 
under a pseudonym; in his case Opheffer, or “uplifter.” As the name suggests, the civilizing 
mission in the Netherlands Indies was the central theme of his letters, and he often adopted a 
wry, ironic style to comment on the topic. But he sometimes veered off in another direction 
when he expressed a more genial attitude towards Dutch rule. A trip in mid-October of 1912 
through the Bengawan-Djero region put him in the latter mood: sailing the Solo river on a 
small motor cutter, Gonggrijp was treated to a view on the deeply cultivated fields that were 
expected to produce a bumper crop that year. He surmised that the region, which had been the 
site of famine and depravation in the past, had finally wrestled itself free from the scourge of 
drought—and he was convinced that the engineer who controlled the water flows of the 
enormous region, and who accompanied him on the vessel, should be thanked for that. 
Whereas competition between Indonesians for water had in the past led to waste and 
inefficiency, the engineer stepped in to balance interests and provided expert advice, leading 
the region into progress and prosperity. Clearly impressed by the socio-technical 
achievements of the engineer, Gonggrijp summarized the trip as a great day in his life as an 
opheffer.369
 By virtue of the conditions in the colony, the engineer Gonggrijp met had to be a Jack 
of all trades. Building contractors were generally unavailable in the Netherlands Indies so the 
engineers often supervised the construction of their designs themselves. This made colonial 
engineering, and especially the task set of the engineer at the work site, quite different from 
work in the metropole. It also meant that the engineers of the BOW worked closely with the 
indigenous population. This also held true for the American engineers working in the 
Philippines. This section will explore how the engineers defined their relationship with the 
Indonesians and the Filipinos, and how it was shaped by engineers’ strategies for the uplift of 
indigenous society, their professional ideology and technocratic ambitions, and the practical 
conditions of their everyday labor. 
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As was already mentioned above, when employment peaked at the BPW in 1912 it 
counted many hundreds of Filipinos among its personnel. They worked alongside its corps of 
American engineers. They usually took up lower-level positions within the administration that 
required only limited technical knowledge, such as maintenance foreman, overseer, building 
superintendent, and inspector. In some cases, such as under the caminero road maintenance 
system set up by Cameron Forbes370, the Filipino employees were required by the district 
engineers to dress in uniforms to both foster an esprit de corps and to make them visible to 
the indigenous population who could then more easily approach them to inform them about 
road damage. These foremen supervised small teams of men to assist them in their 
maintenance tasks, and were provided with funding to hire additional local laborers when 
necessary.371
However, the engineer corps was not exclusively American. In 1911, ten of the 143 
engineers were Filipinos. Many of them had been sent to the United States to attend 
universities under the pensionado system that provided them with scholarships paid by the 
Philippine government. The goal of this educational program was to eventually replace the 
Americans in the service once Filipinos had been trained in adequate numbers. This objective, 
the so-called Filipinization of the archipelago’s government, had already been formulated 
during McKinley’s administration, and during 1906 almost two hundred Filipinos were 
enrolled in more than a dozen American universities as pensionados.
 
372 In addition, the 
University of the Philippines in Manila was reopened in 1908 and offered a degree in 
engineering to its students. However, to the disappointment of the director of public works, 
the field attracted little interest: in 1913 only five Filipinos were enrolled in the engineering 
curriculum, while there were almost a hundred and fifty students on the rolls of the law 
department and similarly high numbers taking classes in agriculture and medicine.373
The engineers of the BPW worked hard to make their organization visible to the public 
eye. Starting in 1911, they maintained a presence at the Philippine Carnival held in early 
February in Manila. They distributed flyers extolling the achievements of the Bureau and built 
a large exhibit where the punters could examine scale models of recently constructed 
engineering works. During the 1913 Carnival the exhibit on some days attracted more than 
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20,000 revelers. They were treated to a full-size mock-up of an artesian well tower, casting a 
shadow over the grounds; water flowed through a large reproduction of the proposed 
irrigation project at Iloilo; and the display of a working scale model of the collapsible bridge 
at Mañgalden, which with the flick of a switch revealed how a flood would wash away the 
superstructure but leave the base intact, was visited so frequently and the switch flipped so 
often that repairs had to be done to the model every night. Camineros strutted around in their 
uniforms, and two BPW floats were entered into the parade, one of them depicting the Bureau 
and the other roadwork. The wagons garnered a first and second prize in the competitions.374
The efforts that the engineers of the BPW expended in this outreach program had a 
clear goal: strengthening the “good will of the public” that Bureau director Warwick Greene 
described in the leading article to a 1913 issue of the Quarterly Bulletin as the Bureau’s 
“greatest asset.” Good will, according to Greene, could be garnered among Filipinos and 
Americans in the colony alike by working efficiently and by projecting enthusiasm and 
energy. For “[w]ithout it our work will drag, halt, and finally end in confusion. With it, we 
can leave a monumental record in the history of these islands.”
 
375 Of course, the publication 
of the Quarterly Bulletin was itself part of the propaganda strategy of the Bureau: many 
articles were deliberately written in language stripped of technical lingo in order to be 
accessible to a wide audience.376 All these efforts appeared to be working: reports received 
from several sources that year indicated that the Bureau had a reputation for achieving good 
results and that it enjoyed good standing with the indigenous population.377
Nevertheless conflict did still break out between the BPW engineers and the Filipinos 
when their ideas of how to develop the infrastructure of a region clashed, as it did in Antique 
province in 1910. According to BPW regulations roads should always be fifteen meters wide, 
but in many places in the province they had become considerably narrower because overtime 
houses had been constructed and crops planted on the embankment. When the BPW engineer 
Gray was sent to broaden the roads, he understandably met opposition from the Filipinos who 
did not wish to abandon their homes or cut down profitable coconut trees. Gray then resorted 
to the use of force: assisted by the constabulary he began to forcibly evict the inhabitants and 
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destroy part of their livelihoods to reinstitute the road standards in the region. The Filipinos 
reacted with howls of indignation and sent petitions to the central government to protest the 
violence Gray visited upon them. Aided by their local assemblies, the protestors referenced 
the code of law to contend that Gray had acted illegally.378 While the director of the BPW 
Greene was not overly sympathetic to their complaints, he was appalled by the behavior of his 
engineer and moved to reprimand him.379 In due course the rigorous standards for road width 
were loosened to avoid further antagonizing the local population.380
The responsiveness of the BPW engineers to public opinion was increased in 1913 
when the Filipinization program entered into a new phase. The recently elected Democratic 
President Wilson wished to expedite the independence of the Philippines and sent Francis 
Burton Harrison to the archipelago to replace Forbes as Governor-General. Under Harrison’s 
tenure, which lasted until 1920, Filipinos were quickly promoted to higher levels of office to 
replace Americans. The latter’s numbers declined from 2600 to 600 during his time in 
office.
 Clearly, in their project to 
develop the public infrastructure the BPW engineers could not simply brush aside the wishes 
of the local population, and instead had to respond with compromises to the complaints and 
opposition they met from the Filipinos. 
381 In anticipation of the further devolution of power from American administrators to 
Filipinos – which would be signed into law by Wilson in 1916 with the Jones Act – and the 
move towards a more representative form of government, the importance of the good public 
relations of the Bureau were reiterated.382
The acceleration of Filipinization also left its mark on the BPW in other regards. The 
training of indigenous personnel became of greater importance: although it had certainly been 
an important element of the work of the engineers since the Bureau’s creation, it developed 
into a criterion for promotion in the hierarchy in 1913. Furthermore, the number of Filipino 
trained engineers began a steady and almost unbroken increase. These indigenous recruits 
were every bit as capable as their American colleagues—and sometimes exceeded their 
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uplifters too, as the impressive resume of José Paez, the first Filipino to obtain a Master’s 
degree in civil engineering, amply proves:  
“Paez was the best-educated Filipino engineer of his day, with a Bachelor of Arts degree 
from the Liceo de Manila (received in 1905 at the age of 17) and a Bachelor of Science 
degree in civil engineering the Swiss Federal Technical Institute at Zurich conferred on 
him in 1911. After working a year for a bridge company in Berlin, Paez attended Cornell 
University at Ithaca, New York as a pensionado. […] His countrymen were proud of his 
accomplishments. On Sept. 2, 1912 Manuel Quezon then Resident Commissioner in 
Washington, took him to meet Brig. Gen. McIntre, head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. 
In June 1913 he became the first Filipino to receive a master’s degree in civil engineering. 
He took a semester of additional studies in France before returning to the Philippines to 
take the Civil Service examination and enter the BPW.”383
No trained engineers who came from an indigenous Indonesian background appeared 
on the employee roster of the BOW in the first decades of the twentieth century—although a 
sizable contingent hailed from the white, “European” class of inhabitants of the Netherlands 
Indies. They too had taken their classes at Delft, because no engineering institute existed in 
the colony. But the Dutch engineers, like their American counterparts to the north, also took 
to educating the indigenous population in less complex technical matters. The waterstaat 
trained so-called oeloe-oeloe, who acted as headmen in charge of distributing water fairly 
among the farmers hooked up to the irrigation systems. They were also responsible for 
maintaining the network of canals and drainage ditches that extended beyond the technical 
artifacts constructed by the BOW. As representatives of the indigenous population, but vested 
with authority by the colonial government, the oeloe-oeloe were crucial intermediaries in the 
relations between the engineers of the BOW and the Indonesian peasant farmers. From a 
technical and administrative point of view, the oeloe-oeloe therefore bear a resemblance to the 
Filipinos employed under the BPW’s caminero road system.
 
384
In the first decade of the twentieth century a debate took place both inside and outside 
the framework of the colonial administration on how to allow the indigenous population of 
the Netherlands Indies participate more in the governance of the archipelago. A sense of 
urgency gripped many of those contributing to the discussion, because the Indonesians had 
made the unprecedented move to organize themselves into political movements. Boedi 
Otomo, “the beautiful endeavor”, was founded in 1908 by members of the indigenous priyayi 
administrative class who saw the rapid modernization of Japan and wished to speed up the 
development of Java. Dutch politicians and commentators like Van Deventer and the famous 
Islam expert Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje responded to the challenge of what they perceived 
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to be the apparent impending national awakening of the Indonesian people by suggesting that 
the colonized people should be absorbed into the political system sooner rather than later. The 
each floated their own ideas, calling either for association or assimilation of the Indonesians, 
but never strayed from the idea that a dualist structure in which the Dutch would have a 
powerful and still paramount role in the government should be maintained. Nevertheless, they 
encountered stiff opposition from the many conservative administrators in the BB who were 
unwilling to cede any of their power, let alone to the indigenous population who they felt 
were still entirely unprepared for the task of governing.385
 While the debate rumbled on and the circle of participants widened, the Sarekat Islam 
was founded by the Indonesians in the colony in 1911. Originally founded to protect the 
interests of Indonesian and Arab businessmen against the powerful lobby of Chinese 
merchants in the archipelago, the organization captured the attention of the Indonesians 
because of the Islamic mystique that surrounded its initiation rituals. It soon exploded into a 
mass movement with tens of thousands of Indonesians attending its gatherings, and through 
the founding of local chapters the Sarekat Islam spread like wildfire through the colony. 
Although the organization worked to support the Indonesians through non-violent means, 
often assisting aggrieved parties in taking recourse to legal action to right the wrongs visited 
upon them, the sudden emergence of Sarekat Islam was very unsettling to the Dutch living in 
the colony. In some quarters hysterical and hyperbolic rumors of an impending uprising 
buzzed around. But not all Dutch felt such concern: Opheffer welcomed the newly assertive 
behavior of the Indonesians, who were defending their rights and putting an end to the many 
wrongs they suffered before Sarekat Islam was around to protect their interests. What was 
certainly clear from the popular political mobilization, though, was that the political structure 
of the colony had become obsolete: the forces driving the surging Sarekat Islam would have 
to be accommodated.
 
386
The tentative ontvoogding efforts to emancipate the Indonesians, which Governor 
General Idenburg had already set in motion when he was Minister of Colonies prior to coming 
to the colony, were sped up. As a manner of experiment responsibilities were devolved in 
some regions from the BB to indigenous power brokers. Because of continued disagreements 
among the Dutch on which path of reform ought to be pursued, whole-scale revision of the 
political system was not effectuated. Nevertheless, the need for new policy was clear. 
Idenburg’s successor Van Limburg Stirum, who took over in 1916, continued to push for 
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reforms that were intended to eventually re-allocate powers held by the central colonial 
administration to local administrations.387
The move towards decentralization would also affect the operations of the BOW as 
early as the middle of the century’s second decade: instead of the prevailing system whereby 
the headquarters at Weltevreden supervised most of the Bureau’s activities, local bureaus 
were expected to survey and construct projects in due course. This reform proceeded only 
slowly, however, which led to sharp criticism of the BOW in the press from those who 
supported decentralization: the Bureau was accused of deliberately frustrating the devolution 
of central control to the local public works departments. One of the veteran irrigation 
engineers working at the Bureau’s headquarters responded to the charge by arguing that many 
of the local departments were simply not yet up to the task of designing and supervising 
complicated works, and pointed to specific districts where decentralization had in fact 
progressed to a remarkable degree to show the willingness of the BOW to change.
 
388 His 
argument was apparently unpersuasive, because the negative image persisted: in an article 
submitted to the Indische Gids two years later the former chief editor of a Soerabaja 
newspaper maintained that the BOW’s personnel at Weltevreden continued to fight 
decentralization tooth and nail, motivated by an urge for bureaucratic centralization.389
While the engineers in the Philippines were working in ever closer contact with the 
Filipino officials serving on the local councils – Halsema established early on in his career 
that close cooperation with local power brokers was absolutely vital to success
 The 
conservative, guild-like behavior of the old hands working at the Bureau’s central office – as 
detailed in the previous section – may also very well explain their reluctance to changing the 
operations of their organization.  
390
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engineers of the BOW closed the gap with the Indonesians more slowly, if at all. Furthermore, 
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Philippine Carnival to widely propagandize their engineering successes to the archipelago’s 
population had no direct counterpart in the Netherlands Indies. Celebrations were instead 
388 The 1917 issue celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Vereeniging van Waterstaats-ingenieurs contained an 
article written by a long-time employee of the BOW at Weltevreden that was specifically intended to refute the 
charge that the Bureau was opposed to decentralization. F.W.Th. van Oordt, “B.O.W. contra decentralisatie?,” 
De Waterstaats-ingenieur 5 no. 4 (April 1917): 152-153.  
389 H. Tersteeg, “Practische Ethiek,” Indische Gids 41 no. 1 (1919): 153-161, 155.  
390 Halsema, E. J. Halsema, colonial engineer, 114. 
109 
 
 
 
restricted to the festive occasions that accompanied the completion of construction of specific 
engineering feats, and even then these festivities were directed mostly towards the 
“European” inhabitants of the archipelago.391
Despite the segregated lives of the European rulers of the Netherland Indies and their 
colonized subjects, moves were still afoot among the former to democratize the BB and 
include the Indonesians in its operations. To an extent the Dutch were caught up in the 
maelstrom of quickly changing colonial policy throughout the rest of the world. The First 
World War had thrown the administration of major colonies into flux, especially in the British 
Empire: in India the rulers resorted to promising their increasingly nationalistic subjects that 
they would grant them greater self-rule in order to be assured of their support in fighting the 
war.
 
392 Although the Dutch remained neutral throughout the conflict, the tactic of disarming 
the growing nationalism of the Indonesians through greater political representation was also 
adopted in the colony. The Volksraad (People’s Council) was instituted and had its first 
assembly in 1918. It had only advisory capacities, half of its members were appointed rather 
than elected, and only a miniscule as well as conservative electorate could cast votes for the 
other half. Despite the toothless appearance, the Volksraad, would exert considerable pressure 
on the colonial government.393
But the engineers of the BOW were affected by the First World War through very 
different channels. Because the conflict posed great problems for shipping between the 
Netherlands and the colony, aspiring students of engineering were no longer able to make 
their voyage to Delft. The colonial engineering community responded by creating an ad hoc 
curriculum to be taught locally to prepare the young men for their future studies at the alma 
mater in anticipation of the time when peace would allow direct lines of communication with 
the European motherland to be re-established.
 
394
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found a technical college in the colony. In the pages of De Waterstaats-ingenieur the 
possibilities afforded by a true institute of learning for the engineering occupation in the 
Netherlands Indies had long been suggested as a possible lasting solution for ending the 
continuing personnel shortage by providing a greater number of graduates.395
Those colonial engineers who supporte a local higher institute of learning in the 
colony found support in the pages of De Ingenieur. A three-man committee of KIvI members, 
in which chief editor and colonial engineering enthusiast R.A. van Sandick naturally took a 
seat, wrote a proposal for the curriculum of the hoped-for school and took to lobbying the 
Governor General to realize their plans.
  
396 However, the financial contributions necessary to 
found a school would end up originating in the private sector rather than the colonial 
government.397 Aided by private industries, a sum of three and a half million guilders was 
collected to fund the construction and operations of the Technische Hoogeschool which 
opened in Bandoeng in 1920.398
By the time the engineering college in Bandoeng opened its doors the universities in 
the Philippines had been training engineers for over a decade. The graduates were rapidly 
absorbed into the BPW when Filipinization gathered steam after 1913, setting in motion the 
long-term trend of replacing American personnel with Filipino engineers. In fact, the former 
were removed from service at a faster pace than they could be replaced. But despite the 
reduction in manpower and the turnover of control from colonizer to the emancipating 
colonized, morale at the Bureau remained high two years into the newly dynamic 
Filipinization program, when six districts had already been turned over to Filipino 
engineers.
  
399
The entry of the United States into the First World War dealt a far more powerful blow 
to the operations of the BPW. The Americans in the service were called up en masse to serve 
in the armed forces, starving the Bureau of expert personnel it still desperately needed for its 
operations. The annual reports reveal that by the end of 1917, the number of trained 
Americans engineers had declined to 43, while the number of trained Filipino engineers stood 
at 79; nineteen districts had been turned over to the latter’s supervision.
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year these numbers were respectively 37, 88, and 29 (although the number of districts had 
increased from thirty-one to forty-five by that year).401 The end of the war relieved some of 
the stress on the Bureau according to its annual report; nevertheless, just 31 Americans 
worked alongside 121 Filipinos.402
The rapid departure of the Americans created opportunities for the Filipinos already 
employed by the BPW. This was particularly true for José Paez, the well-traveled and talented 
engineer. With just five years in the service of the Bureau he again recorded a first: not only 
was he the first Filipino recipient of a Master’s in civil engineering, in 1919 he also became 
the first Filipino director of the Bureau. In May of the following year he would in that 
capacity join the delegation sent by the Philippines to attend the General Engineering 
Conference in Batavia, where he would rub shoulders with representatives of the American 
Society of Civil Engineers, dozens of participating Dutch engineers, and even have his 
photograph taken alongside R.A. van Sandick and Ch.G. Cramer.
 Throughout the annual reports, the continued necessity of 
American guidance in BPW operations was reiterated and concern expressed that under the 
prevailing personnel shortage little more could be achieved than constructing works that had 
already been designed—manpower was in such short supply that no new plans could be 
drafted. The irrigation division was so starved of personnel that construction was shut down 
completely, and its labor devoted entirely to maintenance. 
403
“The conditions in the Netherlands East Indies appear to us to be entirely the same as those 
in the Philippines. Similar climate, similar surroundings and needs make our programs of 
public works roughly comparable. We are presented with the same problems and their 
solutions can be found in similar ways. That is why we hope that our presence at this 
congress may serve the common interest. We are convinced that we may learn a great deal 
from your work, and we assure you that it would be a privilege to us to be of any use to 
you by presenting our experiences in the Philippines.”
 Speaking on behalf of the 
Philippine contingent, he told his audience that: 
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Participants of the General Engineering Conference held at Batavia May 8-15 1920. Third from left, José Paez; 
fifth from right, R.A. van Sandick; second from right, Ch.G. Cramer.405
 
 
When Paez took to the podium to deliver his flattering speech – confirming the 
international orientation of the colonial engineers – the golden age of the American engineers 
of the BPW had already come to an end. Although some of his successors would again be 
Americans, their domination of the colonial project in the archipelago was a shadow of what 
it had been in the years before. In the Netherlands Indies, on the other hand, the BOW 
appeared to be entering new age of success. Armed with a new technical college the days of 
personnel shortages were expected to soon come to an end. The professional brotherhood of 
Dutch engineers also appeared to be gaining real political clout in the colony: in 1922 both 
Soerabaja and Semarang – which, along with Batavia, were among the three largest cities in 
the archipelago – had engineers as their mayors.406
But the future had different things in store for the colonial engineers in the 
Netherlands Indies. The portents of what was to come were certainly already there. In the 
second half of the first decade of the twentieth century the Department of Agriculture 
emerged as a powerful competitor to the BOW in defining the message of material uplift that 
was part of the Dutch civilizing mission in the colony. More and more, the large scale 
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technical construction plans of the Bureau would have to compete with agricultural 
instruction and experimentation of the Department.407 Decentralization would also be taken to 
its logical endpoint, dismantling much of the Delft engineers’ colonial outpost: the control 
over the irrigation departments that formed the heart of its waterstaat was devolved down to 
the provincial level in 1925.408 Finally, the Ethical Policy itself would wind down as the 
colony entered the third decade of the twentieth century. Although no single moment is 
agreed upon as the end of this specific mode of civilizing mission and moral duty, the budget 
cuts instituted by the new Minister of Colonies and Governor General around 1920 curtailed 
the ambitions of those hoping to develop the colony.409 Expenditure on irrigation was pared 
back sharply: the level of annual outlays declined by more than forty per cent in just two years 
from its peak in 1921, never to reach that high again.410
Even more ironically, the technical college at Bandoeng would also help to sow the 
seeds that led to the end of the grandest engineering project of all: the Dutch colonial project 
in the Netherlands Indies. In 1921 a young but already ardent Indonesian nationalist by the 
name of Soekarno entered through the institution’s gates to pursue a degree in civil 
engineering. Five years later he left, as one of the most highly educated Indonesians in the 
archipelago, and with his nationalism and will to organize opposition to Dutch rule stronger 
than ever. In the pre-war years he fought a bitter struggle with the repressive Dutch colonial 
administration that sent him into exile in hopes of neutralizing his agitation. Despite this 
opposition, the engineer succeeded in his campaign less than two decades after his graduation 
from Bandoeng: on the seventeenth of August 1945 Soekarno declared the independence of 
the Republic of Indonesia, and the next day he was proclaimed the first president of the 
country.
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Conclusion 
 
William Howard Taft could set his plans to uplift the Filipinos in motion when McKinley 
appointed him to the post of Governor General of the Philippines on July 4th of 1901. Three 
months later Queen Wilhelmina delivered her annual speech from the throne, using the 
occasion to tell her Dutch audience of the moral duty the Netherlands had towards its colonial 
subjects in the Netherlands Indies. These two events in the summer of 1901 effectively 
enshrined the recently developed civilizing missions of the two countries as the ideologies 
driving their colonial policies. These missions to uplift the indigenous populations of the two 
archipelagoes from the state of primitivism into civilization consisted of two overlapping and 
intermingling components: a campaign to transform the Filipinos and Indonesians spiritually, 
and to develop their societies materially.  
 At the heart of the civilizing missions of the United States and the Netherlands was the 
conviction that their own societies were superior to those in their tropical territorial 
possessions. While this sense of superiority had a long past, dating back to Christian religious 
missionary activity, in the nineteenth century it had come to be buttressed by the industrial 
transformation that took place in both countries. As it was commonly understood in both 
American and Dutch society, technology – itself the product of modern science – had 
provided the path towards the unequaled levels of wealth and prosperity that those living in 
the industrialized West enjoyed. The material and technological attainments of societies thus 
emerged as important yardsticks for measuring their degree of development of civilization.  
Despite the manifest importance of technology to the Dutch and American civilizing 
missions, the historiography on the ethical policy and benevolent assimilation has more often 
than not reserved its attention to the spiritual component. Such accounts of the political 
tutelage and education of the indigenous population have shown little regard for the ways in 
which the material component of the civilizing mission went well beyond the immediate need 
of ending the famine and disease that periodically plagued Filipinos and Indonesians, and thus 
overlook how the technical artifacts that the colonial governments constructed were also 
intended to have a civilizing power. It is only in the last two decades that the interest in the 
agenda of the various imperial powers to materially develop their colonized subjects has been 
growing. Since then, historians have begun to compare and contrast the civilizing missions of 
the major imperial powers to draw the similarities and differences between their policies into 
the open. 
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This study is the first to make a direct and systematic comparison between the 
civilizing missions of the Netherlands and the United States in their Southeast Asian colonies. 
The two countries are in many regards different from what one might call the “Franco-
British” mainstream of late nineteenth-century modern expansionist imperialism. The 
enormous United States, which unlike the European powers had no experience with overseas 
empire, suddenly came into the possession of the Philippines and several other former 
Spanish holdings—which made it the youngest imperial power in Asia. The relatively small 
Netherlands on the other hand was recognized since 1815 as the sovereign holders of a clearly 
defined territorial area in which the Dutch had been active since the days of their East Indies 
Company.  
Many Dutch and Americans therefore considered their countries to be exceptional in 
their colonial practices. The Netherlands denied being imperialist, as the country did not 
appear to join in the aggressive territorial aggrandizement of the British and the French—
despite fighting destructive colonial wars when it extended and deepened its rule over the 
outer reaches of the Netherlands Indies archipelago. The United States positioned itself as 
benevolent and hence different from the “European” exploitative mode of imperialism. Yet it 
fought a deadly guerilla war against Filipino nationalists. Furthermore, the British and French 
Empires took up civilizing missions of their own too, adding an element of moral duty to their 
colonial rule like the Americans and Dutch. 
Upon closer study, the yawning chasm that the Dutch and Americans believed to exist 
between their own countries and the other European imperial powers is revealed to be less 
deep and wide. However, this study has shown that the colonial policies of the United States 
and the Netherlands are unusual, and similar, in the ways they were inflected by a particular 
subset of the personnel manning their colonial administrations: the engineers of the bureaus of 
public works. 
The influence of the colonial engineers in the two archipelagoes can be traced back to 
the rise of the politics of social interventionism that arose in the late nineteenth century in the 
Dutch and American metropoles. The demand for a greater role for government had resulted 
from the apparent social ills wrought by the rapid changes that followed in the wake of 
industrialization. The modernity that technology had helped to usher in tore at the fabric of 
society in the Netherlands and the United States: endemic conflict between capital and labor, 
city-dwellers living in almost literal cesspools, and a restive underclass created an 
environment conducive to the creation of a post-laissez faire politics. Reform and regulation 
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were called for by the young social-liberal movement in the Netherlands and the Progressives 
in the United States who instated powerful bureaucracies to deal with these excesses.  
Due to the complexity of the “social question”, the reform politics placed a premium 
on expertise—and engineers, as men of science believed they were ideally positioned to 
provide some of that expertise. Their profession had emerged simultaneously in the 
Netherlands and the United States and had undergone a rapid expansion during and after the 
last decade of the nineteenth century. Its members believed that their social status and 
political power still lagged behind the supposed social importance of their work, so they 
engaged in a campaign to improve their standing in society. The new political atmosphere of 
respect for expertise in the Netherlands and United States provided them with opportunities 
they could exploit in this campaign. In order to reap the full benefits afforded by the moment, 
engineers also played on several socio-political registers. As men of science they emphasized 
their male, rational mindset, contrasting it with what they saw as the bias of politicians and 
feebleness of the female mind.  
At the same time, their scientific rhetoric was picked up by politicians who hoped to 
appropriate the authority that engineering jargon vested in its user. Strikingly, there is a 
remarkable overlap between the jargon popularized on either side of the Atlantic: nut, 
rentabiliteit, and efficiency denote similar moral and economic values. The technical 
vocabulary – and, more importantly, the social and moral meaning of that vocabulary – of the 
Dutch and American engineers was therefore closely in tune. 
The engineers, and the civil engineers especially, worked to normalize and systematize 
the material environment of the Netherlands and the United States with their public works. 
But in addition to their technical plans, the engineers in both countries developed an ideology 
that stated that members of their profession also had a moral duty: like the systematization 
and normalization of rivers to prevent them from treading outside their banks, engineers 
believed that they had an obligation to systematize and normalize society to end its excesses. 
Moreover, the new emphasis on scientific expertise in the two countries gave rise to the 
engineers’ idea that their profession was uniquely positioned to perform this task. Many of 
them argued in favor a political system that would give them, on the basis of their “esoteric” 
scientific knowledge, a mandate to pursue their projects freely without having to contend the 
meddling influence of others, such as lawyers and corrupt politicians. Their ambition was to 
instate a technocracy. 
I have made extensive use of the technocracy heuristic to analyze the beliefs, 
objectives, and strategies of the colonial engineers. The concept is relevant because in the 
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colonial environment conditions were more propitious for the establishment of a system of 
engineer authority: the absence of democratic institutions and the smaller presence of groups 
competing for political power gave the engineers more room than in the metropole to flex 
their professional muscle. In addition, the newly articulated civilizing mission, which stressed 
the importance of material development, supercharged the engineers’ technical authority. In 
the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines the personnel of the bureaus of public works were 
in many ways the foot soldiers of the material component of the civilizing missions. 
Engineers had a technocratic sensibility in both colonies. They organized themselves 
into professional organizations, published journals, constantly lobbied the government in an 
attempt to increase their political power, and made attempts to subvert existing regulations 
when these stood in the way of their professional interests. Their professional ideology 
instilled in them the ambition to find ways of working autonomously, free from the meddling 
of restrictive bureaucracies. Their ambitions led them towards real political power: the staff of 
the BOW and the BPW had a large influence over the practical implementation of the 
civilizing mission in the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines. Within the context of the 
civilizing missions, technologies were defined under their direction as particularly “ethical”, 
such as the irrigation works in the Dutch colony, or especially “civilizing”, such as the roads 
in the American colony. The large budgets of the two bureaus allowed their personnel to 
intervene sharply in the everyday lives of the colonial subjects, providing them with clean 
water, paved roads, irrigated fields, and a host of other technical artifacts that had large 
consequences for the social conditions in the archipelagoes. 
To achieve these results the engineers had to overcome the challenges of the tropical 
climate and the unfamiliar social and geographical environment of the two island chains. 
Although these differences between the colonies and the metropoles often acted as 
impediments to achieving the technical objectives of the engineers, the challenges were in 
some ways a boon to their technocratic agenda as it gave them opportunities to leverage the 
professional identity formation process they had practiced at home. For example, because it 
was believed that the climate and society of the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies 
possessed an inherent dangerous “tropicality” that threatened to corrupt weaker minds, the 
idea emerged that the colonial government needed above-average men to withstand this 
menace. In the Netherlands and the United States engineers had long worked to fashion 
themselves as members of an occupation who were exemplified by their trustworthiness. 
Their strength of “character” therefore supposedly allowed them to withstand the tropical 
corruption that would have claimed other, less strong-minded men. 
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Race and gender issues are highly relevant towards understanding the identity 
formation process of the Dutch and American colonial engineers. In terms of gender, it is 
clear that the engineers belonged to an almost exclusively male occupation that often defined 
itself as a brotherhood, and worked to exclude women. At an individual level – and this is 
especially true for the Americans – they projected an image of themselves as masculine 
pioneers who brought order where there had been chaos—or, who brought civilization where 
there had been savagery. In the charged political atmosphere of expansionist imperialism, the 
engineers leveraged their image as paragons of scientific prowess and male gender power to 
make a persuasive claim to authority in the colonial arena. 
The bonds of brotherhood could cross the boundaries of nations, as many Dutch 
engineers who visited the United States felt it did. But fraternity created exclusionary 
processes too: at the BOW in Weltevreden attempts were made to block the appointment of 
foreign engineers. Rather than being the result of a nationalist ideology, though, the cause for 
this behavior was the extra identity layer the Dutch engineers possessed as graduates of a 
single educational institution: Delft. This leads to the conclusion that the colonial engineers in 
the Netherlands Indies created something akin to a guild. This stands in clear contrast to the 
more open atmosphere at the BPW in Manila, where many foreign (Western) nationals were 
recruited and even promoted to high positions. 
The race of the colonial engineers was also a significant determinant of their policies, 
because the Americans and Dutch felt that their whiteness very clearly set them apart from the 
colonized peoples they ruled. But while the ethnographic barriers of the engineering 
profession in the Netherlands Indies were practically insurmountable in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, those in the Philippines were positively porous. The pensionado 
system sent many Filipinos abroad to receive a university education and some took up classes 
in engineering. Most notably among them is José Paez, who became the first Filipino director 
of the BPW. Such a promotion was almost inconceivable in the Netherlands Indies, and the 
hardening of the colonial society’s racial stratification in the decades that followed 1920 made 
it only more unlikely to ever occur; and indeed, the BOW directors would continue to be 
white men until the end of Dutch colonial rule. Furthermore, the opening of universities in the 
Philippines in the latter part of the first decade of the century allowed aspiring engineers from 
the indigenous population to follow the curriculum without having to travel abroad, and they 
began taking up positions with the BPW in significant numbers as early as the first years of 
the second decade of American rule. 
119 
 
 
 
In other words, there were very real differences between the willingness of American 
and Dutch colonial engineers to have Filipinos and Indonesians become participants in their 
civilizing project during the 1900-1920 period surveyed in this study. Only once the 
Technische Hoogeschool was opened in Bandoeng in 1920 could Indonesians learn what the 
Dutch had been teaching at Delft for so many years already. Still, the degrees they obtained 
there were not enough for them to be allowed into the professional brotherhood of engineers 
working in their archipelago. The distance between the Dutch and their colonial subjects was 
simply unbridgeable, even when the two groups were intellectually matched. American 
engineers on the other hand took benevolent assimilation’s tutelary mission to heart and made 
the training of indigenous personnel an integral part of their day-to-day work and entered into 
much closer relations with the Filipinos. The propaganda strategies used by either Bureau 
further underline these findings. The Quarterly Bulletin emphatically directed itself towards 
Filipinos, and the BPW distributed pamphlets and participated in the spectacle of the 
Philippine Carnival to gain the coveted “good will” of the indigenous population. By contrast, 
the Dutch were content to celebrate the opening of their public works within their own, 
“white” circle.  
The tendency of the Americans to take their relations with the Filipinos very seriously 
were already clearly present in the years before the election of President Wilson, when the 
appointment of Governor General Harrison led to the acceleration of Filipinization. At a time 
when the Dutch personnel of the BOW continued to fret about the appointment of foreigners 
to their Delft bastion, dozens and dozens of Filipinos entered into the ranks of the BPW—a 
development that would speed up even further when the United States entered into the First 
World War and many of the Bureau’s personnel were called into military service. 
These findings underline the relevance of the engineering cultures concept. Like many 
other professions, engineering creates distinct ideologies – that, for example, operate within 
the boundaries of a specific nation – that carry over into the everyday practices and outlooks 
of its members. This study has first shown how aspects such as brotherhood and the self-
fashioning processes that were part of the ideology of the American and Dutch metropolitan 
engineering cultures were surprisingly closely in sync. In what followed it was revealed how 
these cultures made their way to the colony and subsequently diverged, be it due to pressures 
of competition with other government departments or the opportunities afforded by 
enthusiastic and supportive administrators. 
While the technocracy heuristic offers a window through which to analyze the colonial 
engineers in the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies, it does not describe the outcomes of 
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their works. Even in the 1900-1920 period, which was the high point of the colonial BPW and 
BOW, the personnel of the two Bureaus could not wrest themselves free from the 
bureaucracies they were part of to attain full autonomy. The Americans arguably enjoyed 
their high tide during the four years that Cameron Forbes was Governor General from 1909; 
the Dutch had their golden years between 1913 and 1920, when their wages were high, their 
colleagues were appointed to the office of mayor in several large cities, and funding for large-
scale irrigation was forthcoming. To the members of the profession an era of great political 
power often appeared to be dawning just behind the horizon; but the sun would never rise on a 
colonial technocracy run by engineers. To the determined technocrats among them this must 
have been a disappointing outcome. 
Still, even the technocrats might have been happy to resign themselves to what they 
left behind in the Netherlands Indies and Philippines. Although they styled themselves as 
missionaries of modernity, many of the engineers revealed an interest in the past. They 
admired the works built by Babylon, Sumeria, Rome, Carthage, and Egypt, and hoped to one 
day leave behind artifacts on a par with those constructed by these civilizations. From a 
technical point of view, they may have worked to bring permanent improvement with their 
designs; but at the same time they personally hoped to build monuments to their own 
ingenuity, and immortalize themselves in the process. Going by Halsema’s epitaph – “Baguio 
is his monument” – some amongst them have succeeded. 
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Summary 
 
This study compares the role played by Dutch and American engineers in the colonial 
governments of the Netherlands Indies and the American-controlled Philippines in the 1900-
1920 timeframe. It contends that these colonial engineers extensively influenced the practical 
implementation of the civilizing missions of that were formulated in the United States and the 
Netherlands around 1900. Through the use of a systematic comparison between the activities 
of the engineers in these two Western countries and their tropical colonies the unique aspects 
of the American policy of “benevolent assimilation” and the Dutch “ethical policy” will be 
drawn into focus. 
 This study makes use of the technocracy heuristic to analyze the behavior and 
ambitions of the engineers. Technocracy in this case refers to rule by experts, a goal that 
many members of the engineering profession that had emerged in both countries in the 1890s 
strove for. Such a political system could not be implemented in the Dutch and American 
metropoles, but in the colonies the engineers faced fewer obstacles to their political agenda. 
The technocratic ambitions of the engineers are reconstructed here by analyzing the rhetoric 
they used and the discourses they drew upon in their journals. 
 In the first part of this study the emergence of the engineering profession in the 
Netherlands Indies and the United States is compared. The rhetoric of the engineers on either 
side of the Atlantic evinces important similarities, as does the receptiveness of politicians and 
public to their ideas. The new mode of imperialism and the civilizing missions that either 
country articulated concurrently also bear close resemblance. 
 A series of vignettes in the second part of this study describing the practices and 
ideology of the colonial engineers working in the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines 
reveals how the meanings of the technologies they used were socially constructed. They show 
that the Americans possessed a unique willingness to have the Filipinos participate in their 
developmental strategy, whereas the Dutch did not cross the ethnographic separation from the 
Indonesians. This finding to an extent confirms the “exceptionalism” of American empire in 
this period. 
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Appendix 
A. Cast of characters412
 
 
William McKinley (1843-1901). Twenty-fifth President of the United States. Under his 
administration the Spanish-American war was fought victoriously, ending with the 
fateful decision to annex the Spanish overseas possession, including the Philippine 
Islands. He was assassinated by the anarchist Leon Czolgosz in Buffalo, NY. 
 
Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919). Assistant Secretary of the Navy from April 1897 until 
May 1898. Served as Governor of the State of New York for the two years of 1899 
and 1900 and was selected as Vice President to William McKinley. Upon McKinley’s 
death he became President and successfully won a second term. 
 
William Howard Taft (1857-1930). Member of the Second Philippine Commission and the 
first civil Governor-General of the Philippines from July 1901 until December 1903. 
He was Secretary of War during the second administration of President Theodore 
Roosevelt, and was the latter’s successor in the White House for a single term ending 
in 1913. 
William Cameron Forbes (1870-1959). Secretary of Commerce and Police in the Philippine 
Commission from 1904 until 1908, and thereafter Governor-General of the Philippines 
until 1913. He was a strong supporter of public works construction.  
 
                                                          
412 Most of these biographical details are in the public domain or have already been sourced in the narrative 
above. Any additional information (especially for the slightly more obscure Dutch characters) has been drawn 
from the records of the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (“International Institute for Social 
History”, www.iisg.nl), and the Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland (“Biographical Encyclopedia of the 
Netherlands”, www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN), and Parlement & Politiek (“Parliament & Politics”, 
www.parlement.com). 
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James Wallace Beardsley (1848-1934). Chief consulting engineer for the Philippine 
Commission and first director of the Bureau of Public Works in Manila from 1905 
until 1908, where he struggled to staff the new office. He was eased out of his position 
and appointed consulting irrigation engineer and tasked with compiling a report on the 
techniques in use in several European colonies including Java.  
 
Eusebio Julius Halsema (1882-1945). Sailed to the Philippines as engineer of the Bureau of 
Public Works from 1908, becoming mayor of the American summer capital of Baguio 
in 1919 until retiring in 1935. He improved the public infrastructure during his tenure 
and built the road to Bontoc, today still known as the Halsema Highway. 
 
José N. Paez (1888-?). Brilliant student of civil engineering who attended university in 
Europe at his own expense before coming as pensionado to Cornell University in 
Ithaca, New York.  He obtained a Master of Science degree in civil engineering in 
1913, the first Filipino to do so. After a rapid rise in the BPW’s professional hierarchy 
he became the Bureau’s first Filipino director in 1919. He left the post in 1924 when 
he became the general manager of the Manila North Railroad, a position he would 
keep until the outbreak of World War II. 
 
Alexander Willem Frederik Idenburg (1861-1935). Politician of the confessional Anti-
Revolutionary Party who was highly influential in colonial politics and supported the 
political emancipation of the Indonesians. He was elected to the Dutch lower house of 
Parliament in 1901 and served as Minister of Colonies thrice in the two decades that 
followed: 1902-1905, 1908-1909, and 1918-1919. Between his second and third 
ministerial office he took up the post of Governor General of the Netherlands Indies 
from 1909 until 1916.  
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Rudolf Adriaan Van Sandick (1855-1933). Politically active and prominent member of the 
Dutch engineering community and proponent of a progressive engineering ideology. 
He studied at the Polytechnische school in Delft from 1872 until 1878, served on the 
senate of the Student Corps and participated in the activities of the left-leaning 
Debating-club and the “Vrije Studie” (“Liberal Study”) society. Worked for the 
waterstaat in the Netherlands Indies between 1879 and 1884 and served on the 
editorial board of the Indische Gids (1896-1902) and rose to level of chief editor. He 
stepped down after he took up the same post for De Ingenieur in 1900, a position he 
would keep until 1932.  
 
Pieter Brooshooft (1854-1924). Ethical thinker and the editor of De Locomotief, the 
periodical based in Semarang, between 1887-1895 and a second time after 1901. In its 
pages he delivered strong critiques of the extractive policy of the Dutch in their 
colony, and argued that the Netherlands had an “Eereschuld” or “debt of honor” to 
fulfill towards the Indonesians. He demanded that an ethical policy be implemented in 
a 1901 pamphlet. 
 
Conrad Theodor van Deventer (1857-1915). Friend of Brooshooft and popularized the 
“Eereschuld” with his 1899 article of the same name. He provided the motto for the 
ethical policy: irrigation, education, and emigration. From 1905 until his death Van 
Deventer served in both chambers of the Dutch parliament as an Indies Specialist or 
colonial expert. 
 
A.G. Lamminga. Designer and builder of several high-profile irrigation projects in the 
Netherlands Indies, including those at Pemali on Java. He was appointed professor of 
irrigation studies at the Technische Hoogeschool in Delft. He was a consistent 
supporter of a different approach to calculating the value of improved irrigation in the 
Netherlands Indies in an attempt to break the opposition of the BB in the 
rentabiliteitscommissie. 
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Henri Hubert van Kol (1852-1925). Indies Specialist in both chambers of Dutch parliament 
between 1897 and 1924 for the SDAP (Labor Party) that he helped found. A graduate 
of Delft, Van Kol developed his socialist ideas there, and spent close to two decades in 
the Netherlands Indies working as an irrigation engineer between 1876 and 1895. 
Simultaneously a critic of imperialism and a supporter of colonialism, he argued that 
the Dutch had a moral duty to uplift the population of its colony, using technology to 
lift the bane of primitivism and bring prosperity to the islands. 
 
J.E. de Meyier (1848-1913). Irrigation engineer and director of the Bureau Openbare Werken 
from 1898 until 1901. He developed into a staunch opponent of the irrigation project 
in the Solo valley on Java. After leaving his post he took over’s editorship of the 
Indische Gids. He visited the International Engineering Congress held by the ASCE in 
Saint Louis in 1904 to deliver a presentation on Dutch irrigation practices on Java. 
 
Charles G. Cramer (1879-1975). Rose to the position of chief irrigation engineer during his 
employment at the Bureau Openbare Werken between 1904 and 1923. He was the 
secretary of the Vereeniging van Waterstaats-ingenieurs in the Netherlands Indies that 
published De waterstaats-ingenieur from 1913 onwards. He acted as the society’s 
representative during his time in the Netherlands ca. 1914. Served in both the upper 
and lower house of Dutch parliament between 1923 and 1937 for the SDAP (Labor 
Party). 
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B. Directors of public works in the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines, 
1900-1920 
 
Bureau Openbare Werken, Weltevreden413 Bureau of Public Works, Manila 414
 
 
J.E. de Meyier 1898-1901 James Wallace Beardsley 1905-1908 
 
H.P. Mensinga 1901-1905 James F. Case 1908-1909 
 
A.P. Melchior 1905-1908 Warwick Greene 1909- 1916 
 
W.B. van Goor 
 
1908-1911 E.J. Westerhouse 1916-1919 
J. Homan van der Heide 1911-1914 José Paez 1919-1924 
 
P.J. Ott de Vries 1914-1920  
 
 
 
                                                          
413 Ravesteijn, De zegenrijke heeren der wateren, 366. 
414 Halsema, E. J. Halsema, colonial engineer, 31, 49-50, 127; Olivia C. Caoili, A history of science and 
technology in the Philippines, Analysis of Conditions for National Scientific and Technological Self-Reliance: 
The Philippine Situation (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1986), 25. 
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C. Sites of interest 
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Sources 
 
For this study I have made use of primary sources made available at locations in the 
Netherlands and the United States. The internal communications of the American 
administration of the Philippines were found in the records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs 
kept at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The books and pamphlets relating to 
the engineering profession in the Netherlands Indies were found at the Koninklijk Instituut 
voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV; “Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian 
and Caribbean Studies”) in Leiden.  
I make extensive use of the publications of the engineering societies set up by the 
Dutch and American engineers in both countries and, in the case of the Netherlands Indies, in 
the colony. The annual reports by the directors of the Bureau Openbare Werken in 
Weltevreden and the Bureau of Public Works in Manila, as well as the Philippine 
Commission Reports to the Secretary of War in Washington, D.C. have also been consulted. 
The BPW’s Quarterly Bulletin is positioned in between these official memorandums and the 
publications of the engineering societies: as an effort to engage in what is now known as 
‘public relations’, it was published by a professional organization of engineers rather than a 
voluntary association. I studied these periodicals at the National Archives in Washington D.C 
(NA); the library of Yale University (YU); the Science, Industry and Business Library in New 
York City (SIBL); the Library Annex of Rutgers University on Busch Campus (RU); the 
Royal Library in The Hague (KB); the library of Leiden University (LU); and the digitized 
collections of Google Books (GB). The details of these publications are listed below. 
 
De waterstaats-ingenieur: orgaan der Vereeniging van Waterstaats-ingenieurs in 
Nederlandsch-Oost-Indië. Published every two months in Soerabaia by the Vereeniging van 
Waterstaats-ingenieurs in Nederlandsch-Oost-Indië between March 1913 and January 1916, 
thereafter published monthly. (LU) 
De ingenieur: orgaan der Vereeniging van Burgerlĳke Ingenieurs : weekblad gewĳd 
aan de techniek en de economie van openbare werken en nĳverheid . Founded in 1886 and 
published weekly by the Vereeniging van Delftsche/Burgerlĳk  Ingenieurs, from 1900 
onwards in collaboration with the Koninklijk Instituut van Ingenieurs. (LU) 
Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Instituut van Ingenieurs, Afdeeling Nederlandsch-Indië. 
Notulen der vergaderingen, verhandelingen, vertalingen, verscheidenheden, verslagen. 
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Published once a year between 1875 and 1914 by the KIvI engineers working in the 
Netherlands Indies, and contains the transcripts of their meetings alongside articles submitted 
by its members. (KB) 
De Indische Gids: staat- en letterkundig maandschrift. Monthly on economic, 
political, and literary issues pertaining to the colony. Published in Amsterdam from 1879 until 
1941. 
Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War. These reports were 
compiled on an annual basis between 1900 and 1916 by the offices of the government of the 
Philippines, and printed by the Government Printing Office of the United States. (GB) 
Quarterly Bulletin of the Bureau of Public Works Manila. First published on April 1st 
1912, this quarterly magazine was published under the direction of the Chief Engineer and the 
Director of the BPW until 1920, with a two issue interruption in the second half of 1919. 
(NA/SIBL/YU) 
Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers. Published in New York by 
the ASCE, the Transactions are compiled annually and contain items such as the addresses of 
the Society’s presidents at the yearly conventions and papers related to the engineering 
practice submitted by its members. (RU) 
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